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Preface
Although I write here about politics and inequality in India, both are
universal aspects of human society. As the form of political activity will
differ from one culture to another, so too will the way in which inequali-
ty is manifested in behavior and sanctified (or condemned) in ideology.
India has proven a fascinating place to look at the dialectics of political
interaction that occur within a traditional ideology of caste-which
legitimizes inequalities through a belief in the divine order of hier-
archy-and within the alternative ideology of equality, to which the na-
tional government has affirmed its commitment. The example of India
also permits us to examine the ways in which contradictions between
these two ideologies affect political behavior in a changing environment.
In many ways, a specialized study of any selected aspects of a culture
will present a distorted view, especially to those readers who may be un-
familiar with other parts of the whole. A generalized ethnographic ap-
proach would avoid this pitfall, in the main, although it rarely allows for
detailed study of any single activity system. Since politics deals with con-
flict over the allocation and control of things valued in society, an
ethnography of a political system will necessarily focus on what may ap-
pear as the more disruptive elements of the social fabric, ignoring areas
involving cooperation and direct concern for one's fellows. During the
course of three visits and two and a half years of living in India, I have
amply witnessed and been affected by this latter part of social life. The
lack of focus on cooperative activity here is no comment on the extent of
its existence within Indian society and culture.
This study has come about as a result of an evolution of personal in-
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terest and research that dates from the time I was an "occasional" stu-
dent at the University of London, when I concurrently met two people.
One introduced me to the rich culture of India and the other to the equal-
ly rich discipline of anthropology. My husband Jagdii'lh, and subsequent-
ly all members of my sasural, have imbued in me a respect and love for
things Indian, while at the same time they have not blinded me to what
they see as the shortcomings in their way of life. Doranne Jacobson has
shared with me her commitment to anthropology, knowledge of India,
and regard for the country. Additionally, Professors F. G. Bailey and
Adrian Mayer, at the School of Oriental and African Studies (London),
helped me gain a foundation of learning that I was able to build upon
subsequently at the University of Hawaii. Teachers and fellow students
here have provided a stimulating environment in which to carry on fur-
ther study. Specifically, I would like to acknowledge Jack Baumer, who
taught me Hindi, and Bob Harrison, Ben Kerkvliet, and Woody Watson,
for their concern and patience in helping me to formulate the dissertation
on which this book is based. Alice Dewey has been both mentor and
friend and a constant source of encouragement through the years.
My greatest debt is to those who supported and aided me during the
period of research in India. The Registrar at Banaras Hindu University
was kind enough to let me live in the Women's Hostel early in my stay,
and friends there facilitated my easy transition into Indian society. Pro-
fessor A. K. Narain, Ushaji, and their wonderful family were "my fami-
ly" in the city. Dr. C. P. Goel of Kashi Vidyapith University and
members of the Kashi Vidyapith Community Development Block head-
quarters helped in my search for a village to study. Professor S. K. Sriva-
stava of Banaras Hindu University recommended one of his most prom-
ising students, Sri C. B. Pandey, to be my assistant. It is to my coworker
and the people of Arunpur* that I am most in debt. Pandeyji was an in-
dispensible part of the research project, and the extent to which he must
have had to adapt himself to live with us I have only realized fully in re-
trospect. It is difficult to express true feelings of gratitude, beyond what
may appear as a perfunctory acknowledgment, to the people among
whom an anthropologist lives. Perhaps I need not try-shared, reciprocal
relationships in India do not demand a verbalized "thank you. "
Lynette Jagbandhansingha-Wageman, South Asia Specialist at the
University of Hawaii Library, stoically bore my frequent raids on her un-
catalogued PL 480 books and dealt with other demanding requests for
material. Jean Kennedy, another good friend, made the maps and dia-
grams, while Freda Hellinger typed from the original nightmare that was
*Pseudonyms are used for all villages and villagers named.
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this manuscript. Maud Nishimoto gave me time in which to write, and
Harry Lamley, formerly chairman of the publications committee for this
series, encouraged me to submit the work for publication. Many have
read and commented on parts of this study; the remarks of anonymous
(and not so anonymous) reviewers were among the most critical and the
most useful. I should also like to acknowledge financial support from the
an N.D.E.A. fellowship, Fulbright Predoctoral Research and N.S.F.
grants, and moral support from my mother and pihar.
I wish I could thank a long-suffering wife-one who aided unflinching-
ly in the collection of much of my data, carried out the daily concerns of
organizing households and family in the field and at home, and labori-
ously typed all the drafts of this much revised work. I unfortunately can-
not, and those who can should be truly grateful.
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MAP 1. Map of India, showing location of Banaras District in the state
of Uttar Pradesh. Based on map issued by the Registrar General and
Census Commissioner of India, 1971.
CHAPTER 1
Politics in Indian Village Society
I think, and people in the village think, that if you speak against a powerful
man you will get only trouble from him or anyone else against whom you
speak. Take my case, I didn't want to contest the election for village head
(pradhan) but Jai Singh stood against me. I was opposed to making the elec-
tion a contest and did not file any papers for it. But others in the village
went and filed my name. As most people supported me, I thought that if I
accepted the post I might lessen factionalism (partibandi) in our village. I
also knew that our village has spent some 50,000 to 60,000 rupees since 1960
or 1957 in court cases. For there was always competition that if someone did
something, the other would like to outdo him so that he didn't suffer
dishonor.-the Pradhan of Arunpur
The presence of powerful men, conflict, animosities, elections, dis-
putes leading to court cases, competition, and feelings of prestige are all
recognizable parts of political activity in an Indian village. The idealized
Metcalfian vision of villages as "little republics" that existed in harmony
and without conflict has been discarded by those who have studied any
aspect of political activity in rural India. I Another view has appeared in
its place, in which the "language" of traditional (i.e., village) politics is
articulated through caste and comes increasingly into conflict with the
language of modem politics spoken through the idiom of "policies and
interests, programmes and plans" (Morris-Jones 1964:53; also 48ft).
When, more than a decade ago, Morris-Jones wrote his provocative
essay outlining India's political idioms, he attributed great significance
to the work of anthropologists in charting the unknown terrain labeled
"Indian politics." "For they," he stated, "have to follow caste as a
social institution wherever it may lead them, and it has led them firmly
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into politics" (1964:65; first appearing in 1963). The anthropological in-
sight that the relation between society and politics in non-Western and
predominantly rural societies will be different from what we are led to
expect from the Western experience has considerably advanced our
understanding of the Indian scene. Yet because the many different
aspects of social life are so intermeshed in rural society, it is difficult even
for anthropologists to identify analytically what is political. A primary
concern with the social organization of Indian society has led them to ap-
proach politics mainly through a study of the caste system and to explore
political activity to the extent that it reveals something of that institution.
This focus has produced a considerable body of research dealing with
factionalism. A small but growing number of studies also look at conflict
from the perspective of intercaste or specifically class relations. 2
Given the importance of a political idiom that has its roots in com-
munities comprising some eighty percent of the total population, it is
surprising that no comprehensive political ethnography of any village
exists. Anthropologists have not yet done for politics what has been so
aptly done for caste, that is, follow it where it may lead. This study, in
presenting such an ethnography, attempts to fill the gap. It concentrates
solely on political activity as an essential part of all Indian behavior (as it
is of all human behavior) and follows that activIty into whatever areas of
village life it permeates. ~ates_to_decisioD!,abol!1Jhe_
,allocation of~ce and valued~nJlc.ontroLQyeunen(Easton
1959:226f.The essence of politics is conflict-conflict over the attenm1!Q
gain c()ntLQLof thes~ resources, to influence behaviodn.a.certain direc-
'ti5n;-a.~d ...to-acqUiJ;orexerci~.-l?ower' (M'ark and Snyder 1957:2i8).
WheIlconflict is so broadIy'defined,much of human behavior may be re-
garded as political.
This study focuses on political activity in that wider sphere which af-
fects most community members and then delimits the boundaries of what
may be considered the political system of a villagewide "arena," the so-
cial and cultural environment within which such activity takes place. It
points out the ways in which the boundaries of the villagewide arena
become fluid and extend outward. An arena contains several fields of ac-
tion composed of the actors who are directly involved in the processes
being studied (Bailey 1963b:224-226; Swartz 1968:6ft). Such fields repre-
sent different cleavages that cut across village society and organize the
arena.
Arenas are also organizedb~Which define ~~lltable..waY§..Q.L
getting things done ancUmPose some kind of limits on possible_action.
They prescribe who makes decisions,-how'decisionsare 'm;de, an,Cthe
way in which conflict over such decisions is resolved. The rules also
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disclose the objects of value in a society (its resources) for which people
compete. Knowing these rules permits identification of participants and
their respective sides and this, in turn, reveals the boundaries oLthe
-political arena. As the case material will illustrate, however, there is an
area of discretion and choice where actors can manipulate the means to
acliieveuieir ends withinthese limits. Wh1Iefhell.iIes orgaiiizetheactivi~
ty-oI"poHifcians" and poliflCafgroiipS, the cleavages orient the latter to
one another and define the extent of political activity (Bailey 1960:11, 13,
251; 1963b:223-224; Gamson 1961:374; Mark and Snyder 1957:217;
Nicholas 1968a:246).
The field data upon which the research is based are presented as a
series of case histories that deal with three major questions integral to a
political ethnography. First, is it analytically possible to distinguish be-
tween the political activity that pervades all human behavior and that
which may Deconfinejl to the designated arena under observation, in this
case the villageWide political system? Second, can the designated political
arena be circumscribed, and what are the points at which it becomes in-
volved in na;orksof relationships that extend beyond the arena boun-
daries? Third, what are the rules for this particular arena relating to who
-makes decisions about resource allocation, how these decisions are
made, and how conflict is resolved?
POLmcs IN ARUNPUR
It is known that conflict within a caste and among castes occurs in rural
society. To find out how this political activity is organized and whether
other cleavages may be present, I carried out fieldwork in Arunpur, a
village in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh. Arunpur is eight miles
from the urban center of Banaras, within a district of. the same name
(Map 2). Its population of 1,047 people, divided into sixteen castes, is big
enough to reveal the many different levels at which politics works in
village life. The numerically large and traditionally dominant landown-
ing caste of Bhumihars (see Table 1) is divided into two main factions.
These are coalitions of powerful Bhumihars known as the village "big
men." Faction leaders seek to gain the support of other villagers by using
a diversity of ties to attract them to their side. The village also has a large
group of Untouchable Chamars, traditionally leatherworkers, who pro-
vide the Bhumihars with cheap agricultural labor. 3 They are mostly
illiterate and poverty stricken, but rising consciousness of a unity of in-
terests has brought them into conflict with their masters on several occa-
sions. Between these two extremes of the caste hierarchy lie a number of
other castes, of which the agricultural Kurmis are politically and eco-
nomically the most important.
6 POLITICS IN INDIAN VILLAGE SOCIETY
Factionalism within a dominant caste or group of closely allied castes,
which runs vertically through the village, is the traditional and still pre-
dominant form of political activity in rural India (Nicholas 1968a:278).
Arunpur proved no exception to this rule. Most competition and the ef-
fective allocation of resources are determined by decisions of the two
coalitions of powerful Bhumihar big men, each with their respective
bands of followers and general supporters. Given the small, face-to-face
nature of a village community and the high degree of interdependence
among its members, few villagers could remain aloof or unaffected by
factional politics.
In contrast to factionalism, which involves most of the inhabitants, it
was found that Arunpur also contains a horizontal cleavage between the
Table I. Caste Hierarchy in Arunpur
Caste Traditional Occupation Varnaa
Brahman Priest Brahman
Bhumihar Brahman Cultivating "priest" "
2b Agrawal Merchant Vaishya
3 (A) Kurmi (Kunbi) Cultivator Shudra
3 (B) 0 Kahar Waterbearer, fisherman "
Lohar Blacksmith "
Kevat Fisherman, cultivator "
Parihar ? "
Nai Barber "
Kohar (Kumhar) Potter "
Kalwar Distiller "
Noniya Saltpeter worker and
earthworker "
Teli Oil presser "
4d Pasi Pig raiser, toddy tapper Untouchable
Chamar Leatherworker "
Musahar Wood collector "
Dharkar Basket weaver "
a Arunpur has no caste considered to be in the kshatriya varna.
bOnly the ex-zamindar belonged to this caste. He is not considered a village resident.
oThere was great variability in the way that villagers ranked castes according to cards listing names of
castes individually. This order represents the ranking most often mentioned. Villagers distinguish be-
tween two major categories of caste: high caste (unchjat) and low caste (nichjat). Those in categories 3
and 4 are considered low caste. The Indian government regards castes in category 3, along with the
"Scheduled Castes" of category 4. as belonging to the "Backward Classes" and therefore eligible for
certain preferential treatment (Beteille 1969b:l0Sff). Some social scientists regard category 3 as
representing the "middle" castes.
d The category of Untouchable is usually considered outside the fourfold varna classification.
r
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landed, upper-caste Bhumihars and their landless, Chamar agricultural
laborers. The nature of this cleavage makes it more amenable to analysis
in terms of class. This cleavage has become exacerbated because the Cha-
mars have not effectively participated in the economic and political mo-
bility which has characterized much of Indian society as a whole and
which is exemplified by the achievements of the Kurmi caste locally.
if Factionalism, representing a primary cleavage within the dominant
caste that has spread vertically to encompass other villagers, is intimately
related to the horizontal cleavage which occurs between castes acting as
corporate classes. Two major conditions affect the relationship between
factions and class conflict in the village arena. First, the existence of fac-
tions within the Chamar caste that are connected to those among the
Bhumihars has a limiting effect on the solidarity of the Untouchables in
relation to their superordinates. Second, the frequency of class conflict
has a decided effect upon the nature of factionalism within the dominant
caste because it forces the two factions to close ranks before a common
opponent.
V' Competition for water from the government tubewell is a special fac-
tor that enters the arena of villagewide conflict. The peculiar feature of
this resource, when compared with other government aid or land, for ex-
ample, is that it is always available and yet perennially scarce. Water is
supplied almost daily from the tubewell, but the supply can never ade-
quately fulfill the demand (especially in the peak seasons of irrigating
potatoes and rice). This means that there is constant rivalry for this com-
modity. As such, the conflict for water involves not only the vertical and
horizontal cleavages mentioned earlier, but also spreads out to involve
villagers along other lines of dissension-between the two Bhumihar
puras (settlements), among factionally aligned and neutral villagers, and
among men who are considered as belonging to the same faction. Much
of the competition for water takes place among individuals who happen
to require this commodity at the same time and is not encompassed by
the two main types of conflict.
THE DIALECTIC
Defining the presence of both factional conflict within a dominant caste
and class conflict between castes does not fit in easily with prevailing
views about the nature of Indian village politics. A major theoretical
assumption of many anthropological studies has been that political activ-
ity must be subsumed under, encompassed by, and articulated through
the major social institution of caste. Caste is the arena within which all
political activity takes place, and caste society is regarded as antithetical
POLITICS IN INDIAN VILLAGE SOCIETY 9
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to (and not allowing for) the existence of classes. Such studies assume
that for classes to appear, castes must disappear. A caste society must
somehow be transformed into a class society. This interpretation has
come about through a particular view of caste as an ideological system
and a particular view of the roles of dominance and factions in the
system.
Most studies on village politics argue that caste society does not allow
for conflict between castes. Castes are regarded as mutually interdepen-
dent groups which cooperate and do not compete in the ideal view of the
system (Bailey 1963a:121; Leach 1960:7; cf. Srinivas 1962; Beteille
1969a). It is recognized, however, that in reality the system is held
together not so much by ties of reciprocity as by the concentration of
force and coercive sanctions in the hands of a dominant caste (Bailey
1960:258; 1963a:ll0; Rudolph 1961:386).
Srinivas has emphasized the need to distinguish between ritual status
based on ideology and the distribution of wealth and power in Indian
villages with his concept of the "dominant caste." A dominant caste is
one that predominates numerically over other castes and also wields
predominant economic and political power. "A larger and powerful
caste group can also be more easily dominant if its position in the local
hierarchy is not too low" (Srinivas 1955:18). The criterion of Western
education was added later, as it "is the means by which such dominance
is acquired" (Srinivas 1959:1). Dominance implies the replication of the
royal kshatriya function on a much smaller (Le., village) basis. Its mai
characteristics can be summarized as: (1) relatively eminent right over
land, (2) the resulting power to grant land and employ members of other
castes, (3) the power to dispense justice, (4) the general monopoly of
authority, and (5) the tendency to claim royal caste status (Dumont
1972:207).4 The concept is particularly suited to the political structure of
the Banaras region, where, since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
the basic jural unit was the "little kingdom," with the dominant caste
controlling all beneath it (Cohn 1959:81).
Although few anthropologists would deny that even in the tradition
situation competition and conflict have always been present, they ac-
commodate such activity within the rules of the system by confining
political competition to the dominant caste (e.g., Bailey 1960:169; Du-
mont 1972:348; Leach 1960; Yalman 1960)' and by noting the con-
gruence between caste, class, and power (Bailey 1963a; Beteille 1965;
1969b:57ff). Competition confined within the dominant caste produces
cleavages that are characteristic of factions. They represent a vertical
breach in the village, and members of all castes may be found in one
camp or another. "Cooperative relationships run up and down between
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families in the dominant caste and families in the service castes" (Bailey
1963a:118; also Elliott 1970:134). There is no single principle by which
faction personnel are recruited, and leaders make use of many different
ties to gain supporters. Factional conflict takes place between structural-
ly equivalent bodies with no specified criteria for inclusion or exclusion,
while conflict between classes (discussed later) takes place between social
strata characterized by superordinate-subordinate relations (Boissevain
1968:551).
~ce...the~~~<!n!p-etition along factional lines within
~gle caste is extended to othersastes onlLb-~~mseof th~need tOgain
,supporters. This reinforces the defiiiitiOfi of ca~tesaS "non-antag-
ollistic'~rata in a social system (Beteille 1969a), and much of the liter-
ature on rural politics in India is devoted to this phenomenon.
Opposed to the interdependence of castes is the conflict associated
with classes. While there is no unanimity on exactly what constitutes a
(C1aSS'(cf. Dahrendorf 1959:237-238; Lenski 1966:74-75; Lenin 1971:231;
\ ~rlI963:124; Weber 1966:2lff; see also discussions in Alavi 1973:25ff;
.Beteille 1974b:73-93; Lipset 1968), it is regarded essentially as an ag-
gregate of persons..wh.Q.occupy the same positi~!atiO!LtoJhe,_'E:eans ::>
an~ganization of production. They share a specific causal component
of life chances ana commoIf"economic conditions (Bendix and Lipset
1966:7; Weber 1966:21). Like factions, classes never exist on their own
but are encountered in the plural. Beyond this, however, it must be seen
that ultimately, "classes ar~_po1itical groups unit~Y-a...commQ!!-.in­
.~st. The struggle between two classes is a political struggle" (Dahren-
dorf 1959:16). Differential position in an authoritutructure and_proper-
ty form the bases~ahr~:13ft). Incontrastto castes,
'the~~re.iiiarK§cfQy-a CQ..nflict.of-interests_al1~allin~S_Of
c~eavag~J.~!1l1S of super~~~Eat.~~.and_s!J!>-,)!"~jnat~.----ociety has
been--cIiaracteri~ and. unchanging~ety w~
inequalities are legitimized through an ideology of Illerarchy. A_~
society, on the other hand, is marked by instability an~J)g!:ulue-to
divergence between actua!.J!1.t~ests and prevailing_ideology (Beteille
1972; 1974a:fiOff;T94ft).----------- ~--'
Though strikingly parallel to the modernity-tradition model that has
sparked a long debate, it is equally striking that, with the major excep-
tion of Beteille's writings, this dichotomy has not been theoretically ex-
amined. Similarly, while considerable attention has been paid to the
presence of caste outside of India, barely any serious thought has been
given to the suitability of the term "class" within Indian society.6 Fac-
tionalism has been so defined that it is recognized as an integral part of
every society, group, and organization, but the utility of a similar ap-
proach to a definition of class has not been treated.
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There is, however, an alternative approach to this "either-or" division
into caste and class societies with their a priori categorization of the
nature of political activity. Anthropologists have long acknowledged
that all people do not structure their world in the same way and that the
categories of one culture may not necessarily be applicable to another. It
is not that groups similar to our own may not be present in Indian socie-
ty, "but rather that they are not defined in the same way" (Nicholas
1973:153). This seems to be particularly true for the notion of class and
the role of class conflict in Indian politics. Thus, a starting point lies with
an examination of the cultural categories for relationships indicative not
of caste but of what we mean by class. Thorner proposed looking at the
agrarian system of rural India in terms used by the people themselves. He
specified malik (master), kisan (peasant) and mazdur (laborer) as repre-
senting important divisions within the agricultural population (1956:4-
6). Eight years later, Pocock referred to the existence of indigenous terms
relating to different kinds of relationships between landowner and labor-
er to support his argument that jajmani (the ritualized exchange of eco-
nomic services) may not represent a single system of relations (1962:88;
also Harper 1968; see later, pp. 71ft).
Beteille has advocated the need to study the dialectic between ideas and
interests in Indian society in terms of those relationships centering
around the ownership of land for which native categories exist (l974a:43,
117ff,126).7 He remarks pointedly that although Marx conceived of class
and class conflicts in terms of property relations, it is strange that the
concept has not been applied in those very societies in which ownership
of land is preeminent (1974a:53). Two other original essays employ the
concept of class to analyze the bhadra/ok-chhot%k ("gentlemen"-
"lowly people") dichotomy in the social and political development of
nineteenth-century and present-day Bengal (Mukherjee 1970; Sinha and
Bhattacharya 1969).
The argument of this work is, therefore, that the scholarly study of
village politics has been inhibited by the scholarly study of caste. The
ideology of caste is remarkable in the extent to which it has successfully
enforcea and immobiHzed an existin system of class relations and
gr e a legitimizing status to all t)'P.es of ine9...ualities in society. It has
'liKewIse been remarkable in the degree to which it has masked the ex-
tremely differin socioeconomic interests of roups and made them less
amena e to study. "The mask is not always consciously worn but it is
"fOr tbat reason no less there" (Beteille 1974b:l04). This study will in-
vestigate the ways in which participants themselves structure their per-
ceptions about political activity and examine the extent to which certain
relationships may be indicative of class.
The study of class relations is located primarily within the structure of
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landownership in India, and the political activity of classes does not
necessarily depend upon the presence of organized conflict on a national
scale or on a unified class consciousness. Such strict prerequisites entail
the danger of possibly defining classes "out of existence" (Beteille
1974a:52-53).· Alavi has reasoned convincingly that "the complex me-
diations of the processes by which class solidarity is established and
manifested, escapes the attention of those Marxists who focus exclusively
on drama:tic demonstrations of class solidarity of peasants in revolu-
tionary action" (1973:59), and this may prove to be the most crucial
aspect ofthe study of class (also Beteille 1974a:141; Terray 1975:92).
The concentration on a case in which a local group is in the process of
class formation reveals the way in which class is becoming a more impor-
tant variable in Indian political conflict. Because of the presence of com-
yeting ideologies, along with other changes in society, the legitimacy of
V caste (and its relations of dominance and subordination) as an accepted
code for all behavior has been undermined. The strength that it still has
in ordering actual relations, however, has not been undermined.
Villagers increasingly have become aware of the existence of two dif-
ferent systems of social relations, one pertaining to the village and the
other to that which derives its strength and legitimacy from the world
outside (see below, pp. 61ft). Only when the many ways in which people
divide up their social universe are understood may the dialectic between
ideas and interests be seen.
FIELDWORK AND THE COLLECTION OF DATA
It is a truism that the findings of a study can be no better than the data
upon which it is based. Yet all too often, this principle is forgotten and
information about the actual collection of research material is relegated
to a secondary position. It is possible that someone else looking at the
political activity of Arunpur may come to different conclusions than
those presented here. I feel, however, that a clear statement of the way in
which fieldwork was conducted and the problems that were faced would
go far to explain such possible differences.
There are four important points to be considered in the evaluation of
the data. These are: (1) the role which I assumed as a fieldworker, (2) the
methods used to collect data, (3) the nature of information obtained
when the major mode of organizing political action is factionalism, and
(4) the involvement of me and my associates in village politics.
The very first appearance of an anthropologist at the research site
often provides the strongest, if not most lasting, impression. I entered
Arunpur in a jeep one day, accompanied by a driver, a professor from a
Banaras college, a minor official from the local Community Develop-
...
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ment office, one of the most important local political figures from a
neighboring village, and the pradhan (elected village head) of Arunpur. I
was wearing a sari and a short, sleeveless blouse. Much, much later,
villagers confided that it was rumored that a film actress had come to
shoot some scenes in Arunpur (because I was of "fair" complexion, as
are the film stars). Some also thought that I was a dancing girl cum pros-
titute (randi) because I first came at the height of the marriage season in
May. Who else but a randi would wear a sleeveless blouse in the village
(and I never wore one again)!
The most crucial liabilities, over which I had no control and which
determined much of my subsequent role, were that I was a woman, a
Westerner, and married to a Brahman. Sitting and talking with men in a
highly sex-segregated society, where wealthy and high-caste women
(whose status I was later accorded) are in "seclusion" (purdah), was
regarded as an unacceptable form of behavior by some villagers through-
out my stay. I also had to dispel many of the preconceived notions of
what a mem sahib was like, gleaned mostly from Western films, by
scrupulous attention to modesty and decorum; this included wearing a
sari as well as controlling all other aspects of my physical and verbal
behavior.
With a few men, in addition, I also had to take the role of a passive
member of the group and let my assistant do most of the talking, while I
spoke only when I had a specific question. To some extent (so I like to
believe), my personality as it was perceived by those among whom I lived
went far to overcome these liabilities. The addition of my husband's
mother to our household, some six weeks after our arrival in the village,
gave me an added respectability and put an end to gossip about my actual
relationship to my husband and assistant.
Once I had established some sort of place for myself as an accepted;
albeit outside and temporary, visitor in the village, much depended upon
the methods we used to collect material. The standard anthropological
technique of participant-observation was most often employed. This
meant sitting with, watching, and listening to others and participating in
informal talks and interviews as a part of our daily routine.
Most of the information on politics I gained by talking with village
men, especially those who were leaders of the two factions, their kins-
men, and other people who actively supported one side or the other. The
Chamars were most willing to tell us of their miserable conditions in the
hope that we might be able to do something for them. More intimate
details of their relations to the Bhumihars, however, came primarily
from younger men and from those known to belong to the anti-Bhumi-
har faction of their pura. In addition, we spoke to many other men of
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neighboring villages and often visited these places. We also had extensive
contact with minor government officials that included the Village Level
Worker in the Community Development Program, the Seed-Store In-
spector and, to some extent, the Block Development Officer and his en-
tourage.
We gained little knowledge of village politics from the women, for that
was not their major concern. Yet I found that as the work progressed,
more and more of my time was being spent in their company, while my
assistant stayed with the men. There are two reasons for this. First,
women became less shy and more insistent that I come into their homes
as I became a familiar part of the village scene. Second, the more I came
to understand their culture, the more acutely I began to feel that my
behavior in sitting and talking with men was anomalous. I had to come
to terms with this feeling for the duration of my stay so that fieldwork
could be continued. The tendency (if not the necessity) to slip into social-
ly accepted sexual roles is most seductive in a highly sex-segregated soci-
ety like India.
A detailed census of all households was taken in the early weeks of
fieldwork. This was later supplemented by genealogies of important
Bhumihar and Kurmi families. A socioeconomic interview schedule was
also prepared for all heads of households, and it contained a number of
questions relating to opinions on political affairs. There were also
lengthy, more standardized interviews with a number of men conversant
.in village affairs, from Arunpur and neighboring villages, regarding the
different panchayats (local councils) and the changes that Local Self-
Government has made. It was possible to collect on-the-spot information
about a number of disputes which occurred while we were in the field.
The case history method was used extensively for organizing the data.
The material fell conveniently into rather discrete, albeit interrelated,
dispute events because political activity relates to conflicts over specific
decisions. All the scattered references pertaining to a specific encounter
were put together and the event was coherently described in the form of a
case history. I also attempted to give a processual view of each dispute,
as far as knowledge regarding it permitted, so that the course of the event
through time would be understood. Many of the events described refer to
conflicts which took place in the past and about which the villagers could
speak with relatively greater freedom. Yet the picture remains necessarily
incomplete and sketchy, while also subject to the biases outlined below.
The texts of the cases also incorporate those interpretations or items of
information that are greatly disparate and are significant to understand-
ing the event under consideration.
Besides the particular drawbacks of being a Western mem sahib that
....
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hampered my own work, any fieldworker who seeks to collect informa-
tion about politics in an arena organized mainly by factions is put in a
difficult situation. I realized beforehand the importance of remaining
both neutral and discreet if the information we desired was to be ob-
tained, and I sought to enlist the understanding of my assistant and my
husband in this matter. Although the latter did not actively take part in
fieldwork and was not often in the village (our house being somewhat
apart), many men would come to visit him and he had several good
friends among them.
It soon became clear that the political situation was a delicate one.
Factionalism requires fierce loyalty (even if only temporary) to one's V
leader; hence, any divulgence of information is also treated as a personal
matter. The only people with whom one speaks of such things candidly
are the members of the same faction. Since we attempted to remain
neutral, we were suspected by both of being loyal to the opposing side.
This was highlighted by the villagers' much more open talk of their in-
volvement in the midterm local election that took place during our stay
and was not greatly influenced by factional considerations.
Much of the information gathered about factional politics was from
the extreme gossip, frequently quite malicious, that one side told about
the other. It is, of course, difficult to assess the reliability of such data,
and I often questioned whether I was learning anything at all of the true
situation in the village. A few features, however, saved me from aban-
doning hope altogether. There was usually some basic agreement be-
tween the version each faction gave of a certain situation. The major dif-
ference was their moral assessment of who was in the wrong. In addition,
on rare occasions one faction would substantiate a particular interpreta-
tion given by the other side. Finally, the information given by people
who were either known to be neutral or from outside the village, and
hence uninvolved, was taken to be fairly reliable.
Knowledge about the Chamars' situation came from two major
sources. The Bhumihars who employed them as laborers told us about
the conditions of their work. This was double-checked by eliciting the
same information from the Chamars. The events which took place dur-
ing our stay in the village were also corroborated by our own observa-
tions and discussions with others. But by far the major bulk of the infor-
mation regarding their plight was obtained from the Chamars themselves
in a serIes of "secret" meetings arranged for that purpose. Chapter 8
discusses this further.
We had to be known as neutral and trustworthy people before anyone
would talk to us of these controversial affairs; we could not divulge any
confidences. I was strongly committed to this approach and was even-
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tually regarded as being either neutral or insignificant. My husband and
assistant, however, each became closely associated with opposing sides
and I am not sure of the success we had later in attempting to counter-
balance this situation.
The role of my assistant was more crucial, for he was intimately in-
volved in the fieldwork situation and I had to depend on him for the
material he gathered independently as well as for aid in translations and
interpretations of events. I soon became aware of the discrepancies of
some of his translations and even general interpretations, since I had a
fair command of Hindi. His own attachments, personality, and feelings
also affected the information he passed on to me, although he was con-
versant with the requirement of objectivity in research. He became closer
to the faction which opposed the Pradhan, perhaps partly because of the
competition he felt from the latter's highly educated kinsmen. Most of
the opposing faction's leaders and key members are educated only up to
the primary or intermediate levels. My highly educated (M.A. in sociolo-
gy) assistant felt that they gave more respect to his learning. In addition,
they seemed to have a greater appreciation for his status as a non-
Bhumihar Brahman.
A similar course of involvement followed with the Chamars. I tried to
overcome the usual high-caste bias that so easily slips into fieldwork,
especially since all groups in the village were affected by political activity.
My assistant, a pakka (' 'pure' ') Brahman and staunch believer in the
ideology of the right-wing Jan Sangh political party, had great difficulty
in interviewing the Chamars at first. However, after we agreed that it was
necessary to sit and speak with them because part of my fieldwork
depended upon doing this, he soon switched into the role of a leader.
From that time until he left Arunpur, his role became that of a young,
educated Brahman concerned with the welfare of poor Untouchables.
Although I feared possible reprisals from upper-caste village people,
especially the Bhumihars upon whom our successful stay in the village
ultimately depended, he continued his association with the Chamars.
This created a potentially explosive situation (see Chapter 8). It was only
after his departure, when some high-caste villagers commented about
their feelings toward him and his interference, that I could assess how
much he had become involved. It may be that the situation of conflict
between the Bhumihars and Chamars was latent, but our arrival on the
scene and my assistant certainly added to it in such a way that the cleav-
age and alignment of personnel were clearly revealed. It is also possible
that our very presence produced some conflict that might otherwise not
have occurred.
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I. That the vision is still not without a certain allure may be seem from such works
as Ishwaran (1966) and Beals and Siegel (1966: especially p. 158). Cohn stresses
that it is one of the main sources for the "tendency in the study of Indian fac-
tionalism, and for that matter of all forms of conflict, to view these situations as
abnormal or bad" (1965:96).
2. On factions, see, for example, Beals and Siegel (1966); Siegel and Beals (1960a;
1960b); Lewis (1958); Singh (1961); Nicholas (1965; 1966; 1968a; 1968b); Firth
(1957); Yadava (1968). On intercaste or class conflict, see, for example, Bailey
(1957; 1960); Beteille (1965); Caplan (1972); Gough (1960; 1970; 1973); Nicholas
(1968a); Shepperdson (1969); Sivertsen (1963); Srinivas (1962). The interests of
political scientists lay more in the direction of analyzing the formal politics of
panchayati raj (Local Self-Government) institutions and elections.
3. The percentage of Chamars in Arunpur, 24 percent, is somewhat larger than
their numerical strength in the state and district-about 18 percent-while the
total for all Scheduled Castes and Tribes (the latter quite small) is 21 percent for
these levels. Chamars thus constitute the overwhelming majority of this cate-
gory. Further, the tehsi/subdivision of which the village is a part contains 40 per-
cent of the district's total number of Scheduled Castes (Government of India
1965).
4. Srinivas has been criticized on several points relating to his concept, specifically
on the necessity for a caste to be numerically dominant in order to dominate in
general (see, e.g., Dumont 1972:206; Mayer 1958:425). The dominant caste need
not always be a majority (either the largest single caste or larger than the rest put
together). Nor is the same dominant caste present in all villages in a given locale.
The Bhumihars are clearly dominant in Arunpur, but in a neighboring village,
where there are no Bhumihars and practically the entire population is of the Kur-
mi caste, a different situation prevails. There are two dominant castes within the
wider Banaras region, the Bhumihars and the Rajput Thakurs. The identifica-
tion of a dominant caste is thus a function of the level that is being studied; the
village, multivillage, or regional areas (Mayer 1958; Beteille 1969a:2l).
Nicholas discusses the presence of more than one dominant caste in a village
(1968a:273), while Gardner analyzes differing referents for the term (1968).
Miller has a good summary of these and other positions (1975:105fO. Such
criticisms not withstanding, the concept remains singularly useful for the study
of Indian village politics. Furthermore, no theoretical discussion of caste and
politics exists which does not employ this concept in some way.
5. For detailed criticisms of Leach's position, see Bailey (1960:258; 1963a:llO,
117-118), and Beteille (1969a:21).
6. Some anthropologists have examined class in other precapitalist societies. See
Terray (1975) and his bibliography.
7. Just how strong the pull of ideas is, even for those interested in examining class
relations in India, can be seen from Beteille's own writings. At one point he ques-
tions the "relevance of native categories such as caste as compared with general
analytical concepts like class; or to put it a different way, the use of mechanical
as opposed to statistical models" (1974a:35). In a later essay, however, he does
mention certain native categories which may be regarded "provisionally" as be-
ing of the class type (1974jl:126). Mencher, whose major interest is the study of
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class relations in South India, muddIes an otherwise cogent discussion of a view
of the caste system from the bottom. Although she refers to numerous revolts
and conflicts between landlords and lower castes, she maintains that the caste
system prevented "the formation of social classes with any commonality of in-
terest or unity of purpose" (1974a:469). It is difficult to understand what were
the bases for organizing such conflict, then, in lieu of common interests and
goals for different groups, even though the conflict may have been localized and
short-lived.
8. Marx's observations on the French peasantry led him to conclude:
In this way the great mass of the French nation is formed by simple additions
of homologous magnitude, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of pota-
toes. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of exis-
tence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from
those of the other classes, and put them in a hostile opposition to the latter,
they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among
these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no
community, no national bond and no political organization among them,
they do not forma class. (1963:124)
-CHAPTER 2
The Village of Arunpur
Anthropologists make a conscious decision when they choose a par-
ticular village and are also influenced by factors beyond their control. In
my own case, I tried to locate a village which met certain criteria that
seemed relevant to the topic chosen for study. I had decided beforehand
to work near the ancient and holy city of Banaras. This particular area
was chosen for personal reasons, not the least of which was the presence
of friends and facilities which could provide invaluable help. I learned of
the great difference between the standard Hindi I had studied and the
dialect spoken here-Bhojpuri-only after reaching Banaras. Many
village men were bilingual in both Hindi and Bhojpuri, but I always ex-
perienced difficulty communicating with and understanding most of the
women, who spoke only the dialect.
The Bhojpuri area, from eastern Uttar Pradesh through western Bi-
har, forms a cultural region where the people are united by a dialect and
the existence of certain caste groups and customs that are common to all
(see Schwartzberg 1968). The region is one of the most densely populated
in India and is considered economically and socially backward. This
position is epitomized by the city of Banaras, which seems to cater more
for the needs of the soul than the body, and strongly influences life in the
surrounding countryside. At the same time, the trend in modern India is
toward an increasing communication and mobility between urban and
rural centers, via the transit and transistor revolution. 1 I felt that the
kinds of changes that are taking place in the political arenas of com-
munities near an urban center are those that will most likely come to af-
fect the more than half a million villages of India.
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Besides location near an urban center, I had several other criteria for
choice of a site. There should be a population of at least seven hundred
and fifty persons, to ensure the existence of a sufficiently large and active
political arena to be reasonably studied in a year; both traditional and
statutory panchayats (councils); contact with government development
programs that provide new resources requiring distribution; and a pri-
mary reliance on agriculture for subsistence (since this is true of prac-
tically all Indian villages).
Three more criteria were added after I began to look for a village.
First, one of the two major landowning and traditionally administrative
castes in the area should be represented. These are either Rajputs or
Bhumihars and they are usually mutually exclusive in a given village. The
Bhumihars predominate in the region around Banaras by virtue of the
fact that the maharajas of this ex-princely state had belonged to this
caste. Second, the village should also have at least a dozen or more dif-
ferent castes so that intercaste as well as intracaste conflict might be
observed. Finally, the "people" (usually meaning the elected head of the
village or any other influential men through whom initial contact was
made) would have to welcome my intrusion and be able to suggest some
accommodation for me.
The criterion of religion was conspicuously absent, for I was unaware
at the time of its importance in the Banaras region. India is predomi-
nantly Hindu, but in certain areas other religious groups are present in
significant numbers: Christians, Jains, Zoroastrians (parsis), "neo~Bud­
dhists" (among Untouchables), tribal religious groups, and, of course,
Muslims. The 1961 Government of India Census lists Muslims as consti-
tuting 10 percent of the people in Banaras District. Many villages around
Arunpur had varying proportions of Muslim inhabitants. The study of
religious conflict, in addition to and intertwining with that of caste and
class conflict in the political arena, would have greatly enhanced the con-
tent of this work.
The notes of my diary reveal that the search for a village was com-
plicated by other unforeseen problems, primarily those of heat, exhaus-
tion, frustration, and lack of transportation. A crucial factor affecting
my ultimate choice seems to have been the necessity to depend upon
others at all stages of locating a village. I had to consider their views,
from the initial process of becoming familiar with the general area to the
final ones of deciding which villages could be visited and which would be
most suitable.
Having now described my odyssey, let me now turn to the place where
the journey ended.
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LoCALE OF ARUNPUR
My search ended some eight miles west of Banaras, along the ancient
Grand Trunk Road. A dirt path leads from there for half a mile, crosses
the railroad tracks, and ends in the main settlement (pura) of Arunpur
(see Map 3). The railroad station, small market of Dallia, boys' and girls'
primary schools, and the Intercollege are all on the main road and are
easily accessible from the village. Tea stalls and betel stands are located
just across from the Intercollege, as is the huge enclosed mansion of the
ex-zamindar (landlord) of Arunpur. He is considered the main benefac-
tor, since he donated most of the land for the school. The Intercollege
and ex-zamindar's house have electricity, and the latter has the only
telephone in the area. The only electricity Arunpur has is generated by a
single private pumping set. Other substantial stone buildings are in-
terspersed with temporary and mobile stalls all along the Grand Trunk
Road which provide many goods and services (haircut and shave, cycle
repair, school supplies, betel, cigarettes and ganjha-cannabis sativa).
Arunpur is surrounded by eight villages and has relations with all on
the basis of kinship, marriage ties, services rendered and received, friend-
ship, disputes, and through participation in the "big men" panchayat.
An appreciation of the location of the village would not be complete
without reference to its proximity to Banaras. This makes it what Somjee
has termed a "peri-urban" community (1964). Village men work in the
city, daily cycling the eight miles back and forth with ease, and students
attend its university and other institutions of learning. People go to
Banaras on business, to use the courts, shop, meet with relatives and
friends, see films or enjoy other forms of amusement, and take a dip in
the holy Ganges. They go by cycle, rickshaw, bus, car, train, bullock.
cart, or on foot.
Villagers know about the activities of the city and are able to expand
their world by reading the local Hindi daily paper (Aj) or anyone of the
national papers and magazines. Like the area around Baroda studied by
Dr. Somjee's students (1964:2), people here are threatened with the pro-
posed expansion of the Banaras municipal limits and feel that their land
may eventually be taken away (Aj 8/25/68:7-9). Though Arunpur looks
like any other village in the region, it is exposed to much greater informa-
tion and influence from outside communications. This increased in-
formation has widened the political arena of the village and presented
new possible alternatives for action. Despite this, there are many areas of
life which seem to be hardly affected by these changes. This specifically
relates to the family, kinship, and the position of women (see Chapter 4). ~
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Brahman 48 10 48 4.6 10 4.8
Bhumihar 218 19 64 6 282 27.0 25 11.2
Kurmi 87 10 35 6 74 9 196 18.7 25 7.8
Kabar 12 2 25 3 37 3.5 5 7.4
Lohar 33 5 33 3.2 5 6.6
Kevat 3 I 3 .03 I 4.0 b
Parihar 13 3 13 1.2 3 4.3
Nai 17 3 17 1.6 3 5.6
Kohar 24 3 24 2.3 3 8.0
Kalwar 29 2 29 2.8 2 14.5
Noniya 20 3 20 2.0 3 6.6
Teli 48 6 48 4.6 6 8.0
Pasi I I .01 b
Chamar 255 44 255 24.3 44 5.8
Musahar 29 4 29 2.8 4 7.3
Dharkar 12 2 12 1.0 2 6.0
Subtotals 505 60 99 12 255 44 89 13 99 12 1047 99.64 141 7.4
• This does not include the ex-zamindar's household or several other houses along the main road which are not part of the community.
b The single Kevat in Arunpur lives with a Pasi woman. They have two children.
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My impressions and findings on the feeling of unity that the villagers
have with one another, as well as their pride in belonging to the same vil·
lage, are also similar to what Somjee has found. Such a unity insofar as it
ever existed, seems to be dissipating. Part of this is due to the fact that
the city offers an alternative sphere of action for those men who would
have as little to do with their fellow villagers as possible (Somjee 1964:4).
For example, the small group of highly educated young men in the village
who teach in the Intercollege have practically no social relations outside
of each other's company or that of fellow teachers', and their own lin·
eage members (pattidars). The bond of friendship between them is often
also reinforced by kin ties. These young men, as well as most other
villagers, have little regard for an appeal to "our" village or the prestige
of the village in terminating a quarrel, reaching a unanimous decision, or
attempting to overcome indifference toward a public cause. This is oneJ of the reasons given for the increased factional fighting within the village
as well as the high frequency of court cases.
Yet the decline in the feeling of village unity cannot be solely attributed
to the propinquity of Banaras. There is, rather, a continual dialectical
process whereby certain factors in the village (e.g., presence of factions,
other disputing groups, educated men, and the settlement pattern itself)
constantly interact with the alternatives offered by the city and the
changes that are occurring in the society at large. It is also conceivable
that the unity found in the villages of western Uttar Pradesh may not
have existed here in the eastern region because villages in this region are
composed of a number of settlements (puras). The main settlement is
separated from smaller ones ("hamlets") by fields lying between them.
In Arunpur there are five such puras and each of them was populated at
a different time. Three contain only low castes and the other two have
nearly always been in opposition to one another (Table 2). Historical
antecedents seem to have combined with certain contemporary com·
Jmunal forces to produce a feeling of community unity more at the levelof the individual pura than of the village as a whole.
VnLAGE HISTORY
The fact that the two settlements of Bhumihars (Main Pura and Little
Pura) were founded separately and by different ancestors has affected
village politics. It is said that Arun Singh, a relative of the then Maharaja
of Banaras, came to the village some one hundred eighty years ago and
settled in what is now known as Main Pura. The village is named after
him, and the largest and most influential families in this pura today are
his descendants (Chart 1). Other Bhumihars and castes came later. The
first Bhumihar came to Little Pura about a hundred years ago to work in
bz
THE VILLAGE OF ARUNPUR
an Englishman's indigo fields. The crop was planted throughout the
present village and surrounding area at that time. This Bhumihar was
Chait Singh (Chart 2), who supervised some hundred indigo laborers as
the foreman. When the Englishman left, his lands went to the villagers
who had worked for him. Chait Singh received a large amount of land in
what was subsequently called Little Pura. Apart from a few households
that were established before the founder Arun Singh came to the village,
most of the low castes came after, and primarily to work for, these two
Bhumihar groups. Some low-caste people lived in separate puras and this
was mandatory for the Chamars.
There has been a history of antagonism between the descendants of
Arun Singh and those of Chait Singh since the founding of Main Pura
and Little Pura. Arun Singh's descendants claim that their ancestors
were the original zamindars of the village until they neglected to take
proper interest in the land and part of the government revenue was left
unpaid. The Maharaja then put the post on "auction," for he was anx-
ious to have a landlord who would successfully obtain the government's
share. It fell to the grandfather of the last zamindar, Babu Sahib, who
was of the Agrawal merchant caste. The latter took control of the village
with the help of guns and the police. The result was an uneasy relation-
ship of simmering hostility between the old zamindars and the new. Babu
Sahib's grandfather, however, was quite clever and invited the displaced
landlords to his marriages and other functions, thereby gaining their re-
spect and gratitude. Arun Singh's descendants, in turn, responded by
compromising with the new situation.
To be certain that he received all the revenue due him, Babu Sahib's
grandfather did not employ these ex-zamindars as messengers who in-
formed the farmers to pay their taxes to the collector. Instead, this task
fell to the Bhumihars of Little Pura. They were now used by the new za-
mindar to buttress his authority and this fostered further rivalry and hos-
tility between the two Bhumihar settlements. The policy worked well.
Much of the village power struggle today may be seen as a legacy from
this past.
Because of their connection with Babu Sahib's grandfather, the Little
Pura Bhumihars came closer to the seat of power in the village. The new
zamindar's first tax collector was Chand Singh (Chart 2). This position
subsequently passed on to his son, Cheddinath, who is reputed to have
been a physically imposing as well as notorious personage. The link be-
tween the Little Pura Bhumihars and the power structure became even
stronger when Cheddinath was also appointed village headman (mukhi-
ya) by the British. It was he who called the village panchayat, presided
over it, and settled all disputes within his jurisdiction. He was also the
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chief member (sarpanch) of the British local (amin) panchayat, which in-
cluded Arunpur and the eight surrounding villages.
The Independence Movement that started at the beginning of this cen-
tury set the stage for the next major period of conflict between the de-
scendants of Arun Singh and Chait Singh. During World War II, Arun-
pur and the neighboring area were included in a large British military
depot. Members of Amar Singh's household in Main Pura (Chart 1) had
by this time become active in Gandhi's Non-Cooperation Movement of
1942, and several men were sent to prison. I was told of the hardships
they suffered during this period and how Amar's house was searched by
government police nine times.
The Little Pura Bhumihars sided with the rulers, since their leader was
the British-appointed headman, and appeared as government witnesses
against the village freedom fighters. After Independence, however, they
supported the Congress Party, while the Main Pura families of Amar
Singh, his kinsmen, and followers voted for the Socialists. Although the
father of the present ex-zamindar had been allied with the British and
aided their troops, Babu Sahib himself now leads a quiet life since the
abolition of zamindari. He is involved in his own family affairs and
farming enterprise and stays aloof from the politics of Arunpur or any
other village. His only connection with village affairs is through his posi-
tion as manager of the Arunpur Intercollege. When Ajay Singh (Chart
1), the most active and famed freedom fighter in the village, started to
work for the foundation of the college, Babu Sahib supported the effort
and donated much of the land on which it was constructed.2
This historical background uncovers the roots of one major form of
political conflict in Arunpur, the existence of factions among the Bhumi-
hars. Factionalism and other political conflict in the village arena are
primarily concerned with competition for the distribution of the scarce
resources of land, water, and labor. Their place within agriculture, the
most important economic activity, must be explained before we can un-
derstand the disputes over these resources.
WATER, LAND, AND LABOR IN THE AGRICULTURAL CYCLE OF ARUNPUR
A peasant's work is arduous when he must eke out an existence from the
soil armed only with one or two bullocks, a wooden plough, and a few
"machines" that are run by his own sweat. An elderly man told of his
labors:
I get up at 4, feed the animals, and then take them to the field and plough
until 10 a.m. Then I bring the bullocks back to the house and return to the
fields to cut two headloads of fodder which I take home in two trips. I cut
these by hand and finish at noon. Then I feed the animals, eat, and it is 1:30.
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I take the bullocks to the fields again and plough until 5 or 6. I return home
and go to the market and come back by 8. Then I feed the animals and eat.
Then it becomes 10 at night. Because of all this work I sleep like a dead man.
A description of the agricultural cycle may begin with the arrival of the
monsoon rains by late June, which serve to break the intense summer
heat. At this time, the rain crops (kharif) are sown, of which rice (both
early and late varieties) is the most important. In addition, there is maize,
sorghum, millet, and jute-much of the three latter crops are used for
fodder. The rains often fail and a great deal of the crops dry up. Agricul-
turalists depend upon either the government tubewell, a private pumping
set, or other more primitive methods of irrigation at such times. While
these rain crops are harvested during September and October, the most
strenuous agricultural work is simultaneously begun with the preparation
of the fields for the winter crops (rabi). The winter harvest provides most
of the staples for a north Indian village.
During October and November, the newly ploughed fields are sown
with wheat, pulses, potatoes, peas, mustard, and sesame. After sowing,
the major work is providing irrigation for the potatoes during the dry
winter months, cutting, crushing, and preparing molasses from the now
matured sugar cane, and cutting and husking the rice. By February, these
tasks are complete and it is time to harvest the peas and potatoes, cut the
wheat, and pick and crush the mustard and sesame. At the same time,
beginning in March, the difficult job of ploughing starts once again, this
time to prepare the fields for planting sugar cane. Great effort is required
to follow through a zigzagged ploughing scheme which may overturn the
earth as many as ten times. Although potato is the major cash crop in the
village (because of the general lack of sugar-crushing mills in the area),
many of the larger landowners are able to market some of their surplus
molasses.
By May, when the temperature reaches its peak and the infamous dust
storm (/00) makes its appearance, work is complete. People spend most
of the day indoors and the only preparations made are those of arranging
for or participating in a marriage. Few people will bother to plant the hot
weather crops (zaid), which yield only vegetables and some melons.
It is well known that the main impediment to increased agricultural
production throughout the entire northeastern section of India-stretch-
ing from the eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh through Bihar and vast
regions of Bengal-is the lack of irrigation. The lands between the
Ganges and the Jamuna in the west enjoy an extensive canal network
through which water flows naturally. In the east, however, the river beds
are often below the level of the fields and an expensive pumping method
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is required to bring the water up to field level. "Canal irrigation here is
fifty years behind the western areas" (Etienne 1968:155).
In Arunpur there is only one tubewell, located just outside of Little
Pura, which was installed by the government in 1953. During the dry
winter months, when irrigation is required for potatoes and when the
monsoon may come late or even fail, there is tremendous demand for
tubewell water. Thus, it is not surprising that the major number of
disputes in Arunpur occur over the distribution of this extremely scarce
resource. The only privately owned pumping set in the village began
operating during my stay and irrigates the twenty-bigha (one bigha = .67
acre) field belonging to the family of Amar Singh (Chart 1). They also
plan to sell water to others at the rate of four rupees (one rupee = U.S.
$.13) an hour and believe that their agricultural output will double or tre-
ble in just a single year after introducing this innovation.
While a tubewell provides more water than a pumping set, it is much
more expensive to install and requires an outlay of some 20,000 to 30,000
rupees. The pipe in the well is bored deep into the ground and a fifteen to
twenty-horsepower engine is then employed to bring the water up to the
level of the fields. A pumping set, on the other hand, can be installed on
an already existent well and is run by a maximum five-horsepower elec-
FIGURE 1. Manual boring of a tubewell.
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tric (or diesel) generator. It costs only about 12,000 rupees but may
possibly run dry. Six farmers were in the process of filing applications at
the Community Development Block office and at the electric company
for new pumping sets and electricity connections by the time I left Arun-
pur. There is competition among them over who shall get a set (for there
are regulations about their spacing) and who shall have it installed first.
Applying and successfully receiving approval for the installation of a
pumping set is a tedious business which requires familiarity with the
workings of the official world as well as the acumen to calculate maneu-
vers and alter strategies to achieve this goal.
By far the most usual method of irrigation, however, is the old system
which entails the use of a large leather bag (mot) drawn from the well by
a pair of bullocks who walk up and down the well ramp. This is hard
work for the animals as well as for the man who drives them, and the
man, woman, or child who must pull the bag over the top of the well so
that the water can flow along one of the small channels to the fields.
Much water falls back into the well, and it is necessary to stop for rest
more often than with a Persian wheel, the device common in the western
part of the state. It is estimated that two bullocks, pulling one bag each,
can irrigate a little less than one bigha in a day, while a Persian wheel ir-
rigates two bighas per day (Etienne 1968:153).
Another method for moving water from either a pond or a depression
where it has accumulated to a higher area is the use of a tubelike con-
struction operated by two persons who constantly move it up and down.
I have even seen water arduously transferred by means of metal pans. .
The competition for water is based upon the possession of land, which /
is itself another major cause of disputes in Arunpur. This competition
usually takes two forms: (1) conflict over the possessi(jfi of land and (2)
conflict between the landed farmers and their landless laborers, who
receive a small plot of land as part of their wages. A preliminary to this
discussion, however, is some knowledge about the nature of land tenure.
In 1950, the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly passed the V.P. Za-
mindari and Land Reform Act, which reduced a plethora of land tenure
statuses to two main types-bhumidar and sirdar. The law went into ef-
fect in 1952 and affected Arunpur as it did all other villages in the state.
The ex-zamindar was allowed to retain ownership of the land he had
cultivated directly with the help of agricultural laborers (khudkasht). As
compensation for the loss of other lands, he received ready cash and
government debentures or bonds which were equal to eight times the an-
nual revenue collected. The landlord then became a bhumidar (absolute
owner with the right to sell) on his own land and paid only half the an-
nual tax previously levied on that property.
FIGURE 2. Laborers irrigate a field from a ditch.
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Those who had been the occupancy-tenants of the zamindar, for the
most part people who now have land in Arunpur, became sirdars and
paid the state a tax which was equivalent to the rent previously charged
by the zamindar. These ex-tenants retained all their former rights en-
joyed under zamindari, including use of the land and its transference to
their heirs. The only restriction was the prohibition on subletting. In ad-
dition, as in the past, sirdars were not allowed to sell their land until they
became bhumidars. A very important provision of the act authorized,
and even encouraged, this change of status by reducing the sirdar tax by
half if a farmer agreed to give ten times the annual revenue initially and
thereby become a bhumidar (Etienne 1968:59). The village record-keeper
(Iekhpal) informed me that most of the people in Arunpur hold land as
sirdar despite the fact that he often tried to convince them of the tax sav-
ing under bhumidar ownership. The farmers, in turn, find it too difficult
to raise the tenfold amount initially required and hence do not change
their status until they are ready to sell their land.
It is easy to say that practically nothing has been gained by zamindari
abolition, since former tenants merely became sirdars and pay to the
state what was previously paid to the zamindar. The landless remained so
(see Table 3; also Cohn 1955:55). Some land, however, did come on the
market and the zamindar's rights as lord of the village were abolished. I
But not all villagers are pleased with the passing of zamindari. A Kurmi
farmer told me:
If anything, things got worse. Babu Sahib [the last zamindar] was good; if
we had no money he understood and would suspend tax collection for two
or three years until we could pay. Now, if we don't give the tax to the reve-
nue collector immediately, they take away our bullocks and belongings.
He further said that, in a way, the Kurmis received less land by abolition:
All the land they own today was held prior to 1952; after that, when land
came on the market they could not buy it, for this precious resource was
"grabbed up by the Bhumihars. It is they who gained the most."
The plight of those without land remains the same. Some Chamars
used to lease land (altogether, about eighty bighas), and during the days
of zamindari they paid their taxes to Cheddinath Singh, the village head-
man and tax collector for the zamindar. Instead of passing the money on
to the zamindar, however, Cheddinath "ate it up." The zamindar never
knew that the rent had been paid and placed the Chamar's land on auc-
tion. Many Bhumihars, Kurmis, and some others purchased the proper-
ty. The Chamars filed a case in the court, but "nothing happened."
Hence today they are practically all landless and rely on their labor and
the land received as wages to keep body and soul together. They also told
FIOURE 3. Cutting fodder by hand.
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Table 3. Land Ownership in Arunpur by Caste (in Bighas) a
Totals
"0Q)
'" 0.I:
.. -~ ...-.- ..c::Settlement c.","0 I:;g '" ....
"0 Q) Q)O"O U~Main Little Chamar Noniya Kurmi I: I: ~ E-o I:
Caste Pur!l Pura Pura Pura Pura j~ ~'Oj ~~
Brahman 28 b 28 6 .60
Bhumihar 210 106 316 63 1.10
Kurmi 51 26 31 108 21 .55
Kabar 3 9 12 2 .30e
Lohar 2 2 .5 .06
Kevat 0 0 0 0
Parihar 0 0 0 0
Nai 10 10 2 .58
Kohar 5 5 1 .20
Kalwar 0 0 0 0
Noniya 2 2 .5 .10
Teli 15 15 3 .30
Pasj 0 0 0 0
Cbamar 6 6 I .02
Musahar 0 0 0 0
Dharkar 0 0 0 0
Subtotals 319 132 6 7 40 504d 100 0.48
a I bigha =0.67 acre.
b Figures incomplete for two households.
eThe amount of land the Kahars own is not exact because of their involvement in a dispute with the
village over a pond.
dThe total area is larger than the amount included in the village boundaries (i.e., 291 acres or 434
bighasl, since some villagers owned land outside Arunpur.
of still having to perform forced labor without pay (begar, the traditiono/
due of the zamindar) for their Bhumihar masters. Some of the latter con-
firmed this fact.
As a result of losing their land and relinquishing their traditional oc-
cupations, Chamars are now almost totally reduced to being landless
laborers who plough and work the land of the upper castes. The Bhumi-
bars in Arunpur, as elsewhere in the region, feel that it is beneath their
dignity and prestige to touch the plough. One of them said:
It is our custom not to plough just as it is a custom that the big man must
give some land to the poor man; if not in the form of a donation, then in the
form of wages. If we big men do not keep laborers and give them land, then
the people of the area will taunt us-"You say that you are big but you can't
even give a bigha of land to a poor man."
FIGURE 4. Carrying fertilizer of dried manure from the fields.
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The situation is much the same as Etienne describes for the village of
Nahiyan, twenty-eight miles north of Banaras, where farmers grant part
of their land to laborers on a sharecropping basis as a part of their wage.
To prevent any legal tangles whereby the tiller may eventually claim the
land he works as his own, the plot is frequently changed each year.
This system of rotating the sublet land (mafi) is so flexible that it
escapes the law and laborers are reluctant to make complaints for fear of
losing their jobs and land (Etienne 1968:157). Although there is no short-
age of labor in Arunpur, so that one pair of hands could easily replace
another, such replacements are difficult, if not impossible. The credit
that a laborer obtains from the landowner tends to bind them together
permanently, and the debts of the father are inherited by his sons. When
such debts accumulate at an annual interest of 20 to 36 percent, repay-
ment at the present "wage" becomes impossible.
TRADITIONAL MODE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE PANCHAYAT
Land, water, and labor are the resources most often fought over in Arun-
pur. The more frequent conflicts over the distribution of water are usual-
ly settled by the parties concerned, and the decision reached is based on
the implicit or explicit threat of force. The same is generally true of con-
flict between landowners and laborers. Conflicts over land, however, are
more technical and serious and are referred to some external dispute-
settling body. Other types of conflicts also occur, and to deal with them
the villagers have access to several different modes of conflict resolution.
The traditional form of conflict resolution, the panchayat, is described.:/
here while new alternatives are discussed in the next chapter.
When two parties are in dispute and unable to settle the matter be-
tween themselves, they will approach a third party who acts as an arbi-
trator in deciding the matter. The third party must initally be acceptable
to both disputants and they then agree to adhere to his (or its) decision.
Thus, if the arbitrator acts in a truly nonpartisan manner, he (it) will be
acting nonpolitically and without any stake or interest in the dispute at
hand, save that justice be done. Once a decision is reached and accepted
by both parties, the matter should end there.
The major form of conflict resolution in village India where one could
expect to receive such a just decision was, and to a large extent still is, the
panchayat. Panchayat, translated as "council," literally means "five sit-
ting in a circle" or "a meeting of five," whose purpose is to sit in judg-
ment on the matter at hand. The men selected to reach a decision in the
panchayat, usually four to ten people, are known as panchas. There are
two major forms of panchayat. Each one demands that its members be
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men esteemed for their impartiality and good judgment; each conducts
its actual proceedings and reaches its decision in a similar manner. But
they are composed of different men and deal with separate spheres of
conflict. Cohn has rightly pointed out that the panchayat is not so much
a council, with the accompanying emphasis on membership and prece-
dence, as a set of processes relating to arbitration and adjudication
(1965:90).
The caste (biradari) panchayat ~s a formal entity among the lower
\l castes and deals with disputes that primarily involve marriage, divorce,
familial relations of caste members, and contraventions of caste rules. It
is regarded as dealing with personal matters, and the panchayat members
chosen to give judgment are solely from the caste concerned. Others
from different castes, however, may also attend the meeting. The head of
a caste panchayat is the chaudhuri, whom the aggrieved party originally
requests to call and organize a meeting of a panchayat. The head may
represent a circle of ten to twenty villages, fifty villages, or even more.
Depending upon the nature and seriousness of the matter, the appropri-
ate caste leader will be called upon. No such formal institution exists
among the Brahmans and Bhumihars. Here people simply decide among
themselves who has broken a caste rule and, as in the case of an "out-
caste" Arunpur Bhumihar, take the necessary steps to cut off those con-
cerned from social relations. Upper-caste men can come together in a
panchayat, which takes the form of a general meeting, when they wish to
discuss a matter of interest to the entire caste or which affects the caste as
a whole.
If a dispute is between members of two different castes or members of
the same caste and involves a quarrel, fight, or conflict over property,
water, wages, money, and anything of interest of concern to the general
public (sarvajanik), it is referred to a panchayat of big men (bare admi).
Ideally, this panchayat is not composed along caste lines and consists of
a number of respected and influential men who can be counted upon to
give the dispute a good hearing and reach an impartial decision. In ac-
tuality, however, high-caste men will often be judged sole by their caste
peers. If one or both of the parties is from a lower caste, then one or two
men from that caste may be invited to sit in the panchayat. Yet even the
Bhumihars admitted that in such a case these lower-caste panchas would
feel intimidated by their superiors. Considerations of wealth and power
often figure in the selection of panchayat members, although honesty
and impartiality are regarded as the prime virtues. It is said that it is im-
portant to have influential and powerful men give the decision so that the
disputants will be afraid to disregard the judgment.
The different spheres of influence relegated to the two forms of pan-
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chayat are not, however, always that clearly demarcated. The personal
circumstances and predilections of the aggrieved party may account for
the type of panchayat called. For example, a purely (low) caste matter
can be referred to a big man panchayat (as in Cases 4 and 9 in Chapter 5)
or even to an on-the-spot panchayat (Case 17 in Chapter 7). The
disputants may want to avoid the cost and formality of calling a caste v
panchayat. A high-caste man may also be invited to sit and give counsel
on a caste panchayat, although no one of low caste is ever invited to any
meeting where high-caste affairs are discussed. Cohn has found, for a
village in a nearby district, that "frequently it would seem that members
of the dominant caste interfere with the workings of lower-caste councils
to support clients or to achieve political or economic ends of their own"
(1965:103). Two men who are in disagreement may also approach a
group of other villagers who are socially sitting together and choose
several among them to settle their dispute.
The conduct of both types of panchayats is similar. It is the party who
feels wronged, usually the weaker one, who makes the appeal for a pan-
chayat. Both disputants must be present at the actual meeting and agree
to abide by whatever decision is reached before the panchayat proceeds
further. The disputants, or those in attendance, then talk among them-
selves and decide who among the influential and powerful men present
are to be selected as panchayat members and will give judgment on the
case. These four to ten members must be agreeable to both parties, and
one of them becomes the leader (sarpanch) who conducts the meeting
and leads in the decision making.
The one who has called the panchayat is asked to speak first and ex-
plain the dispute. The other party is then called upon to state whether the
charges are true or false and to present his version. Witnesses come forth
and other evidence (Le., written deeds, notes, and so on) is also given. .
When the panchayat members have thoroughly examined the case,
they retire to discuss what decision they will give. It is said that people in
a panchayat cannot be fooled by false evidence because they are alliocal./
men who have an intimate knowledge of the lives of their fellow villag-
ers. If the leader is wise and persuasive, he may succeed in getting all to
agree to a common decision. If not, then the decision proposed by the
majority (bahumat) of the members is accepted and presented to the
meeting as the decision with the consensus of all (sarva samiti se). Deci-
sions reached by the panchayat used to be solely oral. In important
disputes today, in cases where the people involved are skeptical about
whether or not the decision will be implemented, or if they wish to use it
as evidence in a law court, the decision will be written down, signed,
witnessed, and officially registered.
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The judgment and punishment imposed in the big men panchayat are
usually in the form of a declaration that the party who is found to be cor-
rect should receive what he demands and the offender be fined. There is
no actual way effectively to force the decision of this panchayat upon the
two parties concerned, save making them afraid of going against the ver-
dict of big and powerful men and antagonizing society as a whole by
their disobedience. The caste panchayat, from which there is usually no
other court of appeal, is much more effective in achieving compliance
.j with its decisions because it can threaten total social ostracism. The pun-
ishment imposed on the offending party is most usually a fine in the form
of a feast. Money, repair of a temple, or clearance of some path or
crosswalk, and so on, might also be requested. The person who does not
obey this panchayat's decision can then become an "outcaste" (which
may be an initial punishment as well), when people will cease to sit, to
eat, and to have marriage ties with him.
Today, however, villagers often say that the panchayat as a mode of
conflict resolution is losing its hold on society. People no longer fear
what others think, nor are they hesitant to ignore the decision reached.
Every man thinks himself big and thus comes to the panchayat not for
,; justice but for a favorable verdict. If they fail to obtain this from the
traditional bodies, they are able to appeal elsewhere, outside of the vil-
lage locale. Most often, men will go to officials in one of the government
institutions.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES IN ARUNPUR
From an examination of the tables presented in this chapter, it can be
seen that land and other forms of wealth are highly concentrated in the
hands of Bhumihars and that the gulf between them and the Untouch-
ables is extreme. Of the 504 bighas owned by Arunpur residents, 316
belong to the former, who number 282, while 6 bighas belong to the lat-
ter, numbering 297. In other words, 27 percent of the population owns
63 percent of the land, while 28 percent, who rely almost solely on
employment in agriculture, own less than 2 percent of the land. This dif-
ference is seen more sharply when the average land per capita is com-
puted. For Bhumihars, it is 1.1 bighas and decreases rapidly until among
the Untouchable castes the Chamars have only .02 bighas per capita and
Dharkars, Musahars, and the single Pasi have nothing.
Tables 4 and 5 present basic information regarding land ownership
from different perspectives than that primarily of caste. Table 4 details
the land that different caste groups own according to categories of
holdings (figures rounded out from data just given). A quick glance
reveals that while 33 percent of the total population are completely
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landless, the Untouchables form 68 percent of that number. At the other
end, we find that 4 percent of the village population holds 15 percent of
its land resources. The table reflects the high concentration of land in the
hands of a few, again mainly Bhumihars. The degree of concentration is
shown more starkly in Table 5, which collapses some of the categories of
landholding from the previous table. If the landless and the small land-
owners (up to ten bighas) are put together, we find that 17 percent of the
population controls 51 percent of the land in holdings of eleven bighas or
more. Finally, Table 6 shows land ownership among the Bhumihars, the v'
caste which has the most dispersion of holdings. Here again, there is a
trend toward concentration even within a single caste, although it is not
as great as the disparities between castes or categories of holdings (Tables
3and 4).
Table 7, reflecting occupational dispersion in Arunpur, explains a
number of things about the distribution of cash income (Table 8). The
comparatively high annual monetary income of the Bhumihars (estimat-
ed at 563 rupees per capita) is primarily due to their outside professional
employment, small but lucrative involvement in business, and sale of
surplus agricultural produce. Although almost every Bhumihar landown-
er grows some cash crops (mainly potatoes or sugar cane) for the market, .I'
only a small number of some half a dozen households have significant
farm surpluses and may be seen as engaging in capitalist farming ac-
tivities. Economic differentiation within this caste is increasing as larger
farmers take greater advantage of new opportunities for material gain.
The Kurmis, self-sufficient and independent producers holding small
amounts of land for the most part, receive their cash income almost
equally divided between sales of produce and outside employment. The
Brahmans own more land per capita than the Kurmis but are much less ..,
entrepreneurial and have a smaller surplus to market. The high cash in~
come of the Kalwars is accounted for by the fact that, despite their lack
of land, they are well educated (with 100 percent literacy) and successful-
ly employed in teaching or business.
Members of both the Kahar and Nai castes own some land. The form-
er's income is mainly from the sale of produce (the singhara water
vegetable and fish) cultivated in village ponds they either own or lease.
Nai income is a combination of monies received from employment in ./
both their traditonal occupation and in agriculture. Other castes, which
own little or no land (Lohar through Teli), receive their cash from
nonagricultural employment (see also Chapter 4).
The majority of Chamars work as agricultural laborers and receive
payment in kind for the most part. The same is true of the Untouchable
Musahars. Chapter 8 further details the wage structure for such labor.
Table 4. Land in Arunpur by Amount Owned
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None No.
hsehlds. 3 1 3 I 2 2 2 3 - 36 4 2 59 6
Total 0
pop. 19 3 13 7 13 29 15 13 1 196 29 12 350 33
Less than No.
I bigha hsehlds. 2 2 4 8 16 6.7
Total
pop. 9 9 30 59 107 10
Amt.
land 2 I I 6 10 2
1-5 No.
bighas hsehlds. 8 11 14 5 I 1 I 1 3 45 6.4
Total
pop. 39 75 80 37 3 5 11 5 35 290 28
Amt.
land 26 39 46 12 1 2 5 2 15 148 29
6-10 No.
bighas hsehlds. 5 5 I 11 11.4
Total
pop. 59 62 5 126 12
Amt.
land 39 43 8 90 18

44
Table 5. Land by Categories of Ownership
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Amount of Total Percent of Total
Land Owned Population Population
Percent of Total
Land Owned
Landless 350 33
Up to 10 bighas 523 50
11 bighas and above 174 17
Totals 1047 100
49
51
100
Table 6. Land Ownership among Bhumihars
Bighasof
Land Owned
1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26-35
75-80
Totals
Number of
Bhumihars
75
59
46
47
11
44
282
Percent of Total
Bhumihar
Population
27
21
16
16
4
16
100
Percent of Total
Land Owned
by Bhumihars
12
12
18
23
11
24
100
The 563-rupees-per-capita annual cash income of Bhumihars may be jux-
taposed against the 94 rupees per capita of the Chamars, keeping in mind
that this latter figure represents a larger proportion of total Chamar in-
come than monies received does for the Bhumihars who produce a
surplus.
The information collected on debt is admittedly even more unreliable
than the figures on cash income because people are generally reluctant to
speak about this matter. Yet allowing for an even greater hesitancy on
the part of Bhumihars to disclose such information, which may reflect
upon their prestige, there is surely something significant in the amounts
reported of 4,500 rupees for Bhumihars as against 16,000 rupees for the
Chamars. The large disparity in the fortunes of the very high and the
very low is also reflected in the average family size: 11.2 for Bhumihars
and 5.8 for Chamars. Only the wealthy can afford to maintain large joint
households. The castes lying in the range between these two extremes of
the hierarchy have slowly begun to experience some economic mobility
through newly expanding opportunities. This is most true of the Kurmis.
The prime means to an improved agriculture and irrigation also re-
r Table 7. Caste and Occupation in Arunpur
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Traditional occupation 4 34a 20 b 7 7 0 0 6 a 1 0 0 7 - 0 0 3 89 30
Farmer 10 2 3 1 5b 21 7
Businessman 7 1 2 4 1 15 5
Teacher 5 4 9 3
Government employee 1 12 1 I 2 17 6
Truck driver 1 2 1 4 1.3
Peon 3 4 1 8 3
Oerk I 3 4 1
Housebuilder 1 2 2 2 7 2
Factory worker 1 4 3 1 2 3 14 4.7
Carpenter 1 1 .34
Eectrician 1 1 .34
Weaver 3 11 14 4.7
Cigarette maker 2 1 1 4 J.3
Daily laborer 1 2 1 1 27 c 11 43 15
Ploughman 28 28 10
Rickshaw driver lid 11 4
Cycle repairer 1 1 .34
Well digger 1 2 3 1
Totals 16 65 36 10 11 2 5 8 7 6 8 20 - 86 11 3 294 100
Percent engaged in
traditional occupation 25 51 57 70 67 0 0 100 14 0 0 35 - 0 0 100 31
a Figure includes two men engaged in other nontraditional occupations as well.
b Figure includes one man engaged in another nontraditional occupation.
cFigure includes seven men engaged in this work on a seasonal basis, i.e., when they are not engaged as ploughmen six months of the year.
d Figure includes two men engaged in this work on a seasonal basis.
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Table 8. Estimated Annual Cash Income (in Rupees)
Business Sale of Per Capita
Caste Wages Income Produce Totals Income
Brahman 3,320 5,440 8,670 183
Bhumihar 63,480 30,000 65,400 158,880 563
Kurmi 19,380 3,420 25,550 48,350 247
Kahar 1,080 13,000 14,080 380
Lohar 10,980 10,980 333
Kevat 1,200 1,200 300a
Parihar 3,000 3,000 231
Nai 1,440 600 2,040 120
Kohar 2,240 250 2,490 104
Kalwar 13,500 b 13,500 466
Noniya 5,400 5,400 270
Tell 6,000 1,500 5,200 12,700 265
Pasi a
Charnar 24,000 24,000 94
Musahar 120 120 4
Dharkar 1,320 1,320 110
Subtotals 156,460 34,920 115,440 306,820 293
a The single Pasi in Arunpur is included in the figures for the Kevat caste.
b I could not obtain these figures.
mains in the hands of the upper castes. There are twenty wells in the
village; seven belong to Bhumihars, five to Kurmis, three to Brahmans,
two to Chamars, and the remaining three to those of the Nai, Kohar, and
Noniya castes. The single pumping set in operation when I left the village
belongs to a Bhumihar. Six others have also applied for pumping set per-
mits, of which four are Bhumihars and two are Kurmis.
The size and type of house (mud or brick), general standard of living,
Ii and education (especially after high school) that villagers can afford (see
Table 9) corresponds to the general pattern of land ownership and
wealth, as does even the number of "luxury" items such as bicycles and
radios (see note 1). There is also a relationship between the degree of
education and occupational mobility. The most highly educated castes
have the most diversified occupational structure.
The dominant group of Bhumihars has successfully retained control
over the distribution of resources in the village and has extended that
control to include new resources and alternative forms of conflict resolu-
tion. This brings the village as a single unit into a wider perspective by in-
dicating the relationships it has with outsiders-specifically, the govern-
ment administration.
r
Table 9. Education in Arunpur a
High Inter-
Primary Level School college
or Literate Middle Level (Grades (Grades B.A.! M.A.! Percentages
(Grades 1-5) (Grades 6-8) 9-10) 11-12) B.Sc. M.Sc. of Literates
--- --- --- --
M F M F M M M M M F M+F
--- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Caste 010 No. 010 No. 010 No. 010 No. 010 No. 010 No. 010 No. 010 No. 010 No. 010 No. 010 No.
Brahman 45 10 7 I 9 2 I3 2 5 I 60 I3 20 3 43 16
Bhumihar 40 47 27 30 20 25 6 7 II I3 14 17 5 6 4 5 94 II3 33 37 65 150
Kurmi 30 25 5 3 12 10 II 9 I I I I 55 46 5 3 35 49
Kabar 47 8 25 3 6 I 8 I 53 9 33 4 45 13
Lohar 65 II 17 2 66 10 0 31 10
Kevat 100 I 100 I 100 I
Parihar 14 I 14 I 14 I 42 3 0 27 3
Nai 30 3 20 2 10 I 60 6 0 40 6
Kohar 25 3 17 2 8 I 50 6 0 33 6
Kalwar 20 2 60 6 20 2 20 2 20 2 20 2 100 10 60 6 80 16
Noniya 17 2 25 3 17 I 33 4 8 I 8 I 91 II 17 I 66 12
Teli 53 8 I3 2 66 10 0 31 10
Pasi 0 0
Chamar 6 8 5 4 I I 2 3 .08 I .08 I 14 18 I I 9 19
Musahar 0 0 0
Dharkar 0 0 0
Subtotals 27 128 12 43 II 54 3 12 8 39 5 22 2 10 2 7 55 260 15 55 38 315
a This table includes everyone seven years and older in Arunpur.
THE VILLAGE OF ARUNPUR
NOTES
1. There are 106 bicycles in Arunpur distributed in the following manner:
Brahman-4, Bhumihar-32, Kurmi-29, Teli, Kohar, Kalwar, Kevat, Nai,
Lohar-34, and Chamar-7. One Bhumihar owns a motorcycle and one Chamar
a rickshaw. Of the eleven transistor radios in the village, eight are owned by
Bhumihars and three by Kurmis.
2. I met the ex-zamindar of Arunpur, Babu Sahib, when I first visited the village
and was attempting to make some arrangements for a temporary stay and
preliminary investigation there. Babu Sahib graciously met with me and agreed
to let me stay at his house after his daughter's marriage. As per his request, I
telephoned him a week later and after four unsuccessful attempts to reach him, I
gave up. Perhaps he had changed his mind about offering me hospitality but had
found it too embarrassing to say so.
Once I came to live in Arunpur, I met him several times; most specifically
when we tried to employ his help in rebuilding the Primary School well and put-
ting a roof on the Girls' section. He was always pleasant and full of praise for
our efforts, but exceedingly reluctant to do anything. On the occasions that I in-
quired about his family history, connection with the village and history of the
village, he was noncommittal and kept saying that he knew nothing. A person
cannot be pressed in that frame of mind. With great difficulty I obtained the
genealogy of his immediate family, but as he preferred not to be bothered, I
respected his wishes.
CHAPTER 3
Arunpur and the Outside World:
The Extension of Government Administration
One of the important changes that has taken place in post-Independence
Arunpur has been the increasing frequency of its contacts with the world
outside, because of the proliferation of governmental interests. This is
most evident from the extension of government administration to the
village level. Previously, the British Raj had its local representatives in
the form of the zamindar and the headman; interaction with outside
government personnel was comparatively infrequent. Today, however,
government reaches and affects every village by elections (and tax collec-
tions), and most villages through the Local Self-Government (panchayati
raj), Community Development, and education programs.
ExTENSION OF GoVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
Panchayats have had a long history in India, although the successive at-
tempts to revive the institution by various rulers have more often led to a
continuity in name rather than form. Under the British, the local (amin)
panchayat was empowered to try petty crimes and raise money by taxa-
tion. The panchayat jurisdiction extended to a circle including the head-
quarter village and neighboring villages. Village headmen were ex-officio
members of the panchayat. The Constitution of Independent India also
empowered state governments to frame laws and rules pertaining to
village panchayats and to endow them with such powers and authority
as might be necessary to enable them to function as agents of self-
government in the village. The Uttar Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act of
1947 and its subsequent amendments of 1955 and 1961 provided for the
establishment of village assemblies (gram sabha) consisting of all resi-
dents over twenty-one, village panchayats (gram panchayat), and justice
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. panchayats (nyaya panchayat). The village panchayat was to implement
the plans and decisions authorized by the assembly, while the justice pan-
chayat performed the task of deciding petty civil, revenue, and criminal
cases.
The Constitution of 1950 also acknowledged the need for a social and
economic transformation of India's hundreds of thousands of villages.
Under the First Five Year Plan (1951), community development was
regarded as the method to bring about such a transformation. The first
series of pilot projects to study what would be involved in a nationwide
program were launched in 1952 by an agreement with the Ford Founda-
tion. In 1958, a committee investigating the effectiveness of subsequent
development programs reported a general failure due to the lack of
association of the people with the projects; they were imposed from
above instead of from within. The committee then recommended that the
existing structure of Local Self-Government through panchayats be
altered into a three-tiered system upon which all development work in
their jurisdiction would devolve. It was found necessary to have two pan-
chayats at the village level, as the traditional function of panchayats was
primarily that of dispute settlement. The justice panchayat would carry
on this old function of conflict resolution (see later), and the village pan-
chayat would deal with the new tasks of social reconstruction. The report
of the committee in 1958, which studied the progress of community
development, suggested an even more radical departure for the village
panchayats; they were to implement development work and promote
self-motivation for these programs at the grass roots.
V" The new three-tiered system which the committee recommended was to
be matched at every level with a complementary one in the Community
Development administration. Thus, at the bottom tier the village pan-
chayat, consisting of an elected village head (pradhan) and approximate-
ly ten to sixteen panchayat members, is to deal primarily with agricul-
ture, sanitation, and provisions for village wells. The Village-Level
Worker is the Community Development liaison.
The second level of local self-government is formed by a panchayat
samiti, which corresponds to the Community Development Block of 100
villages under a Block Development Officer (BOO). The panchayat
samiti consists of all elected heads of villages and the BOO. They elect
one among themselves to be the head (pramukh), and this appointment is
usually made on political party lines. The second tier is to concern itself
with the development functions of the block, namely that of improved
agriculture, cattle, promotion of health education, and industries. There
is often much competition and ill feeling at this level between the ad-
ministrators of the Community Development program (the BOO and his
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FIGURE 5. A Community Development worker helps a villager sign his
name in the registry during a village meeting in which the possible in-
stallation of a government tubewell in Kusampur is considered.
government officials) and the implementors (the pramukh and his village
representatives).
The zila parishad, at the highest level of the Local Self-Government
system, coincides with the administrative boundaries of the district. It
consists of all the presidents of the panchayat samitis, members of the
State Legislative Assembly and National Parliament from that constitu-
ency, and the District Collector. The zila parishad has only a planning
and supervisory capacity with no direct powers of execution and taxa-
tion.
Although panchayati raj may have been born of a marriage between
community development and rural local self-government, it has generally
"not taken any effective part in planning from below" (Narain 1969:24).
The Arunpur panchayat takes no part or initiative in development work
and is completely inoperative at the present time. Because of factional
divisions and a general lack of interest, the villagers believe that it cannot
really achieve anything worthwhile. In interviews with each of the four-
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teen panchayat members, we were told that none of them had contested
the post in the last panchayat election held in 1963. The present Pradhan
chose the members he wanted when he won the election. Men from sever-
al castes were selected (six Bhumihars, four Chamars, one Brahman, one
Kurmi, one Nai, and one Kabar) who were either his firm supporters or
else were equally friendly to both village factions.
The panchayat has met only two or three times since 1963. Almost all
of its members said that they had wasted five rupees to obtain a useless
post and would not do the same again. When one of the Chamar pan-
chayat members was asked if he would like to hold that post when the
next elections are held, he replied:
Whether or not I am elected next time-I don't care. What will be my
loss? It [the panchayat] has not been of any use the past six years. I was
never called and I was never with Amar Singh [the eldest male in the
Pradhan's household] or the Pradhan in the last six years. Last year Amar
Singh called me and said, "Give me the five rupees fee for being a pan-
chayat member." And I yelled at him, "Look, you made me a member, but
I never worked as one. So burn your file, because we never acted as pan-
chayat members. So where are they and where is the panchayat? I am not
givingfive rupees."
Amar Singh got mad, but I never gave the money because I knew I never
worked as a panchayat member. So why should I give-so they can eat it
up? It is clear that these high-caste pradhans are useless and can't work. I
dream that a man from the Chamar settlement will become the pradhan. I
know he won't be the real boss; they will be some of the Bhumihars. But
never mind, at leasfwe will have the chair [Le., post]. At least people out-
side the village will know that there is a Chamar pradhan. I don't care who
is boss.
The panchayat secretary, a government appointee in the Community
Development administration, serves several villages and is supposed to
supervise much of the paper work of the panchayats. The Arunpur
secretary was suspended for incompetency in 1966 and there has been no
replacement for him. The Pradhan has not succeeded in collecting the
taxes that are to aid in village development work. Any land that was
previously owned in common by the villagers has long since disappeared.
The possession of a remaining pond is currently being contested in court
by two Kabar brothers who say that the pond is theirs because they have
cultivated fish and water vegetables in it and have paid the taxes for the
last twelve years.
In 1957, a two-room panchayat house was built in Main Pura, but
neither the Chamars nor the faction which rivals the head of the village
can make use of it. While I was there, the house was let rent-free to a
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Brahman teacher at the Intercollege who came from another village and
was close to the Pradhan's family.
NEW ALTERNATIVEs FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The second arm of local self-government is the statutory justice (nyayaJ
panchayat that was imposed upon the village to aid in settling disputes
previously heard by big men panchayats but now increasingly finding
their way to the district courts. Any dispute involving less than fifty
rupees is supposed to be settled by this panchayat. The justice panchayat
of Arunpur includes its eight neighboring villages. Each village sends
representatives from their own elective statutory village panchayat. The
representatives of these various villages then choose one among them-
selves to be the head. The head of the justice panchayat in which Arun-
pur participates comes from the neighboring village of Ramapur and is
the brother of Krishna Singh, a powerful local big man.
The fact of the matter is, however, that the statutory justice panchayat
is also virtually ineffective. People complain that (1) it works in the same
manner as the courts and takes a lot of time; (2) it does not meet regu-
larly or discharge its duties properly; (3) the men who sit on the justice
panchayat are elected (not selected) members who do not necessarily rep-
resent the wisest and most respected men; hence, (4) they do not act im-
partially; and, (5) because they may not be men familiar with the village
in which the dispute occurs, they may more easily be fooled by false
evidence. The two major reasons for the failure of the justice panchayat
seem to be that villagers do not have the same trust for elected officials as
they do for those chosen in the traditional panchayats and that they still
prefer to take their cases to the courts. Even where the Pradhan has the
opportunity to settle quarrels and fights, it is said that he does not want
to involve himself. A dispute that eventually ends up in the court would
prove too time-consUIning and bothersome for him.
The lack of confidence in elected village officials, which applies to the
justice panchayat as well as the village panchayat, stems from the feeling
that the truly good and wise man will not demean himself by contesting
an election. He will accept the position only if he is unanimously chosen.
In the majority of cases, then, the man who assumes office after being
elected over other candidates is one who is pursuing his own self-interest
and wants the post to benefit himself and his supporters. A contested "
election, villagers say, creates at least two parties-that of the elected and
that of the defeated. Each contestant will remember who stood for and
against him and thus in his official capacity will always show favoritism
and partiality. Most men also complained that village elections were a
major cause of dissension and increased factionalism.
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Distrust for elected local officials has, among other reasons, led people
increasingly to prefer the alternative structure of the court system to that
of the new statutory justice panchayat. That the traditional panchayats
have also been bypassed as a mode of conflict resolution can readily be
seen by the number who have been concerned with legal tangles in Arun-
pur. At least sixty heads of families have been involved in one or more
(and as many as thirteen) court cases. With the exception of six
instances-two concerning the ex-zamindar Babu Sahib, two that in-
volved land in another village, one against an employer for loss of work,
and one against a merchant for fraud-all the litigants were from Arun-
pur. The majority of the cases involved disputes between unrelated par-
ties for land (often neighbors). Disputes between pattidars (patrilineally
related kin) over divided property were less in number. Occasionally a
case went to court that involved beatings, destruction of property by an
animal, or an accusation of murder.
There are two main reasons why villagers prefer this alternative struc-
j ture for conflict resolution. First, there is the general decline inadherence to and respect for traditional panchayats based on the desire
for a favorable, rather than just, decision (see Chapter 2). When this is
combined with a lack of faith in the statutory nyaya panchayat, then
recourse to the courts may be seen as a default. Certainly the drawbacks
of appealing to the courts are clearly recognized. It is an expensive, time-
consuming process which protracts the enmity between disputants while
they await a decision. Yet despite the great expense involved and the
lengthy waiting period, even penniless Chamars have initiated legal pro-
ceedings. Several factors specific to the village form a crucial part in ex-
plaining this. There is the close proximity ofthe courts in Banaras as well
as the opportunity this provides for becoming sophisticated in such mat-
ters. In addition, Arunpur has men with the time, education, and money
to indulge in such affairs. It seems that the stronger party (in terms of
money to bear legal expenses and bribe officers, and power to occupy
property by force while the case is going on) has the most to gain by initi-
ating a legal struggle, judging from the fact that quarrels over land most
often find their way into court. Such struggles often seek to wrest proper-
ty from its rightful owner.
The willingness of village big men to stake their fortune and prestige
on the outcome of a legal contest is also implied in the following state-
ment by a Bhumihar: "If the dispute is between us [relatives or faction
members], we settle it ourselves, but if it involves our rivals, we go to
court." The courts are regarded as an extension of the village political
arena where fights for prestige over one's caste fellows and lower-caste
men can also take place (see also Cohn 1959:90, 93).
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A similar situation has been described for the village of Senapur,
twenty-five miles north of Banaras in Jaunpur District. Previously, most
disputes were settled on a local basis by the dominant Rajput caste.
Power and prestige, law and judicial proceedings were all bounded by the
"little kingdom"-a local area in which "all the villages were 'owned' at
one time by one lineage of Rajputs, locally termed 'Thakurs' " (Cohn
1959:80). The establishment of a legal system in India based on British
procedural law conflicted with the local law ways. Likewise, the in-
troduction of electing village panchayat officials presented an alternative
to the traditional mode of selecting decision makers. Villagers have been
quick to react in both cases. "Indians in response thought only of
manipulating the new situation and did not use the law courts [in this
case, statutory panchayats] to settle disputes but to further them" (Cohn
1959:90).
While the legal system of the courts is not in itself new, it is (along with
the nyaya panchayat) an example of the alternative structures that are
becoming increasingly available to the villagers of Arunpur and whose
appearance has brought about changes in their lives and outlook. The
government administration offers other alternatives, specifically through
the Community Development and Local Self-Government (panchayati
raj) programs. It also offers a choice of channels by which new resources
can be brought into the village and has added a new dimension to the
relationship between villages and outsiders, especially government of-
ficials.
NEW RESOURCES AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL ",
Most new resources that come into the village are from Community
Development funds and materials, which are distributed through ~he
Local Self-Government institutions. For example, the Community De-
velopment Block receives government aid and grants in five areas: public
health, road construction, help for Untouchables (mostly in construction
of wells), industrial grants, and animal husbandry. The Village Level
Worker (VLW) informs village pradhans of what aid is available and
who can apply. He also processes applications for a specific item and for-
wards them to the Block Headquarters for approval. New seeds and fer-
tilizers received by the Block are distributed at various rural centers.
Loans for these agricultural improvements are also available on a short-
term (usually seasonal) basis. Once again, the VLW is the intermediary
between the villager, who wishes a loan, and the Block officials, to whom
the application is made. There are also cooperative societies that will
make loans to their contributing members.
Arunpur has received money to build wells, construct drinking water
II
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taps from the tubewell, pave streets, and build a panchayat house and a
house for some Chamars. All of this was done by the Pradhan, in the
name of the village. These resources actually were used as a form of
patronage to repay party men for their support, and villagers now refuse
to pay the panchayat tax because there was such an obvious bias in the
distribution of these favors. Because new projects must be matched by
funds available in the village, primarily through the collection of this tax,
it is not possible for Arunpur to receive any more government aid at the
present time.
With the entire area of panvillage development in abeyance, the only
other government resources available to villagers are those that are ap-
plied for and distributed on an individual basis. They are primarily new
" seeds, fertilizers, government loans to cover their cost, and the installa-
tion of pumping sets for irrigation. As these resources are distributed to
the villagers by government agents, the relations between these two
groups form an integral part of this discussion. The most important of-
ficial at the village level is the Tubewell Operator (see Chapter 9), and
secondarily the VLW and Seed Store Inspector, the latter in charge of
distributing the actual supplies of seed and fertilizer.
The VLW for Arunpur had been transferred to this area only two
months before we arrived in the village. He is a thirty-five-year-old man
who comes from a district near Banaras. He served in another area for
eight years and since his transfer has made his home in the city. He said
that his position initially required him to act as a multipurpose social
worker in the rural communities and to provide the link between the
Community Development program and the village population. Since the
major emphasis in development has turned to agriculture and irrigation,
however, he spends most of his time dispensing information on new
techniques and innovations in that field.
The VLW is also responsible for propagating the government family
planning program. Block officials exert pressure on him to fulfill certain
quotas and threaten to jeopardize his job if he does not meet them. The
VLW even sought the aid of Mohan Ram, a Chamar leader whose own
son is also a VLW. Mohan promised to help him find at least four men
who would submit to vasectomies, but most men are reluctant to go
through with the operation.1
The VLW is also pressured by his superiors into obtaining a minimum
amount of orders for new types of seeds and fertilizers that the govern-
.J ment wants agriculturalists to use increasingly. He, in turn, then makes
fulnIlment of a specific order contingent upon the buying of these new
types as well. A concomitant of the fact that certain targets are set for the
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VLW is that he spends less time among the poorer landowners, who (he
says) are "uneducated, inexperienced, and always doubt new informa- v
tion." He finds it necessary to go to the big farmers who are "educated
and experienced" because they are ready to innovate and take risks. The
VLW understood that this preference for the already rich was not good.
On the other hand, he stated that it was important to go to the big men
first, for it is only after they have tried new seeds which succeed that the
smaller farmers will be convinced. The favored big farmers will be the
first to receive a highly desirable seed available only in limited quantities.
Others are forced to buy it on the black market, if they can afford to
do so.
The preference for big farmers is a bias built into the system and the
nature of personal relationships. The VLW had his own stereotypes of
the different people that compose a village, and to him all small-scale
cultivators are ipso facto "uneducated." Certainly, barriers to com-
munication do exist. When the VLW goes into the Chamar Pura people
begin screaming and yelling at him, trying to attract his attention; at the
same time they are suspicious and perhaps abusive. He is not, then, very
likely to go back there and have much interest and care in their welfare.
He finds it more pleasant to go to the houses of the rich and to sit quietly
chatting, take their orders, and enjoy a hot glass of milk as well!
Whereas his predecessor came to the village perhaps two or three times
a year, the present VLW comes at least once or twice a week. He was
always in a rush and complained of constantly being harassed by his
superiors at the Block Headquarters. He also said that they make his job v
more difficult. There are so many administrative departments that
nothing really gets done. The higher officials do not care about their
work, and although he is required to attend all meetings, they rarely
come. Inefficiency at Block Headquarters can often have disastrous
results for cultivators. When the latter's application for grain, fertilizer,
or loans, for example, is forwarded there, the request is often not filled
in time. A man may order seeds and irrigate his fields in advance only to
find that the seeds come at a later date and the fields have already dried
up. The VLW did not find, however, that factionalism hindered his
work. He was friendly with both sides and stood aloof from their feuds.
He said that no villagers wanted, to lessen their agricultural output
because of disputes; rather, competition in agriculture was marked be-
tween the two parties.
Orders for seed and fertilizer given to the VLWare processed at the
Block office, and the cultivator goes to a government seed store to obtain
what he needs. Before 1967, they had to go to Banaras, but now there is a
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government storage depot just opposite the village on the main road. The
Seed Store Inspector lived next door to us, and we saw him daily and
observed his interaction with the villagers. He was always rude and blunt
to smaller cultivators and showed marked deference toward the richer
ones. On one occasion, the Inspector refused to sell anyone fertilizer
which had been stored there for a week. However, when the brother of
Krishna Singh (a big man from neighboring Ramapur) came, he sold him
whatever fertilizer he needed.2
The Seed Store Inspector, like the VLW, also regularly takes bribes.
Often, if people do not have enough money to pay this extra charge,
some of the seed or fertilizer is kept back by the Inspector, who then sells
it at black market prices. He said that he shares his extra money with his
assistant and the VLW. The latter, in addition to taking money for
himself, also takes money from the villagers to distribute to other of-
ficials who have a hand in processing any particular application and
claims that this is necessary to get work done. 3 Bribery and general cor-
J ruption in the official world are well known and accepted by villagers as
part of the way the system works.
The village record-keeper of property and revenue (lekhpal) also
receives bribes in connection with determining ownership of disputed
land or giving preference in informing someone of land for sale. A
messenger from the Banaras court who brings a summons for an Arun-
pur Nai waits for some extra money for his "pocket expenses." At the
local police station, the taking of bribes is rife. The results range from
letting people go who have committed crimes to having to pay for the in-
nocent to be released. One Arunpur faction leader was reported to have
given a 300-rupee bribe when he called the police to Arunpur during his
dispute with a rival (Case 17, Chapter 7). Villagers who want an electrical
connection for their pumping sets must bribe a multitude of officials
before their work is done.
In cases where money was received by the Pradhan for the village, such
as loans and money for well or house construction, some amount was
siphoned off. This general state of affairs existing between the village
..l and the official world has led the villages to be very distrustful of the lat-
ter. Perhaps the saddest part of all is how far this mentality has seeped
down into the perception of village life itself. Some Chamars and others
said that whenever they get into trouble with the police or courts or need
to contact officials, they always go to their Bhumihar patrons, who can
more easily approach outsiders. But, they say, no influential Bhumihar
ever accompanies them without charging a certain amount of money for
his services.
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EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION AND THE POLITICAL ARENA
The extension of government administration and resources into the ..........
village has had two main effects. It has reinforced a continuation of the
traditional concentration of power. Specifically, the failure of the statu-
tory village and justice panchayats to become meaningful bodies in
Arunpur, as well as the inability of the Community Development pro-
gram to reach a significant proportion of truly needy villagers, has
resulted in a perpetuation of the status quo in political and, to a large ex-
tent, economic power. The individuals who have played an important
role in Arunpur history and those who continue to do so today as big
men in the village political arena are all primarily from a few select and
wealthy Bhumihar families. It is these men (or their families) who figured
importantly in the British administration and in the present govern-
ment's statutory panchayat system, as well as in the meetings of the
traditional panchayats to settle local disputes. The big men of Arunpur
participate most in the new structural alternatives present in Independent
India, especially through the courts and by their control of statutory pan-
chayat Community Development resources within their power. They
have also become middle men who mediate between the villages and im-
portant outsiders.
At the same time, the introduction of new resources and new forms of
conflict resolution has had the effect of widening the field for political
activities. The political field of an enterprising big man now extends way./
beyond the confines of the village arena, and even for the "little man" it
has opened up. Previously, the distribution of resources was fairly well
established in a set pattern and any disputes over this were settled by the
British-appointed headman. Competition for resources took place with.in
a rather confined group, that is, the dominant caste. Now, however, new
resources have become available in the village, and they exist in an
unstructured zone of competition where the old rules are in flux or do
not pertain, and the new ones have not yet been established. This
unstructured competition is further complicated by the fact that a man -/
now has an increased range of choice regarding structures that may be of
use to him. The political arena itself has altered because of these many
changes.
The effectiveness with which a big man competes in the village arena is
determined and manifested not only by his power and control over
resources, but also by his family name, prestige, and caste status. The
next chapter describes these relationships so that the connection between
caste, kin, and power may be better understood.
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:
I:
1. Until the time I left the village in May, 1969, I knew of only five men who had
vasectomies (four Bhumihars and one Chamar) and three who were "thinking"
of having operations. Seven men said that they practice "natural" forms of birth
control (unspecified) and one used condoms. Only one woman had ever tried us-
ing the pill.
2. Krishna Singh owns the Seed Storage building as wel1 as the one in which we and
the Seed Store Inspector lived.
3. He also spoke of people in government service giving bribes in order to be
transferred or to obtain a position they desired.
CHAPTER 4
Caste and Kin: The Network
of Social Relations
The village represents a universe of social action for the people of Arun-
pur, where behavior is governed by rules pertaining to caste and kin. The
rules of caste define one's position and rights and duties in relation ,,/
to other castes, as well as denoting the appropriate behavior for that
specific status in a ritual hierarchy. The rules of kinship delineate the
categories of consanguineal and affinal relations and their behavioral
components. They also account for the ties a person has outside his natal
place, for in north India the village is an exogamous unit. Although these
kinship rules still appear to be strong and binding on the individual and
are heavily considered in any specific decision into which they enter, the
same does not seem to be true of rules governing caste relations. There
are a number of areas where caste has adapted to new situations -in
changing India.
Symptomatic of this response to change is the increasing tendency for
villagers to make the distinction between two societies (do sarna;), one of
the village (ganv ka) and the other outside the village (ganv ke bahar). It
is this sort of distinction that is implied when a man says:
I can eat and drink with anybody, of any caste, if he is from outside my
village. But not in my village, because here I have to consider some of the
things which may affect my family.... But all those who have fought any
court case must have cleaned the officer's pot [lata],' and many times the
officer may be of low caste.
Similar explanations are given to justify other seemingly contradictory'l)
behavior. A Nai related that he could not shave the beard or cut the hair
of an Untouchable and requested God never to give him any such occa-
CASTE AND KIN
sion in his life. Yet his sister's husband and son have opened barber
shops in a small town and in a village-cum-bazaar where they cater to all.
The Nai believed that
If we shave the hair of Chamars, we are violating village rules; but not [if we
do so] outside, because that is the territory of the shop [dukan ka desh] and
biradari [caste] is not there. Inside the village, caste is above all; but outside,
man is highest.
Another person said that village society is native (deshi) while that out-
~ide the village is foreign (videshi), the rules for the two societies also dif-
.Jfering. It has been pointed out that this process of compartmentaliza-
tion, a separating of "two spheres of conduct and belief that would
otherwise collide," is an old one. It is also an adaptive process that
enables people to express behaviors that actually belong to distinctive
ways of life and thought (Singer 1972:321-325). This compartmentaliza-
tion of behavior applicable to inside and outside the village (or "native"
and "foreign") is not only basic to operating outside the kin world, but
also to reducing the conflict between recent changes and traditions.
It would seem that greater mobility is going to increase both the range
of society outside the village and the number of people who will par-
ticipate in it. This will increasingly demand some readjustment of
cultural rules to actual behavior. Women, who have less mobility than
men, are more conservative in maintaining rules regarding commensality
outside the village. More occasions arise for men, however, when it
becomes necessary to ignore the rules, such as "cleaning the officer's
pot" while pursuing a court case, or eating the molasses of a Chamar (see
later) while pursuing election votes. Even within the village, and especial-
ly among younger men (those under forty), there seems to be some relax-
ation of certain rules regarding eating, drinking, and deference behavior
among castes.
FORMAL RELATIONS AMONG CASTES: DOMINANCE AND JAJMANI
There are two sides of the coin to relationships that castes have with one
another within the village context: dependence and interdependence. The
formal political relations among castes involve a differential access to
power and are governed by the idea of dominance, while the ritualized
economic interaction of jajmani relationships mutually binds individual
members of one caste to individuals in another in an exchange of goods
and services. Inequality and the differential access to power and ritual
purity are delineated by jajmani relations as well and find concrete ex-
pression in the deferential behavior shown to the Bhumihars by lower
castes.
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If someone is sitting on a cot when a Bhumihar walks by, he will imme-
diately stand up. Kurmi and other Touchable caste men will either squat
on the ground, or, depending upon the Bhumihar in question, sit on a
separate cot in his presence. An Untouchable will never sit before him
but always squat on the earth. The Bhumihar has the right of way on a
narrow village path. Within the rules of ritual purity, he can also com-
mand anyone of lower caste who happens to be near to perform services
such as drawing water, washing dishes, and bringing tables, chairs, or
tea.
Before discussing dependence and interdependence among castes,
however, we must say something about what is meant by "caste." Like
so many other translations, the use of the single word "caste" for varna,
jati, and biradari is both inadequate and misleading. Varna is a Sanskrit
term found in classical Hindu texts and usually means a "class" (or
"color"). There were four such groups in ancient India: the brahman
(priests and. intellectuals), kshatriya (rulers and warriors), vaishya (ar-
tisans, merchants, and farmers), and shudra (servants). The Untouch-
ables are often considered as constituting a fifth class or as being outside
the varna system altogether. Varna does not have any effective usage or
meaning within the context of social relationships for Arunpur villagers. 2
It has become a significant referent for caste in those situations where a
group is upwardly mobile and claims a higher status (Rowe 1968; Lynch
1969), or in the case of socially or politically active caste associations
where varna then takes on meaning in a political arena that is larger than
a single village (Srinivas 1962:15ff; Beteille 1969:163ft).
Jati (literally "race," "genus," "species"), a much later Sanskrit term
for caste, denotes the largest endogamous unit which we may call a caste
and is generally used to refer to castes other than one's own. If a man
speaks of his ownjati or caste fellow, however, he will use the Hindi term
biradari ("brotherhood" or "community"), translated as "subcaste."
The latter is the smallest endogamous group representing the meaningful
unit for marriage ties and dispute settlement (Mayer 1960:4ff, 153).
Thus, many subcastes make up a caste and the distinction between the
two is made on the basis of internal (kin) and external (intercaste) rela-
tions (Mayer 1960:9; Ghurye 1950:20; cf. Beteille 1969b:152ft).
Looking at caste relations within Arunpur, I found that the Bhumihars
exert what Srinivas has termed "decisive dominance," that is, the distri-
bution of wealth, power, and numbers coincides with their high ritual
status (Srinivas 1959:2). Although for the most part they ranked
themselves lower than Brahmans on the caste hierarchy, Bhumihars
maintain that they, too, are of the priestly caste. They say that it was
through their association with the Banaras rajas, who were also Bhumi-
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hars, that they gave up their traditional religious functions and began to
engage in kshatriya-like activities. They took to hunting, eating meat,
and drinking, and also became landlords and hence involved with the
land and agriculture.
Practically all Bhumihars use the kshatriya surname Singh, although
three college-educated men gave the Brahman appellation Sharma.3
i Other castes in the village refer to them as thakur, meaning "chief,"
"lord," or "master," and usually a referent for a kshatriya. A common
attitude, even among Bhumihars themselves, is that theirs is a caste in
which most of the offspring were produced by illicit unions with lower-
caste women. There are histories of this in almost every major family
group, and it is usually traced back to service in the Maharaja's court.
The most common sort of slander among feuding Bhumihars is to accuse
the other faction of such a bastard origin. Yet even the sure knowledge of
impure ancestry is not an impediment to marriage seekers if the family in
question happens to be wealthy.
There was a poor "outcaste" Bhumihar in Arunpur-outcaste in the
sense that no one would marry into his family nor openly eat in his house
(although he eats in the house of others). His father had kept a Kohar
woman and he was produced from this union. His own marriage was ar-
ranged with a Bhumihar girl only because his neighbors and fellow caste
men were willing to support him at the time and deceived the girl's father
about his true ancestry.4 The villagers contrast this case of a gentle man's
helpless situation with that of a big man in the area whose house contains
a similar scandal. Although the latter is not well liked, "everyone runs to
eat in his house" because of his great wealth, and he was able to marry
his daughter into a good Bhumihar family.
Among themselves and others, Bhumihars also have the reputation of
being an unusually prestige-conscious group harboring immense feelings
of competition. Most often, this takes the form of trying to appropriate
the best lands, appear as the best men (e.g., in marriage alliances or ex-
penditure, house construction, material wealth, and education), push
down others who would rise up, and maintain rather poor relationships
with the lower castes both in thought and practice.
The Brahmans do not effectively enter the political arena in Arunpur
because of material poverty as well as poverty of prestige. They are
highly untypical representatives of their status group. All but one group
of related households (khandan) are notorious for entering into illicit
unions. It is difficult for their sons to marry and they must "purchase"
(pay bride-price for) wives, which further perpetuates their notoriety.
Even though other villagers do not approve of their behavior, however,
they are not outcaste in the sense that all services or social intercourse are
j
FIOURE 6. A Brahman from a nearby village performs traditional priest-
ly functions during the naming ceremony for a newborn Bhumihar.
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withdrawn from them. To become outcaste means, as in the elderly
Bhumihar's case, to be put out of one's biradari for marriage and com-
mensal purposes and not to lose one's caste (jati). Even if a Brahman is
outcaste in this sense, he is still considered higher than a Kurmi and all
other castes, and so he will continue to be served by his clients (prajas).
This was acknowledged to be a rather recent definition of "outcaste"
and villagers regarded it as reflecting the weakening of caste sanctions.
In addition to their illicit unions, Arunpur Brahmans also eat meat,
drink, smoke ganjha and one of them has taken on the job of goat
slaughterer. One khandan, consisting of the separate households of five
brothers, is well known for their practice of buying wives. The latter
practice no form of purdah (seclusion and covering of the face) and
openly help their menfolk in the fields.
The Kurmis are not a political match for the Bhumihars, either.
Known to be traditional agriculturalists whose men, women, and chil-
dren are extremely hard working and industrious, they take little part in
village feuds and are not consulted for effective dispute settlement. Prac-
tically all Kurmis own some land or have a cash income from other jobs.
Even the heads of the two largest and wealthiest households make no at-
tempt actively to enter the political arena. For the most part, they feel
that the Bhumihars are not to be meddled with and that, since Kurmis are
economically independent and not tied to any particular faction, it is bet-
ter to concentrate on one's own affairs to achieve greater prosperity. On
certain occasions, especially the panchayat elections, they will support
one or the other Bhumihar party.
There is one older Kurmi who is trying to raise his caste's status by ad-
vocating that others follow his example by praying daily and refraining
from meat and drink. A few others have adopted the surname Singh and
bave begun wearing the sacred thread (janeu) previously forbidden to
castes included in the shudra varna. The Kurmis do not actively follow
him and he is considered less educated and generally more conservative
in his beliefs. He often complained that the Kurmis are not united and
that this inhibits them from putting up a candidate of their caste, or even
lower, to stand against the Bhumihars in the panchayat elections. He
believes that the strength of the Bhumihars lies in their unity as compared
to other castes and their success in dividing others by flattery and fear.
The economic independence and ethic of hard work for which the Kur-
mis are noted has inspired a rather grudging respect among the Bhumi-
bars. Just how grudging it is was uncovered by the feelings expressed
during the statewide midterm elections (February, 1969). Then the high
castes chided Kurmis who thought their caste man would win because of
their greater numerical strength in the area but who lost nonetheless.
--
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Other castes present in Arunpur either own little land or engage in
some occupation that does not provide them with a thriving livelihood.
The one exception to this is a comparatively prosperous and large Kalwar
family, but they, too, take pains to avoid crossing the Bhumihars, whom
they both fear and respect. Some lower-caste families are personally
bound to different Bhumihars by a jajmani relationship or by in-
debtedness for money or favors received in the past. Yet only when one
speaks of the Untouchables (primarily the Chamars) is the absolute
dependence upon the upper castes so clearly revealed. The type of con-
flict and friction that this position entails is important in village politics, /
and the situation is more fully explored in a later chapter. Suffice it to
say here that the Untouchables are overwhelmingly landless and there is
little scope for them to pursue any occupation other than that of agricul-
turallaborer. This is due both to their situation of poverty, which has
reduced their opportunities to practically nothing, and to the pressure ex-
erted by the Bhumihars.
Traditional relationships between master and servant still survive in
the village. Chamars who are ploughmen or agricultural laborers are the
most subordinate workers. As Cohn notes for a similar village just north
of Banaras, "members of other caste groups in the village also do
agricultural work, but since the Chamars are the most numerous of the
impoverished lower castes, an employer talking about his 'laborers'
(mazdooras) is most likely to be referring to his Chamars" (1955:56).
The distribution of political power in Arunpur still coincides with the
distribution of economic power, even though the traditional ordering of
economic relations through jajmani ties has considerably altered. Jajma- V
ni makes use of hereditary personal relationships to express a division of
labor and regulate the flow of goods and services from one caste to
another according to custom. In this way it acts to preserve ritual purity
by delegating polluting tasks to lower castes (Gould 1967:36ff; see also
Kolenda's discussion of Wiser, Beidelman, and Leach, 1966) and is in-
trinsic to the hierarchical nature of caste. Traditionally, each caste was
accorded a particular occupation and a person became a "client" (praja)
when he performed that service for a specific "patron" (jajman).
Payments were made in kind and took the form either of biennial presen-
tations of grain, of the use of a piece of land, or of separate payments for
participation in individual ceremonies.
For the most part, the patron-client tie was a hereditary one, and the
patron could not arbitrarily change a traditional worker. Similarly, no
one other than the hereditary worker could perform such services.
Although the roles of patron and client are ideally interchangeable, the
former on one occasion becoming the latter on the next, it is the ksha-
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triya or dominant landowner who is recognized as the patron par ex-
cellence. The royal court with king and retainers is reproduced in
miniature by the dominant caste and its clients in present-day Indian
villages (Hocart 1950:79; Dumont 1962:52-53; 1972:205-207; Pocock
1962:79; cf. Gould 1967:40-41).
Of the sixteen castes present in Arunpur (excluding the ex-zamindar
Babu Sahib, who belongs to a merchant caste), only the Bhumihars and
Kurmis are always in the position of patron. These two groups are still
primarily engaged in agriculture, although today they follow a variety of
other occupations. The remaining castes each formerly had a traditional
service occupation which they exchanged with one another but mostly
rendered to Bhumihar families. The Brahman is the epitome of a reli-
gious specialist in jajmani relations, and he has no economic service or
commodity to offer at all (Pocock 1962:85, 91-92). Because of their low
status in the village, however, no Bhumihar employs an Arunpur Brah-
man to perform any ceremony or ritual. These Brahmans perform ritualsj for Chamars instead, contrary to a taboo on the offering of their services
to Untouchables.
Some members of the Nai and the Dhobi castes are still strongly in-
volved in jajmani. As there is no one of the Dhobi caste in Arunpur,
Bhumihar and Kurmi families employ those from another village to clean
their clothes and annually pay them fifteen to twenty sers (one ser = two
pounds) of grain per household. In 1948, Opler and Singh found that no
villager of Senapur (twenty-five miles north of Banaras), "no matter
how low his social status, cuts his own hair or shaves himself" (Opler
and Singh 1948:486). More than twenty-five years later, a different pic-
ture is presented in Arunpur. Here, many of the younger men avail
themselves of the razor blade or prefer to have a haircut and shave at an
outside barber shop. Yet though the razor may take away the barber's
daily work, it does not destroy his jajmani relationships. The economic
services that the Nai and his wife perform, like those of the Dhobi, are
intimately embedded in the ideas of purity and pollution and are integral
to all rituals. From shaving and hair and nail cutting to acting as a
messenger, painting the feet of patrons with henna dye on auspicious oc-
casions, and giving massages, they are present at every extraordinary oc-
casion taking place in a Bhumihar's life.
Even among the Nais, however, the traditional rules regarding heredi-Jtary arrangements between patron and client have given way to a more
flexible arrangement that takes into account the situational factors
affecting the persons involved. In one case, a Nai left a patron when the
latter became the rival of another patron with whom the Nai had ex-
tremely strong ties. The Nai told me:
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Jajmani is a matter of love. If there is no love, there is nothing like a patron.
Narain Singh was my patron, but he lost my love, so he lost his jajmani. Jaj-
mani is not an imposed bond .... I left Narain and then he called upon a
Muslim Nai-but his wife [the Muslim's] cannot go into the house, so he is
in trouble. Narain requested many times that I again become his client, but I
cannot. This jajmani is a matter of love, but it is such a stupid thing, that if
one who has served all his life [as client] becomes old, he will be thrown
away. Nobody will ask about him.
It is not clear whether or not such infractions of jajmani rules occurred
in the past and, if they did, with what frequency. Yet there seems no
reason to think that people could not have adjusted to a new situation as
their changing relationships warranted. Similarly, the Nai also said that
the Bhumihars paid him less and expected more service than the lower
castes. Although descriptions of jajmani stress the element of reciprocity
and the stabilizing and integrating aspects of the system, an equally
strong element is the asymmetrical nature of the power relationships
discussed earlier.
The Kahars are another caste in Arunpur who still refer to themselves
as clients serving particular patrons. Their traditional occupation was to
draw water, roast grains, and act as general servants on any occasion
when a large number of people gathered at a Bhumihar's home. Today
this is confined to grain parching by the women and participation at wed-
dings, births, deaths, and other ceremonies and feasts. They can also act
as messengers at such times and accompany their patron when he goes to
attend some function in another village. But their main source of income
now is from the cultivation of fish and a form of water chestnut in the
two village ponds. The Kahars complained that the confined area of their
jajmani relationship has now become an unprofitable one and that only
fear of what the Bhumihars and other villagers would say and do makes
them continue the work. They receive payments for individual occasions
on which some service is performed. Although the presence of Kahars
was required on all ceremonial occasions, they seemed to perform no
function that was integral to the ritual aspect regarding purity and
pollution-unlike the Nai and Dhobi.
The Lohars as a whole have not participated in jajmani relationships
for the past thirty years. Like the village Telis who used to be involved in
oil pressing, they found less and less of a demand for their services as
new machines and parts became available in the city. Only three elderly
men (aged fifty, sixty, and seventy) continue to do this work in the
village. One said that he receives two maunds (one maund = eighty
pounds) as the total annual payment from all his patrons. The second
receives pay on a seasonal basis; for each plough that he services, he
FIGURE 7. A Lohar works on a plough.
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receives twelve seT'S at each of the two harvest times and five sers at the
time of planting. The third Lohar works in the neighboring village of
Ramapur for part of the year, and in the remaining six months takes
work on a cash basis. One young man, who tried to perform his tradi-
tional occupation in the village and could not get enough work, has been
engaged in making bicycle bells for the last three years. He occasionally
works in the village on Sundays as a laborer, at the rate of three rupees
per day. Another young boy, aged sixteen, does carpentry work in Arun-
pur and nearby villages for a daily wage of three rupees.
The Telis, Kohars, Noniyas, and Kalwars do not participate in any sort
of jajmani relationship with the Bhumihars or any other caste in the
village today. Two Kohar men follow their traditional occupations but
require individual payment for each one of their products. The Chamars
no longer perform the polluting tasks-once considered their most im-
portant functions-of removing dead animals and leatherworking. Un-
like the Telis, whose work was taken away from them by the introduction
of machines that press the oil seeds, the Chamars gave up a traditional
occupation which they felt was more degrading than profitable. They are
now engaged in many different occupations but work primarily as un-
skilled laborers. Only the women continue to act as midwives at child-
birth and assist the mother and child while they are in a polluted state.
The Untouchable Musahars prepare leaf plates that are used on the occa-
sion of every large feast and also remove the used plates when the feast is
over. In the cases of both the Chamar women and the Musahars, pay-
ment is made to them at the time service is rendered.
In trying to understand the nature of jajmani as it survives in Arunpur
today and the way in which it has changed, we need to distinguish it from
the more generic patron-client relationship as well as to examine the eJ!:-
tent to which it may constitute a system that includes the landlord-
laborer bond as well. Patron-client contracts, a characteristic of all pea-
sant societies, bind people of significantly unequal economic statuses
who exchange different types of goods and services. The tie is vertical
and asymmetrical and the exchange between the two is based on moral
paternalism (Foster 1963:1281). Among the several different kinds of
patron-client ties in an Indian village may be found: rich man and
dependents, creditor and debtor, landlord and tenant, faction leader and
follower, landlord and laborer, and jajman and praja.
The bond between the jajman and praja expresses the ritualized
economic interaction among castes that anthropologists have formalized
into a system, and is the prototype for all other patron-client relation-
ships. As Pocock points out, however, there is a difference between the
dependence of a landowner upon labor and the dependence of the same
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FIGURE 8. A Musahar gathers wood.
man for the performance of a marriage (1962:82). Jajman (or yajman)
literally means "the one who gives the sacrifice," that is, the person
employing a priest. Its meaning is extended to include those who employ
others and give remuneration for services performed. The opposite of
jajman is praja (or kamin), denoting a "dependent" or "subject"-from
the raja-praja dyad. Praja also refers to those castes whose hereditary
specialization derives from the basic opposition of purity and impurity
and, by extension of this idea, encompasses what may seem to be purely
economic activities. Villagers used the term proja to refer to both rela-
tionships, that of jajmani and that of the more general political domina-
tion by the Bhumihars.
/ It seems a moot point to debate whether jajmani is based on reciproci-
v ty or on dominance (e.g., Wiser 1936; Ishwaran 1966; Beidelman 1959;
Crans 1968); it is based on both. While there is little doubt that the sur-
face relationship belies a reliance on dominance and coercion, a deeper,
underlying meaning lies in the legitimation of unequal relations through
the hierarchical values of caste. Not only can we assume that these values
were generally subscribed to, even by clients on the bottom end, but the
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advantages of the system must have acted as an incentive to patrons to
meet their moral obligations (Epstein 1967:233; Scott 1972:8ff; Moffatt
1975; see also Mencher 1974a).
There is no unanimous agreement regarding the extent to which the
landlord (malik) and laborer (mazdur) tie may be considered as part of a
jajmani system. The more general view is to include all village economic
relationships within the purview of jajmani (e.g. Breman 1974:13ff). On
the other hand, Epstein speaks of two separate types of links with a jaj-
man-that of their functionnaires and that between peasant masters and
Untouchable agricultural laborers (1967:232; also Cohn 1955:56; 1965:
88; Harper 1968). Pocock recognizes that "hereditary specialization is an
'organizing principle' of the caste system" (1962:89) but disputes that it
constitutes a single system of relationships and argues forcefully for a
separation of the services of the unskilled laborer from inclusion in jaj-
mani (1962). There is, however, the difficulty of deciding to which cate-
gory (i.e., specialization intrinsic to the caste system or that relating to
purely economic activities) castes belong. Pocock considers the Untouch-
ables, for example, as part of the category where ritual activities predom-
inate. Yet they provide, and provided, the majority of agricultural
laborers. The Untouchability of the Pasis, Dharkars, and Musahars (un-
til recently, when they began to remove used plates at feasts when
Chamars refused to do so) also seems to be more strongly correlated with
the food they eat (e.g., pig, mouse, frog) than any ritual services they
perform (see also Opler and Singh 1948:488).
A way out of this dilemma is to turn the argument on its head and use
the category, not a particular caste, as the independent variable. In this
way, a continuum may be devised showing the extent to which a caste: (1)
traditionally incorporated different types of relationships, and (2) has
moved into new categories. A comparison of these two points would
enable further analysis of which castes (i.e., in terms of their occupations
and functions) are integral to the caste system as a system, as well as pro-
viding a baseline from which to determine how much change can occur
before the structure of caste has been left with a name alone.
It is necessary, therefore, to separate out those aspects of traditional
caste specialization inherent in a single caste (Le., removal of dead
animals, haircut and shave, washing clothes, and so on) and those ac-
tivities into which any successful or unsuccessful caste member may have
partaken (e.g., landholding, agriculture, or labor). Insofar as Charnars
undertook their traditional services of a polluting nature for customary
payments, we may see them as operating in jajmani; insofar as they were
engaged as agricultural laborers, whose exact conditions of labor in-
volved them in a purely economic relationship that was often on a con-
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tractual basis (Harper 1968:46ff), we may see this as a separate relation-
ship. In addition, low castes are more numerous than those of the strictly
service castes, and the carting away of dead animals, leatherworking,
and midwifery chores could not possibly have supported a large number
of Chamars (Harper 1968:45, fn).'
J The similarity between the landlord-laborer bond and that of jajman-
praja may now be seen. Both are based on a moral and paternalistic
patron-client dyad in which the weaker party exchanges security for in-
equality. The differences are, however, significant. Associated with the
variations in terminology applied is the fact that a laborer is usually com-
pletely dependent on only one master, while other castes serve many.
Such complete dependence of the former does not leave much assurance
that the moral obligations of the landlord were always carried out fully in
the past. Laborers do not necessarily come from any single caste.
Although in Arunpur, as throughout most of India, they are predomi-
nantly Untouchables, there are many instances where tenants of other
castes have been reduced to laborers, especially after zamindari abolition
and the more recent advances in capitalist agriculture. Relations between
landlord and laborer are, moreover, more on a contractual basis and
there is evidence that they were like this in the past as well. 6
Since 1947, when occupational mobility became more marked, there
has been a greater dissociation of caste, occupation, and involvement in
jajmani relationships in Arunpur (see Table 4, Chap. 2). It would not
have been difficult to predict that those castes which performed a greater
number of functions intimately tied to ritual activities would remain
closer to the system through time. Others, such as the Kalwar, Noniya,
Lohar, Kohar, and Teli, whose participation in these activities is less re-
quired and who can shift more easily to a cash market economy, have
Vtended to drift earliest from the traditional form of exchange. With this
increasing participation in nonhereditary occupations and a cash econo-
my, marked by a general decline in traditional relationships, the tenden-
cy is to equatejajmani more and more with the purely ritual-ceremonial
occasions and less with the economic exchange of services.
./ . Several factors have led to this lessening of jajmani ties in the village.
First, there is the existence of nearby bazaars and, in Banaras city itself,
other alternative means of obtaining services. A person who works in the
city or a young man who fancies himself smart may find it more conve-
nient or prestigious to use extravillage facilities. Second, many functions
have been displaced by newer modes of production, while the changing
economic scene has also created entirely new opportunities. For instance,
some forty-five village men now work outside Arunpur and commute
daily-mostly to Banaras. A growing number, now thirty-two men, are
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FIGURE 9. A Kohar sits before his potter's wheel. Pandeyji is behind
him.
also employed at places that are distant enough that they are required to
live there. In most cases, a man leaves his wife and children in the village
and returns to Arunpur during his vacation time. There is a greate.r
tendency on the part of those who increasingly participate in cash-
producing occupations to make monetary payments on the specific occa-
sion a service is rendered. This is especially true of those castes that are
primarily nonagricultural and thus cannot pay in kind. In addition, some
people feel that they no longer wish to perform certain demeaning jobs
required of their caste.
The Chamars, for example, have given up removing, skinning, and
eating dead animals, and eating the leftovers at feasts. The latter job is
performed by Musahars, while Chamars of other villages perform the
former tasks. In several other ways, the ties they now have with par-
ticular Bhumihars and Brahmans differ from that of the traditional jaj-
mani relationship. For one thing, being a ploughman or an agricultural
worker is not a hereditary occupation but is due to the economic exigen-
cies of a man's life. Some Chamars, who have a little education and ini-
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tiative and are not bound by indebtedness, do gain other employment as
daily laborers in Banaras, as rickshaw drivers or even as officers in the
government Community Development program.
There are limits, however, to the new occupations upon which villagers
will embark. Agriculture is open to all castes, but a barber will not take
on a washerman's work in Arunpur, or vice versa. There is a wider range
of positions that men of all castes can hold outside the village. Even this
has limits, however. For example, primarily because the job of pedaling
a rickshaw has fallen to the lot of Chamars, many Kurmis believe that
such work is below their status and would not do it even if there were a
promise of greater economic gain. Here, people's behavior is still regu-
lated by what they feel are the rules proper to village society. On the
other hand, a Bhumihar told me that he has no objection whatsoever to
starting a shoe factory in some large city, providing he could be sure of a
profit.
INFORMAL RELATIONS AMONG CASTES: FRIENDSHIP AND SEX
Hierarchy, and its expression through patterns of deference, does not
present the complete picture of intercaste relations in Arunpur. Rules
regarding hierarchy, deference, or commensality are adapted by the peo-
ple to fit their own particular pattern of relationships and iodiosyn-
crasies. As I observed village life, I was struck by two major areas that
provide exceptions to the accepted rules of behavior: friendship and il-
licit sexual relations.
Friendship is formed on the basis of variables other than caste status,
1/' such as personal preferences or proximity to one another, and often in-
volves breaking certain caste strictures. There are close relations between
one Brahman family and the Lohars, whose houses are adjacent to one
another. A Brahman woman of the same household sits on the ground
with a Chamar woman who often visits her and each one uses a kinship
term for the other. Similarly, some Brahmans who are supposed to eat
only fried (pakka) food of non-Brahmans, would eat boiled (kacca) food
at the homes of their Lohar and Kurmi neighbors. Bhumihar children ate
boiled food at a Nai's marriage party and little Brahman girls aided in
the construction of a Kurmi men's sitting place (baithka). The children
did this because the Kurmis often gave food to their poor families.
A particuiarly close friendship also exists between a Bhumihar and a
Kurmi. The latter was invited to a small feast for intimate friends at the
former's house and ate in the same line as other Bhumihars and Brah-
mans. An older Bhumihar woman could squat on the ground in the Cha-
mar pura and chat with the men and women there; and I have even seen
Bhumihar men sit on the low side of the cot with other castes. 7 Perhaps
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FIGURE 10. Villagers participate in wrestling matches and feats of
strength on the festival of Tij.
the most striking contravention of caste rules is the sharing of the earthen 1.0--"'
ganjha pipe (chi/am) by all castes, including Untouchables.
Behavior regarding eating, drinking, smoking, sitting together, and
having friendships across caste lines seems to depend on the personal
preferences and choices of the individuals involved. The powerless and
poor Brahmans, for example, do not have much to lose by exhibiting
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friendship to others beneath them. Nor do they feel any pressure from
their caste mates to act differently, since caste control among this group
in the village is ineffective. Though such feeling is strong among the
Bhumihars as a whole and their sanctions are forceful, there are those
among them whose circumstances do not necessitate such strict adher-
ence to behavioral rules to maintain their prestige. The college-educated
young men, those who work outside the village or those whose caste is
high but whose economic position is lower could manipulate the rules
with a greater flexibility. But there were certain Bhumihars, usually the
older and more powerful men in the village, who would never exhibit
such behavior and tended to guard closely the activities of their family
members. They sat as equals only among their (caste) equals. Those
whose prestige was high enter only into relationships which would either
maintain or enhance their perceived prestige.
The matter of illicit sexual relations should also be viewed in this con-
text. I refer not to those stable unions which result from the infraction of
marriage rules, as among the Brahmans, but the more furtive affairs be-
tween people of two different castes. The majority of these involved
Bhumihar men and lower-caste women (especially Chamars) and thus
connect sex to dominance and inequality in the distribution of power.
One affair involved a Bhumihar boy and a Kurmi girl-both of whom
were married. The girl's father informed the men of the boy's family
several times of the matter and asked them to intercede. Another situa-
tion involved a rather notorious Parihar girl who had affairs with
Bhumihars, Brahmans, and Lohars in the village. Similar stories were
confirmed about the behavior of Bhumihar girls in a neighboring village.
One of the sisters of an Arunpur Brahman family was said to operate a
house of ill repute in Banaras where several of her brothers' non-
Brahman wives had stayed.
There were also cases involving Kohar women and Bhumihars. One
married girl conceived a child and was sent back to her husband's village
when she was five months pregnant. They did not accept her in that con-
dition and so she was returned to her father's house, only to be remarried
after the birth of her child. While we were in the village, we were told of
another ongoing liaison between a Kohar girl and a Bhumihar. Two
Bhumihars also told of having affairs with Brahman girls in their youth,
while a common sort of factional slander was to accuse the other party of
having had sexual relations with women in their own patti (i.e., women
considered to be their "sisters").
As mentioned, the most common occurrences of these relations were
between Bhumihars and their female Chamar workers or dependents.
Men of all castes openly acknowledged this. Often it was revealed to il-
lustrate the point that while higher castes would not touch or drink the
CASTE AND KIN 79
water of a Chamar nor sit on the same cot, they did not hesitate to touch
their bodies. At other times the topic would come up when villagers
asked whether my assistant and I had accepted the blessed offerings of
sweets (prasad) of a Chamar, or whether we had taken food and drink
from them. In one particular case, my assistant became angry with a man _
who was arguing loudly on this point, and said: "Okay. I ate there. What
did I do wrong? It makes no difference. We are still better than those
who have made love to them in the fields." Upon hearing this, the man
in question left immediately without a word.
This situation, in which Bhumihars take advantage of the women who
come to work for them, had become intolerable for the Chamars. When
a group of them drafted a letter to Jagjivan Ram, a Chamar who was
then Food Minister in the national government, it became the issue of a
major complaint (see Chapter 8). The unfortunate lengths to which af-
fairs can go is illustrated by the sad tale of a twenty-two-year-old
Musahar who drowned himself by jumping into a village well. This oc-
curred after a heated argument with his wife in which she refused to stop
her relationship with two Bhumihars for whom she worked. It was re-
ported that she received many favors from them both in cash and in
kind.
The purpose in revealing this aspect of village life has been to show
that such behavior is a form of expression as important and valid as are
the rules which explicitly deny such relationships. Further, it is also an
example of the existence of contradictory rules to which people may refer -
in making behavioral choices. In this case, the rules regarding intercaste
relations, which are governed by the concepts of purity and pollution,
are supplemented by a rule that accepts this sort of behavior (in fact,
even expects it) from the rich and powerful dominant castes. While the
situations involving Touchable women seem to be random and based on
the personalities of the parties to an affair, those concerning the Un-
touchables have this added structural variable of differential power.
Conflicts among castes, especially between the Bhumihars and Cha-
mars, seem to play an increasingly important role in village politics. At
the same time, the major political activity in Arunpur is organized by
factions that cut across the dominant caste of Bhumihars. This has
resulted to some extent from splits within a khandan (largest group of
related males). The structure of kinship, especially kin groups in the
village, is crucial to an understanding of this intracaste cleavage.
KINSHIP IN ARUNPUR
The most notable variations in kin groups of different castes are those
relating to family size and the position of women. These, in turn, cor-
relate highly with economic position. Arunpur is typical of the rest of In-
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FIGURE 11. Men of all castes share the ganjha chi/am. From left to right:
a Brahman, two Dharkars, and a Bhumihar enjoy a smoke while sitting
along a tubewell canal.
dia where the size and extension (both generational and collateral) of a
joint family are contingent upon its wealth; the biggest families· are the
wealthiest. The largest joint family in the village consists of forty-four
members; three elderly Bhumihar brothers and their offspring (married
sons with their wives and unmarried sons and daughters), grandchildren,
and great grandchildren. They feel, however, that the family has become
too large and unwieldy to continue living together amicably and are
preparing for an eventual friendly division of property to prevent bitter
conflicts. To this end, they are systematically acquiring more land until
they have approximately one hundred fifty bighas. At that time, all land
and other assets (including a family brick-making business and pumping
set) would be divided equally among the three brothers. This is in strict
adherence to the rule of equal distribution of joint family property
regardless of the number of offspring involved. The eldest brother has
sixteen dependents (males and unmarried females), and the two younger
ones have nine and three respectively. This decision regarding property
division has been accepted as fair and inevitable by all concerned.
As can be expected by referring to Tables 2 and 3, wealth correlated
J
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positively with rank in the caste hierarchy and thus the largest families
are found among the wealthiest of the Bhumihars. Among other castes,
only three Kurmi families and one among the Kalwars are wealthy
enough to support families numbering sixteen to twenty-four members.
The most highly educated Chamar family, with 1.25 bighas of land, con-
sists of nineteen people: two brothers, their wives, and the three sons of
the younger brother and their wives and children. Economic pressures
account for the tendency among Chamars and other Untouchables for
married brothers to split apart even while their father lives. In other
castes, this usually occurs after the father has passed away and when
respect for him and his wishes no longer keeps the family together.
Despite such divisions, new joint families quickly spring up as soon as a
man's eldest son marries.
Family size is an important factor within the arena of village politics __
for, more often than not, decisions reached are backed up by the implicit
or explicit use of force (see also Beteille 1969b:188). The success of this
threat depends upon the number of m~n one can call upon for support
who are willing to engage in open conflict (with bamboo poles, sticks,
spears, and fists) if necessary. Many past cases of conflict over property
involved the use of force, and force figured prominently in the disputes
over water we observed or heard about during our stay. The primary
level for the recruitment of support is thus the undivided family. At this
level one refers to the parivar (family), which is either nuclear or joint
(sanyukt). The latter consists of lineal or collateral male kinsmen (or
both), their spouses, and unmarried females sharing one house, one
cooking place (chulha), and maintaining undivided property and house-
hold expenses.
Villagers put most emphasis on the maintenance of joint property in
their discussion of the meaning of parivar. They see the major ad-
vantages as economic, for by pooling resources, more money is saved ,,/
and manpower is consolidated for work and use as a pressure group. No
less important is the fact that the social life of an Indian is intrinsically
family-centered and that the sense of security and well-being that comes
from being among one's own far outweighs any advantage that may ac-
crue to the single nuclear family. The word bans is used to refer to a
man's male offspring and the value placed on the continuation of the
bans is often an important reason for the existence of large families.
We were told that to succeed in joint family living, the following prin-
ciples must be enjoined: (I) There must be no favoritism within the
family-every other child is to be treated as one's own, and you must
always consider the other person. If anything is to be bought, for exam-
ple, for one's child or wife, it must be presented equally to all. (2) All
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must contribute their total income to a joint account. The man with one
son and a large income should be treated no differently than the man
with a smaller income and many children. (3) There should be a single,
powerful decision maker whom all must obey.
The essence of this formula seems to be the stress on unselfishness and
equality. But despite the almost universal preference for the joint family,
j ' it is recognized that there are many tensions within such a group;sometimes they simmer below the surface so that members only grumble
about the arrangement, but often they explode to the surface and end in
a definite rupture. In the following discussion, I shall try to give some
idea of the nature of conflict that can arise at the level of the family and
reserve for the next chapter elucidation of case histories.
In a large family with a wide generational span, compounded by dif-
ferential access to education, there is often conflict between the elders
and the younger men. The former feel that they are not respected
enough, nor are their opinions actively sought and heeded. The latter,~ more educated, wish to implement their ideas, which often represent a
change from established patterns. Those in large families sometimes ex-
pressed the feeling that their life had become depersonalized and that the
scale of living in a household of many persons was like that of a "hotel"
or "factory." People complained of not receiving enough individual at-
tention. One man said that this was a constant source of friction in his
life. His wife was ill and weak from many pregnancies, yet no one in the
family would look after her properly or see that she received medical at-
tention. When he finally took it upon himself to do so and diverted some
of his salary to pay the bills, an open breach occurred. Conversely, the
same man was accused by another family member of being too selfish
and of caring for his wife more than for the family or the money he
spent.
Another area of dissension arises from the inequality of labor and
wage contributions, despite the second injunction just given. We were
told that the joint family is a system which breeds many parasites and
cripples. The necessity to support a noncontributing member rankled
others. The head of the family may also feel himself overburdened
because he is the only one who properly cares about the family and mustj arrange everything. Connected with this sore point are the disputes which
arise from the maintenance of a joint family account. Some people do
not adhere to the first stipulation cited and keep separate items for
themselves or hold back part of their wages to be spent on personal
items. The greater availability of, and emphasis upon, the acquistion of
material goods has often increased desires to a point beyond which the
economy of a joint household can survive. Disputes also arise over the
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FIGURE 12. Bhumihar children from Narain Singh's house.
priorities of expenditure: whether a boy should be sent to college or
another bigha of land purchased instead.
Finally, a whole area of conflict and tension arises out of the clash of
individual personalities with the roles they are supposed to enact. Quar-
rels among women were given as a major reason for the disruption of a
joint family. It was mentioned that there are caste differences in the posi-
tion of women. Generally, the upper castes keep their women in purdah,
while the lower castes let their women work freely in the fields, and, as in
the case of the very poor or the Untouchables, they may also work for
others. The independence of lower-caste women results from their
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greater freedom of movement and earning capacity and contrasts with
those higher in status. There are also differences among families of the
same caste who observe purdah. One family may be stricter than another
and a young bride will never show her face or speak directly with elder
males. Or they may observe the custom of covering the face and slightly
turning the head while still speaking directly to a father-in-law. We
likewise observed differences among individuals in the same family. Still,
the major contrast lies between the Bhumihars on the one hand and the
lower castes on the other.
/ When a young bride first enters her husband's family, she is in an
/ unenviable position of alienation and subservience. The newest entrant,
after an initial period when she is treated as an auspicious guest, must do
the most labor and show the greatest respect to others in the house by her
obedience and quiet demeanor. The new bride is often extremely de-
pressed if, in addition, her husband works outside the village and spends
only brief periods visiting her and his children. In rare cases, she may
even return to live with her parents. Some women are known to be quar-
relsome and argue with all. Some fight only with the other women in the
household or have specific grievances against their mothers-in-law,
whom they may accuse of favoring other sons' wives.
Although a woman seems to have no real escape when the pressures of
/
family life become too great, a skilled man may leave the house for a
period of time and engage in outside employment. Quarrels between
brothers are said to be incited usually by their wives and more rarely arise
due to fundamental differences between male kin. A man may also be on
poor terms with kin whose role expectations would otherwise denote
friendly relations. A joking relationship should exist, for example, be-
tween a man and his elder brother's wife, but this may not necessarily be
the case. Or a man may feel pressure to conform his behavior to ways
that the family demands but with which he is unable to comply. One
woman was perpetually pregnant and had only once brought forth a full,
healthy baby that survived. Consequently she feels weak, unsure of
herself, and unhappy. At night she dreams of all her lost children, and,
tortured by the sight of them before her eyes, wakes up agitated and dis-
turbed. For this reason her husband sleeps in her room every night in-
stead of staying outside the house with the other men. 8 This created
problems and disapproval in the joint family, for such a sleeping ar-
rangement is not their custom and they feel it will be a bad influence on
the younger boys and girls.
Above the family, the next level of kinship is represented by the khan-I dan, a kin group consisting of all the male descendants of a common-
named ancestor, and their wives and unmarried daughters. Within this
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FIGURE 13. Giving an oil massage to newborn infants is a villagewide
practice.
group there is a special term, pattidari, used to refer to all those who had
rights in previously undivided property. The place where pattidars live is
called the patti. They all necessarily belong to the same khandan, but the
term seems to refer more specifically to the most recent property division
among kinsmen. Thus, when the large Bhumihar family mentioned earli-
er achieves their property division, the three brothers and their respective
offspring will become pattidars of one another. At present, however,
their pattidars are the descendants of their father's two brothers, among
whom the property was divided many years ago. There is often friction
among pattidars, and when this gets out of hand, as it has among the
khandan of Little Pura Bhumihars, it can result in the organization of
conflict along factional lines. Here, every familial and personal dispute
tends to escalate out of the personal arena and into the public.
The circumstances out of which a division of property grew provide a
legacy of suspicion and feelings of competition even among friendly pat-
tidars. III feelings are greatest when one of the pattidars seems to prosper
more than another and succeeds in buying more land, building a new
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house, or acquiring a pumping set. In this situation, it is more likely that
only a threat to the patti as a whole will enable them temporarily to
forget their ill will and close ranks against a common enemy. Pattidars,
however, are often mutually helpful in the matter of water distribution,
lending agricultural implements, aiding in agricultural activities, and all
social or ceremonial occasions.
So far, I have spoken of kin groups and relationships that are relevant
to the social universe at the village level. Wider groups come into view
when marriage is being considered, as the village is an exogamous unit.
The gotra, often regarded as a clan, consists of all those who claim to be
/
descendants of a common rishi (ancient Indian perceptor), and who may
or may not show actual genealogical ties. Among the higher castes-in
Arunpur, the Brahmans and Bhumihars-gotras are exogamous and a
child is a member of his father's gotra. Among Kurmis and other low
castes, marriage takes place within the gotra. The biradari (subcaste) is
an endogamous group that consists of several such clans. As far as could
be discerned, however, these groups played no active role in politics.
Their major importance in this connection lies in the fact that further ex-
tensions of kin ties, through biradari and marriage connections, result in
the formation of alliances with other families who may be called upon to
help in any dispute.
While rules pertaining to kinship and caste exist so that interaction be-
tween people may be carried out smoothly in accordance with learned
o/behavioral expectations, they do not preclude occasions of conflict. Not
only maya person choose to disregard the rules in a particular situation,
but the rules that apply in a given context may also be in contradiction to
one another or necessitate decisions which choose among alternative
rules. This chapter has indicated several areas in which conflict may
arise. The next chapter takes a closer look, through the use of case
histories, at specific examples of conflict which did not escalate to the
level of the villagewide political arena.
NOTES
1. Touching (including removal of and cleaning) any food or utensil used by
another is considered defiling (jhunta). Although low castes perform these
chores for higher castes, the reverse situation would be even more polluting.
2. That the people of Arunpur do not use the term varna as a referent for caste, and
often do not even know what it means, is a strikingly different situation from
what Miller found. He states that the distinction between varna and jat; in a
Haryana village "is meaningful [to villagers] ... as a mechanism for the
analysis of differential levels of inequality" (1975:59). His glossing of varna as
"caste" and jat; as "sub-caste" is unusual (1975:60), as is his lack of mention of
biradiri (see Miller:71 for bhaichara; cf. Mayer 1960:167ffon bhaibandh).
--
CASTE AND KIN
3. A Nai and a Lohar also used the same surname, Sharma.
4. He was also the sole exception in Arunpur to the rule that Bhumihars do not
touch the plough. Because he is also "outcaste," he most likely suffers no loss of
prestige from doing his own ploughing.
5. A stimulating and provocative article by Meillassoux (1973), an Africanist,
provides a radical departure from most thinking on this subject. He adopts an
historical perspective and concludes that the "status system of the varna was an
attempt to maintain class relationships as they existed during the classical
period" (1973:90). Thus, both class and clientship relations exist beneath the
ideological representations of caste. He maintains that the institutionalized rela-
tions of jajmani are essentially personalistic ones of the patron-client type,
whose nature and political implications override their economic content. They
are not, in essence, exploitative. Such relations, however, are dependent upon
class relations that enable the patron to make use of essential goods for the
maintenance of his clients. Clients profit, through the mediation of the patron,
from the exploitation of laboring classes who provide the surplus to support the
patron-client relation. Class relations include those between the landowner and
his agricultural workers, slaves and serfs (both in the past), tenants, or wage-
earning laborers, "even when they were associated with other paternalistic rela-
tionships" (1973:102-103). Meillassoux sees clientship as derived, secondary
relations that are functionally dependent upon the class relations that fed them.
The ideology of caste-hierarchy and purity-served only to codify and reinforce
the preexisting relations of subordination and alienation.
6. Miller writes that in a Haryana village, Untouchables are separated from other
shudras by being collectively termed mazdur. He also states that the term jajman
does not have wide usage as denoting a patron of service castes but refers only to
relations with the priest (1975:65; 83; also Pocock 1962:88; Breman 1974:20).
7. Caste etiquette demands that when two men can sit on the same cot, the
higher-caste man sit on the high (i.e., completely strung) side while the lower-
caste man sits on the partially strung end. The same division obtains between all
other nonequals (e.g., young and old).
8. In the men's sleeping and sitting place-baithka.
CHAPTERS
Conflict in Arunpur:
Disputes that Do Not
Escalate
/Many activities in an Indian village are concerned with competition for
things of value, that is, command over resources or control over other
men. In Arunpur there are several cleavages across which conflict could
and actually did take place. Some of this political action escalated to the
level of the villagewide political arena. Conflicts over certain resources,
such as land on the open market or the distribution of government
tubewell water, lend themselves more readily to such escalation because
they are theoretically open to all and certainly coveted by all. This is in
sharp contrast to the lack of disputes over the distribution of water from
privately owned pumping sets. Still other disputes, such as those de-
scribed in this chapter, have not spilled over into the villagewide arena
and remain, so far,apart from it. Disputes within a family are less likely
v'to involve others of the community than disputes between factions,
although the latter did originate from an initial split among kinsmen. All
conflicts, however, have the potentiality of entering the wider arena.
The analysis of the way in which political activity that is not part of the
villagewide arena operates at different levels within the village proceeds
through the use of case material relating to conflict within the family,
among affines and pattidars as well as that inherent within the patron-
client (jajman-praja) dyad. The latter specifically excludes those patron-
client ties between the upper castes and their Chamar laborers, as the
conflicts between them entered the village arena. Generally, there seems
--
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to be a greater tendency for nonkin disputes over valued resources to
escalate than for those among kin.
One of the major concerns of the fieldwork was to determine whether
there are boundaries between the political activities that take place at
various structural levels in the village, starting from the simple dyadic
relationship within a family or between neighbors, and those reserved for
the political arena encompassing the whole community. I initially strug-
gled rather unsuccessfully with the Western concepts of "private" and
"public" to equate public decisions with those of a political system. I at-
tempted to attach the caste and big men panchayats to these labels,
respectively, but was forced to abandon this line of thinking. It could not
account for the fact that certain disputes that might be considered public
(i.e., known about by all and settled by outsiders) did not enter the
village political arena, whereas the reverse was sometimes the case.
It became more fruitful to classify the data the way the villagers did.
Their view of the nature of conflict structured the collection, presenta-
tion, and organization of the material to a great extent. What they con-
sidered to be a family matter, so did I; similarly, what they spoke of in
terms of factions (partibandiJ or casteism (jatpat), or as belonging to the
spheres of the caste and big men panchayats, I, too, will speak of in these
terms. To discern their rules for classifying such events, I first put each
case in the appropriate category in which they had described it. Then I
abstracted from the cases in a specific category (e.g., factional, caste
matter, and so on) those variables they had in common that seemed ade-
quately to account for the inclusion of each case in that group. In this
way, I also classified those cases whose categories I had not ascertained
from the villagers. Finally, when I began to try and separate the political
activity of the villagewide arena from other political activity, it became
necessary to answer the following questions: (1) Who are the people in-
volved, and what are the recruitment principles for gaining supporters?
(2) What are the the alternatives for action present in the situation, and
how are these valued? (3) What are the cultural constraints upon, and in-
centives to, alternative actions? Although there remained certain am-
biguities in the attempted classification, a pattern did emerge that distin-
guished between conflict among individuals and the larger villagewide
conflict.
CoNFLICT WITHIN THE FAMILY
The preceding chapter outlined several possible areas of dispute within
the family. Actual case histories will be discussed here to illustrate con-
flict at this level.
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Cases 1 and2: The Wayward Sons c.1966-1969
1. A Brahman man constantly complains of his only son, who is sixteen
years old. The boy was supposed to be enrolled in Arunpur Intercollege
and took his school fees from home every month. But he never attended
classes and instead used the money to run away to Bombay with the ruf-
fian son of an outcaste Bhumihar from Arunpur. After traveling there
without a ticket, he could find no work and so returned home. He goes
often to Banaras to see films and visit prostitutes; he eats betel, polishes
his nails, keeps "long" hair, and takes money from his parents on false
pretenses. Both of his parents are afraid that if they beat him or try to
hold the boy in check, he will either beat them in return or run away and
desert them. They also fear that if he continues this way, with his bad
habits and not studying, no decent Brahman girl will marry him and he
will have to purchase a wife like his other relatives. The boy's major
complaint is that he is not married.
2. A Nai widow has great hopes for her only son which seem doomed.
The boy was admitted to Banaras Hindu University after graduating
from the Intercollege with a first class in his high school examinations.
Although he was already married, while living on the campus he met and
fell in love with a rich girl of the Khatri (scribe) caste who was also at-
tending the University. One day the boy's maternal grandfather saw the
two walking together and asked them what they were doing. The boy
replied that the girl was his beloved and that he couldn't live without her.
She responded similarly. The elderly Nai returned heartbroken to the
village and proceeded to arrange for his grandson's second marriage
ceremony (gauna). At that time his young wife would come and live with
her husband and consummate their marriage. After the bride came, the
grandfather told" her to go to the University and warn both her husband
and the Khatri girl to discontinue their relationship.
The boy failed after his first year at the college and was readmitted to
Arunpur Intercollege. The Khatri girl came to meet him there many
times. The Intercollege Principal also advised the girl to forget the boy,
but she refused to listen. When the grandfather was informed of this, he
went to the school and beat his grandson with a stick before the other
students and the girl. The boy's wife was also there and she managed to
stop the beating after the boy promised to forget his beloved.
Two years passed and the boy was again readmitted to the University
where the Khatri girl was doing her M.Sc. The two began to meet once
again. The boy's wife went to the University one day and started
pleading with him to stop seeing the girl. Nonetheless, the relationship
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continues and the Khatri girl says that she will remain unmarried if she
cannot marry the boy.
Conflict arose over the behavior of an only son in both of these cases.
Sons are in an exceedingly important position in Arunpur, as they are
almost universally in India. It is they who remain with their parents and
support them in their old age; they continue the family line (bans). The
position of an only son is clearly more crucial and is supplemented by the
cultural norm of respect and obedience to one's parents and elders. The
major issue of conflict pertained to the question of marriage. In India,
marriages are arranged by two families when the boy and girl are still
quite young. The actual consummation of the marriage follows upon a
second marriage ceremony (the gauna), which takes place soon after
both reach puberty (about thirteen to fifteen years for a girl and fifteen
to twenty years for a boy). Given the strict segregation of the sexes and
the practice of purdah among upper-caste women, the early first mar-
riage is regarded as a necessity to ensure both the purity of the girl in her
virginity and the psychological satisfaction of the boy in the allure that
his marriage will eventually be consummated.
The Brahman boy complained that his parents had not even arranged
his marriage. The actions of his other kinsmen who had "purchased"
wives presented him with viable alternative modes of behavior with
which to handle the situation, albeit such behavior is generally not con-
doned. The fact that he felt no constraints is clear from his parents' fear
that to discipline him would mean to ultimately lose him. The boy has
also threatened to throw his father out of the house once he does get mar-
ried. On the other hand, the conflict for the Nai boy revolves around the
question of arranged marriage versus' 'love marriage." He had seeming-
ly respected the role expectations for himself of his mother and grand-
father, up to the time I left Arunpur, by choosing to remain within his
previously arranged marriage. Both disputes, however, have stayed
within the family level and there was no recourse to an external decision-
making body (e.g., a caste panchayat).
Cases 3 and 4: The Jealous Wives c. 1953-1969
3. Some fifteen years ago, an elderly Brahman woman, reputed to have
been a go-between in the purchase of girls for marriage, had arranged the
marriage of her husband's younger brother with a Nepali woman. The
latter bore three children while the older woman had none. The Brahman
woman feels that her husband does not care for her and that he lavishes
all his affection and concern on his brother's children. She said that they
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all abuse and beat her and that she has no satisfaction in life. Because of
the constant fighting between the two women, the brothers have been
forced to divide their households and live separately.
1968
4. Raju, a Chamar rickshaw driver, was living in Banaras in a Chamar
woman's house. He formed a liaison with her solely for the purpose of
ultimately acquiring her property. She had a daughter by a previous mar-
riage and now had a son by Raju. With a wife and four children in Arun-
pur, Raju kept the two "wives" separate for a couple of years. Then he
brought the Banaras woman and her two children to live with his wife
and family in the village. The two women fought and Raju beat his first
wife. The situation had become so unbearable that Raju's father decided
to call a panchayat meeting of village big men to settle the dispute.
The major conflict in the Brahman family seemed to result from the
competition between a man's wife and his brother's children for his af-
fection. As already stated, children are an important asset in a man's life,
and the lack of them in this case has triggered the dissension. Additional
conflict also arises from the proverbial antagonism prevailing between
the wives of two brothers, which leads villagers to say: "A hundred
mustaches can live peacefully under one roof, but not four breasts." The
jealousy·felt by the Brahman woman over this displacement of her hus-
band's affection and wealth was too strong to be overcome by his own
feeling of responsibility toward continuing the joint household. Hence,
they ultimately decided to divide. The poverty that exists among the
Chamars, however, does not permit the luxury of maintaining large joint
families, and they quickly break up at the first signs of pressure and ten-
sion. Raju's father had requested the big men (Le., Bhumihars) of Arun-
pur and neighboring villages to sit in a pam:.hayat, and he hoped that they
would tell his son to take the Banaras woman away so that the wife could
live in peace.
This case, along with Case 9 that follows, presents an interesting exam-
ple of the decision to call a big men panchayat to deal with an affair that
normally comes under the jurisdiction of caste panchayats. Presumably
Raju's father felt that if he could get these powerful men to sanction his
decision to return the second woman to Banaras, his son would be bound
to obey. When I arrived at the scene of the panchayat with one of the
Bhumihars who had been called, we found only the Chamars of that
pura, Raju's sister's husband, and an Arunpur Kohar there. Raju told us
that he had succeeded in convincing his relatives to discard the idea of
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calling a panchayat, as that would mean "throwing mud over our
faces." In other words, he felt the necessity to keep this conflict from
escalating to preserve his khandan's prestige. When I asked why they had
not called a caste (biradari) panchayat, which usually treats such matters
as the infraction of caste rules and disputes involving marriages and
divorces, they replied that it is ineffective these days. "Today there is no
moral duty (dharma) and that is why the panchayat is not obeyed."
When the panchayat of the British-appointed village headman of old
used to settle all disputes, the opposing parties quickly forgot they had
been adversaries. Today, in the Chamar's opinion, the presentpradhan
has no comparable power. If consulted, he probably would have advised
them to go to court. There a dispute becomes more entangled and can
smolder for years. Yet even though a poor man of low caste can ill afford
to do so, he will often follow this advice and seek to imitate high-caste
people by taking his case to court. The Chamars realized that the pres-
ence of this alternative method of dispute settlement was drastically af-
fecting the structure of their traditional caste panchayat. At the same
time, the formality and expense involved in actually calling a caste pan-
chayat may also have influenced the Chamar's decision not to do so.
Case 5: The Disaffected Son 1967-1969
Satya is a young (age thirty-six) teacher in the Intercollege who comes
from a large and influential Bhumihar family. About a year before I had
come to the village, his wife became extremely ill during pregnancy. He
did not mention anything to his other family members, who all knew of
her condition, as it is expected that they will take up the responsibility of
looking after others and not only "care for the accounts or the farm."
However, as no one seemed to be concerned about his wife, Satya finally
took her to the hospital in Banaras himself. She stayed there about six to
eight weeks. He was the only person who went to visit her daily and bring
her food.
Satya had the huge expense of paying for her medicines and other bills
after her return home and therefore could not give any money from his
salary (250 rupees per month) to the joint family account. The second
month, he had some money left after the expenses and he gave it to
Chandra, the family member who kept the accounts, through a boy in
the family. Chandra became angry at this and told the boy to return the
money to Satya and to tell him to give it to the family head instead-
Satya's elder brother. Satya kept the money. The account-keeper then
complained to the family head: "Your brother, Satya, not only takes his
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wife to the city, which brings a bad name to the family, but he won't ac-
count for his money. How am I to manage and know where money is
coming from and going to?"
Satya's elder brother confronted him and demanded an explanation of
his behavior and expenditures. The family had spent thousands of rupees
on Satya's education, his brother continued, and it was expected that he
would contribute to the household purse. The two brothers exchanged
hot words and Satya threatened to leave his wife and children in the
village and depart from the house if he was not wanted there and was to
be accused of breaking up the family. The elder brother was not happy
with this, and after that, they stopped speaking to each other. For three
to four months, Satya spoke to no one, neither his elder brother nor even
the women and children in the houshold. He would go early in the morn-
ing to teach at the Intercollege and come home only late at night to eat
and sleep.
Satya remains bitter about the treatment that his wife has received in
the family. He says that everyone knew she was ill and could have died;
but nobody cares for her, "as they care for their cows." He is disillu-
sioned with his life and dissatisfied with living in his family. But he finds
it difficult to make an actual break and take his wife and children away.
This case isimpo,rtant because it most clearly illustrates the type of
vpower conflict that can usually arise in a joint family, as well as reveals
the alternatives for, and constraints upon, action. Each of the three peo-
ple primarily involved-Satya, his elder brother as the family head, and
Chandra the account-keeper-has a certain position in the family and in
relation to one another that has brought about a conflict of interests.
Each felt that in some way their power was being co-opted by another.
As a son of the family, Satya has a duty to honor the interests of the
group first and to contribute his entire earnings to the joint account. He
also is not expected to be seen escorting his wife in public. The Principal
of the Intercollege had once even commented to Satya that it was not
becoming for him to go to Banaras so often with his wife. A man is not
to speak of his own needs in the family, for it is the responsibility of
others to take note to them and do what is necessary. Caught up in the
complexity of running such a large establishment of forty-four house-
hold members, however, the elders were not responsive to the require-
ments of Satya's wife. Satya decided to act for himself because of the
gravity of the situation.
Chandra is Satya's "nephew" (father's elder brother's son's son) and
is expected to accord him due respect. But there is only a small difference
in their ages, and the account-keeper is a B.Sc. and teacher at the Inter-
...
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college in his own right. Furthermore, as the eldest son in his immediate
nuclear family, Chandra became its "head" when his highly regarded
and influential father died. Thus he feels he is his "uncle's" peer, not
subordinate. He also has the additional prestige and power that comes
from keeping the accounts of this large family with its huge and varied
income. The individual personalities of these two further complicate the
issue. Satya is easygoing and carefree, and when he became disaffected
with the family earlier, he gave up keeping the joint family account. This
duty then passed on to Chandra, who takes his task seriously and is hard
working and sensitive in everything he does. The two never got along well
before.
The family head, in both this position as well as that of elder brother
to Satya, is a man to be doubly looked up to and obeyed. As effective
head of the family, he has the power to make all authoritative decisions
and to expect complete compliance with them. Hence, he responded
angrily to the words of his younger brother. His reference to spending
thousands of rupees on Satya's education with the expectation of return
reveals the way in which education is regarded as a precious investment
for a family's future and is one of its most important resources. Educa-
tion means power for a family: the power to make strategic decisions that~
involve intricate knowledge of agricultural innovations, the official
world, and the court system. The power to gain prestige for the family
name, and the power to be able to make good marriage alliances that
provide a constant pool from which to recruit supporters and strengthen
a family's bargaining position in any conflict that may arise, are also
boons of education.
Satya's two major alternatives of action were either to stay with the
family or to leave it; this latter choice being subdivided into leaving with
or without his wife and child. He could not decide to leave without tak-
ing his wife, for on previous occasions when he had taken up jobs in oth-
er cities, he always had to leave his service and return home. His wife was
constantly ill and unhappy when he was gone. The decision lay between
the alternatives of either staying or departing with his family. Though
Satya is extremely unhappy at home, he finds too many constraints on
leaving. His wife, an illiterate village woman, would be miserable in the
city away from other family members. Used to the security and confine-
ment of life in purdah, she could not manage on her own. Satya himself,
for all his talk, admits that he fears what others will think of him and
that he does not want to be regarded as the one who broke up the family.
The unity of his family has also been a great source of prestige and
strength in the village and he is loath to put that position in jeopardy. His
only solution was to remain at home, the aloof, seemingly uncaring and
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disaffected family member. While we were in Arunpur, two other men
belonging to different Bhumihar families had disputes with their family
members. In both instances, they decided to leave the household for a
certain period of time and seek employment elsewhere, leaving wives and
children behind.
Case 6: Forbidden Love 1968-1969
In a large Brahman house consisting of the separate households of five
brothers and a sixth household of a deceased brother's two sons, a dis-
pute arose between the latter two. The younger brother, Mohan, is a
rather slow and plodding individual and is married to a girl from Bana-
ras. The elder brother, Daya, remains unmarried. 1 He is a notorious fig-
ure in the village and known to be a gambler, drinker, "stud," and thief.
When Mohan went to work in Calcutta, Daya lived with the girl in his
absence. She was six months pregnant when her husband returned from
Calcutta, and shortly thereafter went to her father's house in the city.
Meanwhile, Daya took a gold chain and a transistor radio received by
Mohan as a part of his wife's dowry and sold these. Then he tried to sell
the land in which Mohan also had a legal share. Finally, he locked
Mohan out of their joint room in the house and a physical fight fol-
lowed. Mohan ran and brought a knife with which to kill his brother,
while the latter fled to his beloved's house in the city.
Mohan then called upon his wife's father, who knew of the affair, to
come and settle the dispute. But both the girl and her parents preferred
his brother. Many times he also requested that my assistant and myself
go to Banaras to speak with his wife and her father. We never went. The
Pradhan (elected village head) once tried to settle the dispute, but to no
avail. Daya continues to claim all the things his brother received in the
marriage, including his wife, plus all the land shared by the two.
The normal posture between a woman and her husband's elder brother
is that of complete avoidance. There is no other alternate rule for
behavior, and as a desired "resource," the girl clearly belonged to her
husband. The conflict, however, has its roots in the peculiar fact that
Arunpur Brahman women do not observe purdah and in the personal
predilection of the girl and the elder brother. Because of his cleverness,
the brother has also succeeded in winning the affection of her parents.
None of Mohan's attempts to settle the conflict succeeded. Nor would
Daya listen to the advice of the Pradhan, who suggested that they divide
all their property equally. When he finally returned home from Banaras,
he suggested that they all live together again, but his younger brother was
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warned that the arrangement would mean Daya would again start staying
with his wife.
Mohan said that he had another alternative, to sell his share of the
land, nine bise (one bigha = twenty bisel, for 5000 rupees and then go to
a place where land is cheaper and settle there. He also thought of starting
some business in Banaras. But Daya would not permit this sale. Mohan
was unable to act and went to Banaras again to implore his wife's parents
to support him. There he discovered that his mother-in-law had sold
some ornament he had presented to his wife and this made him even
angrier. His relatives blamed him for his inaction, while he said that his
wife, who had meanwhile given birth to a baby girl, was the guilty party.
Daya was entirely to blame.
Mohan was too weak to stand up to his clever elder brother and,
despite the fact that the latter was so completely in the wrong, people
tended to support him more. I had the feeling that Mohan's indecision
added to his loss of respect in the eyes of others. Daya felt absolutely no
constraints on his actions; he neither listened to his other relations, his
friends, the Pradhan, or us. He wanted his brother's possessions (wife in-
cluded), and the single-minded strategy he followed was that of winning
over the people most concerned, that is, the girl and her parents. The fact
that the Pradhan was called upon to intervene was not enough to escalate
this dispute from the family level, for nothing came of his decision. The
Pradhan is an extremely busy man, looks after a large amount of family
land, and is engaged in his own business. He had little interest in or time
to give the matter. Further, the Brahmans in the village are not people of
importance, and these two brothers were conspicuously lacking in prop-
erty and prestige. There did not seem to be any gain for a big man in the
village to exploit this affair for his own ends. As the following chapter
will show more clearly, this case reveals that it is not so much the nature
of the dispute as the people who become involved which determines the
escalation of conflict from the family to the villagewide arena.
Recourse to dispute settlement was made on the level of the immediate
family in almost all of the foregoing six cases. The conflict remained
localized even when outsiders were consulted. Thus, at the level of the",/
family, people are engaged in competing for property, women, affection,
and prestige.
CoNFLICT AMONG AFFINES
Disputes can also occur between two families united by marriage, and for
the most part this type of conflict remains an affair between the affines
concerned and the relatives who acted as go-betweens. It is entirely to
their advantage to see that the conflict does not escalate and terminates
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quickly, for the marriage contract is regarded as forging a permanent
alliance between two families.
Case 7: Dispute over the Giving of Marriage Gifts (Tilakp 1969
Nagesh, a Bhumihar boy, was to be married at the beginning of June.
The girl's family was to send several people to take part in the customary
presentation of gifts before the marriage (ti/ak). Nagesh's family also
planned a marriage for one of their daughter's, to take place May 10-12.
Wishing to avoid the extra expense and bother of having to make sepa-
rate plans to receive and feast the party of gift bearers (which was to be
about fifteen to twenty men but would expand to several hundred when
Nagesh's other relations and villagers were included), they requested his
future wife's family to present the gifts on May II, when their daughter's
marriage would be in progress.
The girl's side said that they could not possibly arrange all the pur-
chases and the necessary people until June. This incensed Nagesh's fami-
ly, and they were ready to send a letter saying that there would be no
presentation and that the gifts previously sent by the girl's side to signify
the bond between the families would be returned.
Nagesh prevailed upon his family to keep to their previous bond and
ultimately the ceremony took place in June, with marriage several days
later at the girl's home.
This conflict arose because of a cultural rule which states that a boy's
family is supreme and all-powerful in a marriage, while the girl's side
must comply with their wishes. The refusal of the girl's family to cooper-
ate added insult to the injury which Nagesh's family already felt, for they
had been doing everything that their daughter's future affines were re-
questing. They expected at least as much in return from Nagesh's pros-
pective in-laws. They constantly compared the 3,000 rupees they received
for expenses in Nagesh's marriage to the 6,000 rupees they planned to
spend in their daughter's marriage. 3
Nagesh's decision not to break a marriage contract that had been
agreed upon some three years earlier is interesting when compared with
the possible alternative of breaking the alliance. As a student at Banaras
Hindu University, Nagesh had met a Bhumihar girl and professed to
have grown most fond of her. He used to visit her and her widowed
mother often at their home in the city. The mother also grew fond of Na-
gesh and wished him to marry her daughter. He refused because his en-
gagement had already taken place, and he felt that to break it would be a
blot on the family name. Further disgrace would come when people dis-
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FIGURE 14. Women gather in the Pradhan's house to bid a sad farewell
to a daughter who is leaving for her in-laws' house, after the gauna.
covered an engagement was broken so that a "love marriage" might take
place. Nagesh's first concern was for his family's prestige (cf. cases 2 and
5). Now, when his family wanted to break off the marriage of their own
accord, thus possibly paving the way for his marriage with the other girl,
Nagesh again appealed to the propriety of the situation. His elders lis-
tened and the wedding took place, even though the gifts did not come.
when they desired.
Case 8: The Second Marriage Ceremony (Gauna) Fight 1969
A second marriage ceremony was taking place in the home of Krishna
Singh from the neighboring village of Ramapur. Krishna Singh is one of
the most powerful, wealthy, and influential Bhumihars in the area. As
Secretary of Arunpur Intercollege and pramukh of the Community De-
velopment Block, he is one of the leaders in his caste, active in politics
and an expert in affairs of both the courts and panchayats. The dispute
took place when the groom and his party reached Krishna's village quite
late in the evening. Their taxi got stuck in the dark and muddy narrow
lanes leading to the house, and the boy refused to get out and walk to the
door. He insisted upon being driven there. It took one and a half hours
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to free the taxi and finally reach that destination. This was the beginning
of what seemed a deliberate attempt by the gauna party to embarrass
their hosts.
The party was requested to come and eat when dinner was ready. They
refused, saying that first they would like five cups of tea. When these
were brought and drunk, they asked for another four, then followed this
by a request for four more cups. The third time the hosts refused to bring
any more tea and again requested that the party come and eat. One of the
guests then said that he had to go to the toilet and the rest insisted upon
waiting for him to return. He came back from the fields after some time
and everyone finally ate. When dinner was over, the groom said that
rather than sleep in the garden, where arrangements for them had
already been made, they would sleep near the house. The hosts finally
agreed when they persisted in this matter. Just at the point of agreement,
however, the party decided that they didn't really want to stay there after
all and started to retire to the garden area. While one of the guests was
putting their things in a suitcase they had brought along, he also picked
up a jacket and scarf belonging to the son of Krishna, a lecturer in an In-
tercollege.
A fight followed the quarrel and verbal abuse over whom the jacket
and scarf belonged to. It is said that Krishna's son landed the first punch
and that the guests (with the exception of the groom) were badly beaten.
They left the house in anger and walked to the main road. There they
stopped a truck, explaining that they wanted to take one of their friends
to the hospital. One of Krishna's acquaintances, who learned what had
happened, reached the scene and requested the driver not to take the
boys. The whole group then began to walk toward Banaras. When they
were near the city station, seven miles from Ramapur, Krishna and some
others caught up with them. They persuaded them to return to the
village, where an informal, on-the-spot panchayat of the family members
and guests concerned was held. Although Krishna and others apologized
and expressed their deep regrets, the groom remained angered.
The following morning, the groom entered the house alone and asked
for his bride, instead of coming with several others of his party as is
customary. He refused to participate in the farewell ritual in which
money and gifts are presented by the women of the house to the groom.
Nor would he partake of the yogurt and sweets which are considered im-
portant to ensure an auspicious departure. Only when one of his close
relatives implored him to comply with this did he accept the things given
by the women as well as the other gifts which were part of his wife's
dowry. These were all loaded in his taxi and a truck and finally the entire
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party departed without having taken food. When they reached their own
village, some forty miles away, the women of the house became furious
upon hearing what had transpired and they became determined to return
the girl. The elder men's decision to let her stay prevailed and saved the
situation, but the women decided, in tum, that they would never let the
girl visit her natal village.
The people involved in this conflict situation, the decisions that they
made, and the results of these choices are all interrelated. As mentioned
previously, not only is the boy's family considered superior in all
marriage-making decisions, but they are also highly critical of the recep-
tion they receive every time a visit is made to the girl's home. There is an
element of testing the extent to which all of one's whims can be satisfied
by the hospitality offered. The groom and his party, however, were act-
ing entirely unreasonably and greatly taxed the patience of their other-
wise accommodating hosts. The decision to remain at the house and sleep
there, for example, was an impertinent and discourteous request. Wom-
en in the house must observe the strictest purdah before affines, and the
thought of a large number of mischievous college boys in front of the
home, when there were young girls within, caused much dismay.
The position of a new bride in her husband's home is an unenviable
one. Any conflict that would serve further to depress her position there is
to be totally avoided. It was with this in mind that Krishna and the son
who was involved in the fight profusely apologized afterwards. There is a
custom in this region (more common among higher castes) that a girl can
return to her natal village only after she has spent at least a year or two at
her new home; it is possible that Krishna's daughter will be penalized and
could spend up to five or more years at her husband's home without ever.
returning to Ramapur. At the same time, villagers generally feel that it is
best to get wives from poorer and lower families, as they will not show
off and will more easily accept their subservient position in the family.
Krishna's house is wealthy and influential, and it was perhaps the need to
assert themselves in a big man's house that led the boy and his party of
college friends to act as they did. It should also be noted that although a
boy has little or no say at all regarding his own marriage arrangements,
his wishes are prominent at the time of the actual marriage and second
marriage ceremony. In many ways, he is treated like a prince and behaves
accordingly.
The hosts decided to comply with all of their guests' demands while
stifling their own anger. The fight which ultimately erupted represented a
serious breach of etiquette. I was told by one of Krishna's close asso-
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dates: "I am convinced that Krishna's son hit first, and though the
guests behaved obnoxiously, it was at their [Le., Krishna's] house and
they must have given a better account of themselves. It was absolutely
wrong on their part [to act that way]." The result of this over-hasty
behavior is that the girl will always suffer in her husband's home,
although the scandal would have been greater had she been returned to
her natal home.
Case 9: The Branded Daughter 1968-1969
Three years before my stay in Arunpur, a poor Teli married his ten-
year-old daughter to a twenty-two-year-old boy from a nearby village.
The second marriage ceremony (gauna) occurred when the girl was
twelve years of age. Her mother-in-law did not let her cohabit with the
boy, as she had not yet reached puberty. The following year, when the
boy came on his vacation to the village from Calcutta, he attempted to
have relations with his wife. She would not cooperate with him. The boy
started to beat her in anger and then took an iron bar from the fire and
branded her on the face. The father heard of this, took his daughter
home to Arunpur and then called upon the big men of the village to come
and settle the dispute.
This situation is similar to that of Case 4 earlier, where a matter con-
sidered within the realm of a caste panchayat is referred instead to that of
the big men. The Teli said that he had gone through the village and re-
quested all the big men (in this case, the wealthy Bhumihars as well as
two wealthy Kurmis) to come; most told him that they would, but only
two came, along with a few observers. When asked why he did not call a
caste panchayat, the Teli said: "What do you talk of a caste panchayat?
Even the Pradhan, who is an officer in this village and knew of this,
couldn't dare to come. So what big man in my caste will come to decide
this? Jai Singh [the Bhumihar who settled the dispute] is our friend, even
though he is a loudmouth. We will marry our daughter somewhere else
this year, if possible."
It is the custom of all caste panchayats to impose some fine on the guil-
ty party (usually in the form of a feast for biradari members), as well as
take some money from the supposed victim to give to the panchayat
members. It seems likely that the Teli made his unusual decision to call
the village big men to settle the affair because of his extreme poverty. To
call a caste panchayat is a much more formal matter and he could ill af-
ford any expense that might be involved in this. Even to appeal the case
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to a caste leader would have involved the initial expense of traveling to
see him, plus the subsequent arrangements that must be made.
During the panchayat, Jai "called for both sides to present their cases.
When the boy first appeared to state his story, he seemed quite fearless."
Jai threatened him, "If you do not listen, I will sell your whole house.
Remember that I am a Bhumihar." The decision of powerful Bhumihars
carries the same weight as that of a caste panchayat. The boy subsequent-
ly calmed down and said that he had acted out of passion. He was fined
1,095 rupees (465 for breaking the marriage, 565 for marriage expenses,
and 65 for his behavior), although I do not know if this enormous sum
was ever paid. The Teli who called the panchayat was charged 100
rupees, but Jai forfeited this amount because he was so poor. The other
Bhumihar who was also present, an irresponsible drunkard, demanded
50 rupees as his half share but was eventually satisfied with 5 rupees.
Jai's decision was written down, officially stamped, and a copy was giv-
en to each of the disputing parties. .
CoNFLICT WITHIN THE KHANDAN
The decision made by family members to divide themselves and all their
property is a painful one, often accompanied by great conflict over who
gets what from the common pool. Unfortunately, I have no examples of
such disputes. In many instances, however, even after a division does
take place among brothers (or including their father) and they become
pattidars, some dispute usually remains that can drag on for years. The
following two cases present examples of such disputes that continued
after a family had been divided.
Case 10: Competition for a Deceased Man's Land c.1943-1956
This case describes a breach that originally arose between two Bhumi-
har pattidars in Little Pura who disputed the property of a deceased third
party. It is also a conflict that figures in the subsequent history of Arun-
pur factionalism. About twenty-five years ago, land that had been held
jointly by two brothers was divided. The younger brother, Hans Singh
(see Chart 2), died leaving only one son. This son, in turn, died with no
issue and, because he had been a minor, his wife had no claim to any
share of the land. The widow went to live with Jai Singh. The elder
brother, Buddhi, had three sons. The middle son, Kesar, died with no
issue and his widow went to live with Chandra Singh. This son (Kesar),
however, had been legally entitled to a one-third share of his father's
property, and upon his death this right devolved upon his widow. The
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entire land, for practical purposes, however, was equally divided and
cultivated by Kesar's two surviving brothers and their respective off-
spring, Chandra and Jai.
Sometime later, c. 1950, when Kesar's two brothers had passed away,
Chandra tried to get the entire one-third share of the widow who was liv-
ing with him legally registered in his name. Until that time this land had
continued to be cultivated by Chandra and Jai on a half-share basis.
Although people advised Chandra against his action, he went to the
court to register his name on the land. Jai appealed to his other khandan
members, Cheddinath and Rampat, to help him in opposing Chandra's
move. They succeeded in calling a panchayat of the local big men which
decided that Jai should get half of the land registered in his name. And so
it was done.
The sequel to this event is Case 11. It should be noted here that the
people who had a right to compete for this land were clearly delimited,
that is, they were the descendants of the three dead brothers, Rajan,
Kesar, and Lalji. Since Chandra and Jai could not settle the dispute be-
tween themselves, they decided to appeal to a higher body of adjudica-
tion, the big men panchayat. This appeal made the dispute a matter of
public knowledge but did not necessarily move it over into the village
political arena, which was then still under the control of the British-
appointed village headman. At the present time, however, Jai is allied
not with Rampat and his pattidars, but with the man he fought
against-Chandra. The latter never forgot how a section of his khandan
went against him, and what began originally as a conflict within a kin
group exploded to engulf the entire village. Disputes that were once ex-
clusively among kinsmen now claim to attract supporters along diverse
lines of recruitment (see Chapter 7).
Case 11: Disputed Ownership of a Pond c.1950-1958
This case involved the entire khandan of Little Pura Bhumihars. As
their ancestors had been collecting the land revenue for village zamindars
(see Chapter 2), Babu Sahib offered to sell them a twenty-five-bis'e pond
near their pura shortly before Zamindari Abolition. The price was low,
and Cheddinath went to Chandra and Jai to request them to become
partners with him and his pattidars in the land the zamindar had offered.
They both refused, and only Cheddinath and his pattidars purchased it.
Several years later, after Cheddinath died, Chandra claimed to be a part-
ner in the pond. He called a big men panchayat and pleaded that Ched-
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dinath and his pattidars had deprived him and Jai of their rightful
shares. The panchayat decided in Chandra's favor and this decision was
obeyed by his other khandan members.
The panchayat's decision was an oral one. By fraud and with the help
of the village record-keeper (lekhpa/), Chandra subsequently got the en-
tire pond registered in his and Jai's name. It was perhaps out of gratitude
for their support in Case 10 that Jai informed his other khandan
members (notably Rampat Singh) about this. He also requested them not
to implicate him in any court case but to only involve Chandra. A suit
was duly filed, and four years later the court awarded a one-fifth share in
the pond each to Chandra and Jai. The latter, knowing the actual situa-
tion, still accepted this share. He became allied with his pattidar, Chan-
dra, and from that time onward "all men who criticized Chandra and Jai
became their enemies."
Although Cases 10 and II may be seen as marking the beginning of
partibandi (factionalism) in Arunpur, the actual disputes took before its
inception and the personnel involved remained confined to the khandan.
This is a far cry from what we shall see happens in the present day; any
conflict between the Chandra-Jai and Raj Kumar parties now immedi-
ately escalates. As it is, these two disputes illustrate that the most com-
mon resource for which kinsmen compete is land, especially land pre-
viously held in common (i.e., by the joint family). Such disputes used to
be settled primarily by the big men panchayat, like the one that originally
convened in Case 11, and the villagers felt bound to abide by the rules of
their decisions. No other recourse was readily available to them.
People go directly to the courts today or may decide to use them if they
are not satisfied with the decision of the traditional panchayat. A court
appeal means that villagers are burdened by the cost of conducting such a:
dispute and, worse, that the case can drag on year after year while enmity
between the parties hardens. During the process of shuffling a dispute
from one court of appeal to another, the land is usually controlled by the
stronger party, who is not necessarily the rightful owner. The courts do,
however, present a structural alternative to the traditional panchayat,
and the options offered by these two structures refer to contradictory sets
of cultural rules.
DISPUTES WITHIN JAJMANI RELATIONS
Before concluding this chapter, I should like to mention briefly another
form of almost institutionalized conflict, the "ritualized conflict" that is
always present in patron-client (jajman-praja) relationships. Despite the
fact that each participant knows what is expected of him and what he will
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receive in return in the ideal of jajmani (see, for example, Wiser 1936),
there is actually much scope for disagreement and dispute.
The statuses and behavioral expectations of each person in the jajmani
dyad are set, much like that of kinsmen. There is a certain continuity of
personnel who are involved, because these are mostly hereditary affilia-
tions and almost always last for a lifetime. The closeness that often
develops between a patron and his client is similar to the feelings that
bind kinsmen together, and kinship terminology is extended to these rela-
tionships. It is expected that the patron and client will support each other
when the need arises, and the relationship forms one of the lines of
recruitment into different factions (see Chapter 7). This type of conflict
is also mentioned here to avoid the impression that the only type of
political activity that exists outside of the villagewide political arena is
the struggle that takes place among kinsmen for the scarce resources in
their possession. Disputes among kin are more likely to arise, however,
because they share more resources in common, but this is not to the ex-
clusion of other types of conflict.
In the majority of jajmani disputes, it is usually the client who is
dissatisfied with the payment received for services rendered. At a wed-
ding that took place in a Bhumihar's household, fierce haggling went on
between one of the men and a Nai woman who demanded more than the
sari and two rupees (in addition to food for three days) which were of-
fered to her. I have seen similar types of arguments when a drummer was
being paid for playing during the singing to celebrate the birth of a child,
or when money was being paid to a Kahar client for her services during a
Nai's marriage. There were huge fireworks on each occasion, resplendent
with curses on both sides, but there seemed to be no hard feelings after
an agreement was finally reached. Indeed, this is the expected sort of
behavior.
Many disputes also took place over the amount of daily wage to be
paid to field laborers by the farmers for whom they were working. This
usually occurred during the harvest season, when each laborer is paid a
specific, previously defined share of the crop being cut. Conflict then
arose when the laborer felt that the farmer was cheating him of the right-
ful amount. These conflicts always involved Chamars and their primarily
Bhumihar masters. Although often the disputes did not escalate beyond
the parties concerned, they are representative of the class conflict that is
part of the villagewide arena and will be discussed in a later chapter.
CoNT~NTOFCONFLICT
From an analysis of the nature of political activities excluded from the
villagewide arena, several points can be made. By far the most important
fact in discerning the difference between this and the villagewide type of
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conflict over resources seems to be the matter of how wide the breach
becomes and in what way the dispute is resolved. In most of the examples
given, only the people immediately concerned were involved in settling
the matter. When an external adjudicative party, such as the Pradhan, a
local big man, or a panchayat, mediated the dispute, the event did
become a matter of common knowledge. The arbitrators, however, no
longer involved themselves in the matter after decisions were reached.
They remained disinterested parties. In other words, no one tried to
benefit by widening and expanding the original breach to involve other
people in the conflict.
This type of disinterested involvement in settling a dispute is markedly
different from what occurs in village factionalism. What identifies the
latter are the contestants involved and the power they wield. Taking a
case to one or the other of the village big men may embroil the affair in
village partibandi,' the decision to go to court rather than to a panchayat
also moves the dispute into a wider arena. Similarly, every incident that
occurs between opposing leaders, even so small a matter as two dogs
fighting, is regarded as fuel for the fire, and a major confrontation
results. In her study of the political activity of the Reddi and Kamma
castes in South India, Elliott finds that disputes among the lower castes
tend to escalate to the public arena of the village only when "they are
adopted by the dominant caste leaders as their own"; this is because such
conflicts do not initially affect the relative statuses of those holding
power in the village (1970:134). As the following chapters will reveal,
conflict escalates to a wider political arena when a powerful man exploits
and manipulates a dispute to his own interests and advantage.
Although all of the case histories presented in this chapter are exam-
ples of political action insofar as they involve competition for things of
value, they have the following characteristics in common which set them'
off from the villagewide conflict: (1) the main disputants, who were
related to each other through either kin or jajmani ties, came into con-
flict on the specific issue involved and were otherwise on good terms with
each other; (2) the conflict remained localized and only those who were
involved parties concerned themselves in the matter; (3) the conflict was
resolved by recourse to decisions by either the parties concerned or to ex-
ternal arbitration by the Pradhan, a local big man, a panchayat, or the
courts. The major concern of each of these arbitrators was to settle the
dispute as objectively as possible and end the matter there.
NOTES
1. I never learned why Daya remained unmarried. Given his personality and
resourcefulness, however, it seems certain that the choice was his.
·
·)
•
i
•
108 CONFLICT IN ARUNPUR
2. Ti/ak is one of the rituals that accompanies the long marriage ceremony. This
ritual takes place some time before the actual marriage. The main portion con-
sists of either the father or brother of the bride-to-be placing a li/ak (auspicious
mark) on the forehead of the boy to be married. Then he is presented with
presents (clothes, jewelry, sweets, fruits) and gifts of money previously agreed
upon.
3. In north India, hypergamy is practiced in the sense that a girl is married into a
"better" (more prestigious or wealthy) family than her own.
--
CHAPTER 6
The Anatomy of Leadership:
Big Men of Arunpur
Every village has a number of men who, because of their power and in-
fluence, make decisions affecting others in everyday affairs. Power and
influence are based on a combination of caste, wealth, and personal ~
qualities. The few men who have both the desire and means to compete
actively in the village arena are the key to its political activity, In Arun-
pur, those known as "big men" figure in its factions and in the disputes
between the landed and landless. They control whatever resources enter
the village and make decisions regarding their distribution. Without such
men, there would be neither faction rivalries nor any sort of cooperative
venture. They are the chief organizers of the political arena and stamp it
indelibly with their activities. This chapter will approach the subject of
leadership in two ways; through a cultural definition based on terms.
villagers use and through an analysis of leaders in both the pre- and post-
Independence eras.
CuLTURAL CATEGORIES OF VILLAGE LEADERSHIP
The people of Arunpur speak of four different types of leaders: neta,
agua, rais, and bara admi. Each of these terms refers to a cultural
category perceived and verbalized by villagers that is more or less
representative of the qualities of actual influential men. The first, neta
("leader"), is reserved for important men (or women) in one of the na-
tional political parties or in the government. For example, members of
the State Legislative Assembly and National Parliament or national
figures (such as Gandhi, Nehru, and those in power at present) may be
referred to as neta. A local man who has a wide network of followers
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organized through his allegiance to a particular political party will also
be called neta by his supporters.
Disappointment with the actions of politicians has given this term the
second derogatory and often sarcastic meaning of a hypocrite, liar, or
cheat. "A neta," I was also told, "is the man who defeats others [in elec-
tions] by wearing homespun cloth {khadi/. But this is only the sign of a
leader. This type of leader {neta/ is a gift of the British. Before that, no
one heard of this kind [of leader]." A neta of this sort is generally re-
garded as acting without principles to achieve his goals and without the
good of the people or the village at heart because he works for a particu-
lar political group. A neta's first interest is to involve himself in power
politics and win an election. He thinks in terms of his own caste and how
he can win its support to advance himself and his party.
The second term, agua, is seldom used. It may be translated into
English as "foremost" or "leader" and carries the connotation of the
leader who is actively followed and respected and is foremost among his
peers. The head of Arunpur under the British (mukhiya) and the present
pradhan are sometimes referred to by this word. Members of different
(non-Bhumihar and non-Brahman) castes would also speak of their caste
leaders (biradari agua), outstanding men chosen to be spokesmen and
followed by all.
The word agua was also used, however, to identify the heads of the
two different factions in the village. When we first asked villagers who
belonged to these factions, we were told the names of certain men and
that they were the faction agua. The men who are considered leaders
(agua) in Arunpur are thus the heads of factions. Each has a core of
followers and concerns himself with attempting to increase his network
of supporters by offers of mutual gain. It is the leader as faction head
who most commonly enters the political arena in village India. By con-
trast, when reference was made to the general status of these and other
influential local men, they were called bare admi, big men. The faction
head and other types of leaders may thus be regarded as the activization
of big man status.
By far the most important terms for an influential man at the village
level are those of bara admi and rais. Although the former is sometimes
used as a cover term for both of these types, further questioning revealed
that a distinction was made between the two in terms of style and quality
of leadership. A rais, best translated as "noble man" or "aristocrat," is
a man of affluence whose primary virtue is that of generosity. 1 Wealth is
of great importance, since the key function of the rais is to help the poor
without considering his own interests or ends. Should such a man's for-
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tune decline and he become increasingly concerned with making ends
meet, his raisat (nobleness) will correspondingly decline. I was often told
that despite this pragmatic requirement, it is one's style of life and not
one's money that makes a man rais. But this style, it must be noted, is
very much that of lordly grandeur.
Raisat is inherited and reveals itself in the virtues, behavior, and
character of a man. It is for this reason that a low-caste man-a Chamar,
for example, or even a Kurmi-cannot be considered as such. The tradi-
tional virtues of a rais are not regarded as a part of their heritage. 2 The
following qualities were most often mentioned as integral to this ideal
type: gentility, traditional heritage, honesty, generosity, and wisdom.
The rais acts disinterestedly and without jealousy in helping the poor,
even though it may involve some personal loss. In this way, he is often
compared to a mango tree, which provides both shade and fruit, whereas
a big man (bara admi) is like the palm, which is so high and lofty that it
can provide neither. In return for his benevolence, the rais wins the trust,
respect, and obedience of all around him. Of course, a "poor" rais may
not always be obeyed because "money is sometimes the most important
factor that makes one man listen to another." No one in Arunpur was
considered a rais. From the one man in a neighboring village who was so
named, I understand this to be a position of passive leadership whereby a
man is more often requested for help and advice but does not pursue an
active political role. This is notably different from the style of a big man
(bara admi), who is concerned solely with his own self-interest.
The chief quality of the big man is that he has wealth, although educa-
tion is regarded by some as being a secondary feature. I was told:
Suppose a man has only crude power-he may suppress two or three persons
and may stop them, but others will oppose his views or secretly abuse him.
But if he has power and intellect, then he will play such a game that no one
will understand that he is doing wrong.
Intellect in a big man does not mean the ability to counsel wisely but
rather to deceive others in order to further one's own ends. When he
helps the poor, it is with the idea of some return, either to take what
belongs to another or to utilize the advantages of the accumulated favors
he has bestowed upon them. By being big, it is said, a man "collects the
blood of the poor. " Power and strength (in the sense of physical might)
are a correlate to wealth and enable this type of influential person to ex-
ert pressure over men and control available resources. Although a big
man can help one who pleases him, he can crush those who would rebuke
or go against him. Others will always obey these men out of fear. A big
•
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man is considered to have the following qualities: wealth, influence,
/ power, shrewdness, and physical strength. His behavior is characterized
by feelings of self-interest and enmity.
While the presence of another aristocrat or big man does not lessen the
influence of the aristocrat, the power of the bora admi is strongly af-
fected if another seeks to share in it. The power that can be exercised in a
village or local area is regarded as of a limited quantity, and a big man's
sphere becomes smaller by the presence of other competitors. Because of
this, there is tension even among members of a coalition faction; big men
say that they, like two lions, cannot live together in the same forest. It is
this factor that makes a man strive to crush others who would be his
equals. The characteristic of competing for power and crushing others is
regarded as typical of Bhumihars (or any other dominant caste, for that
matter). A man of that caste, speaking about a deceased Bhumihar and
his family in the village, said:
Raja was really like a Kurmi because he was a hard-working and soft-
hearted man. He gave money to anyone in the village, without interest. But
now his family members are not respected because they try to be real
Bhumihars-they want to rule over others by force-and to be a real
Bhumihar means to be a cheat.
, Caste does not ordinarily enter into the consideration of what makes a
man big, for each caste can have its own such representatives. Caste,
however, is an important determinant of big man status in the village-
wide political arena. It is more likely that these big men will belong to the
caste that is dominant in a village or in a local area. Bhumihars were in
this position in Arunpur and the surrounding area, and it is not surpris-
ing that the village big men all came from this caste. It is also for this
reason that, from the perspective of a lower-caste man (i.e., Kurmis and
below), the term "big man" has two dimensions. At one level, all those
of high caste, especially the Bhumihars, are regarded as big men. When
pressed further about who are the truly powerful and influential men,
however, the Kurmis and others would name specific people~
Compared to the aristocrat, the big man is seen as one who is actively
involved in village politics, leading men and competing for control over
them and their resources. The major distinction between these two
J cultural types seems to rest on their different motivations for helping
others. It is possible for a big man to become an aristocrat if he takes on
the qualities of the latter, although this must usually be carried on for
several generations.
If the cultural definition of leadership, in terms of big man and
aristocrat. is compared to the qualities villagers think a leader should
I
I
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have, an interesting discrimination results. To a sample of thirty-six
literate men of all castes in Arunpur, we gave twelve cards on which dif-
ferent attributes were written. These were: speak well, settle disputes, in-
troduce change, give benefits, help others, honesty, education, impar-
tiality, family position, age, wealth, and caste. I had arrived at these spe-
cific attributes by analyzing the criteria that enter into culturally defined
as well as actual leadership. They were requested to rank the attributes in
the order of importance they should have for determining actual leaders.
The most striking result of this poll was that those qualities considered
most important for the aristocrat and big man, that is, helping others
and the possession of wealth, were relegated to secondary positions.
Honesty and education ranked highest. This can be regarded as an ex-
pression of dissatisfaction with the way in which leaders were serving the
present needs of villagers in a changing environment.
The criterion of honesty is explained by the fact that there is an in-
creased number of occasions for a leader to be dishonest, specifically in
the distribution of new resources that either come to the village from out-
side or are only available from within. The villager's contact with the of-
ficial world in which the bribe is "king" (discussed in Chapter 3) has
greatly reinforced the desire for honesty. All too often, people have been
promised and led to expect much, only to be sorely disappointed. Water
from the government tubewell is not distributed fairly; the government
Seed Store Inspector takes bribes and often gives bags of seed and fer-
tilizer mixed with stones and dirt; officials in the police, court, and the
Community Development administration all demand special favors be-
fore looking at a petition or deciding a case; the politicians promise one
thing and then deliver nothing; and even money which comes into the
village is greatly reduced after passing through many hands.
The desire for a leader to be educated as well as honest expresses the
villagers' recognition of education as an important resource in itself and
one that can lead to the acquisition of other resources (see also Srinivas
1959). A village can ill afford to elect one of its members as pradhan who
has little or no education. How will such a man know how to articulate
village needs and communicate with officials; how will he know his way
around the labyrinth of obtaining permission to install a pumping set or
applying for government funds and loans? The rapidly expanding world
of the villagers requires the presence of educated middle men who can
help others to cope with such changes. These people will be able to advise
how to get what, when, and from whom. Similarly, education is neces-
sary to farm more productively, and a village leader is one who can ad-
vise about and show the way in accepting agricultural innovations and a
more prosperous lifestyle.
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This last point, regarding the connection between education and agri-
culture, is something inferred from the behavior of the villagers and not
from how the card attributes were ranked. The wise practice of agricul-
ture (including giving aid and advice to others), as opposed to simple
concern with gaining more money and property, is something that is re-
spected and admired. Most of my sample, however, agreed that wealth
alone was of no importance in determining good leadership, or ranked it
low. Almost all also rejected caste as an attribute deserving considera-
tion. But when asked which qualities most leaders of today actually pos-
sessed, my informants replied that wealth, dishonesty, and caste con-
siderations were of primary importance (see also conclusions in the study
by Oommen 1969).
BIo MEN IN ARUNPUR BEFORE INDEPENDENCE (1947)
The cultural definition of leadership can be compared with a description
of men who entered the political arena of Arunpur in the past and play
such a role at present. The situation in the village before Independence
(1947) was different than it is today. Although the account I have been
able to draw is sketchy, since people told us different things about these
big men depending upon their personal allegiances, the degree of repeti-
tion in their stories leads me to feel that the broad outlines of the picture
can be presented.
The foremost leader in the village at that time was the British-
appointed headman, and for two generations headmen came from the
khandan of Little Pura Bhumihars (see Chart 2). We were told most
about the last headman, Cheddinath Singh, who served for thirty years
and was also the revenue collector for the zamindar. In addition, he be-
came the head of the British (amin) panchayat, which included Arunpur
and the surrounding villages. Backed by the special powers that the for-
eign government bestowed upon him, Cheddinath ruled the village effec-
tively and would rarely let a dispute reach the courts. He decided all cases
while sitting as the head of the village and local panchayat. Cheddinath
also received large sums as bribes (as much as 100 to 200 rupees per day,
it is said), especially when he decided who was the rightful owner of
disputed property. Even his own descendants admit that he did many
wrong things in these matters, but no one dared to oppose him because
of his great power.
He lived in a grand style, surrounded by his admirers, and spent not
less than 2,000 to 3,000 rupees per month. He visited prostitutes, was
fond of young boys, and often held large parties with dancing girls at his
house. A four-horse carriage took him to his varied destinations. For
four to five years, Cheddinath continued in this manner and in the pro-
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cess spent not only all the money he received as bribes or "gifts" (his
salary being negligible), but also started to sell part of his share of the
joint family land. His father's brothers, who were still alive, decided that
the only way to save the family fortune was by partition of the joint
household.
Cheddinath's father, Chand Singh, had also been the headman and
was reputed to have been of similar character. He, too, lived in a grand
manner, and it was from a mixture of fear and awe that he was obeyed
and respected. It is said that a Brahman committed suicide on Chand's
doorstep after the latter had refused him a loan of money and insulted
him. 3 A government official came to investigate the matter, but no one
would testify against the powerful headman. Even today, however, this
family scandal is remembered and whispered about.
The British learned of the unjust behavior of these two headmen but
did nothing, since both remained obedient and loyal to the alien rulers.
Cheddinath died in 1950, three years after his office was abolished. A
few years later, the system of elected village officials through Local Self-
Government (panchayati raj) was introduced throughout the State.
Another big man of the pre-Independence generation, and a contem-
porary of Cheddinath, was the zamindar Babu Sahib. Before 1950, he
was a powerful figure and his office conferred high status upon him.
Since the abolition of zamindari, however, his fortunes have declined
considerably and he has retired completely from the village scene. Much
of the land he had held previously was given as payment to servants in-
stead of cash. That is how the Bhumihar who was his accountant and his
Arunpur Nai received their lands. Land was not worth much at the time
and Babu Sahib did not foresee that it would so increase in value. Today,
he is left with only twenty bighas within his walled compound.
The following story, emotionally recounted by the Arunpur Nai who
still serves the ex-zamindar, reveals just how much Babu Sahib's position
has declined.
The days go by, but not all are equal. Early in the morning I was called by
Babu Sahib. I went there and found him sitting under a tree looking de-
pressed. I greeted him and asked why I was called. Babu Sahib apologetical-
ly said, "I am becoming poorer and I don't have money to please and pay
all the men who lived with me and helped me in my good days. Now I re-
quest that all of them do not kill their time remaining with a poor one like
me, who cannot give them food to eat." Then he also requested me to leave
his service.
I told him, "Babu Sahib, you are right. This type of thinking is good for a
big man. I know that time is a changing process-a king of yesterday may be
the beggar of tomorrow. But I don't care. I will not leave you, because you
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have helped me in my bad days. I am yours. I got much from you and now I
will render my services free of charge."
The descendants of the Bhumihar who founded the village some hun-
dred and eighty years ago, Arun Singh, have also been highly esteemed
(see Chart 1). Ganesh Singh, who died in 1931, was known for his learn-
ing and wealth and was a renowned astrologer. His younger brother and
one of his grandsons, Ajay Singh, became active in the Independence
Movement; the latter also founded Arunpur Intercollege. His son Amar
was highly respected as well, although age and physical ailments now
restrict his activities (see later).
Only one Kurrni was considered a leader and respected man in the
village at that time. Sita Ram, the elder brother of the father of the two
richest Kurrni men in Arunpur today, was named as influential in all the
surrounding villages. He was an essential member of the village and local
big men panchayafs, and it is said that even Bhumihars would go to him
for advice and obey his decisions. The thirty bighas of land he amassed,
in addition to starting an iron and cycle repair shop in Banaras, made
him quite wealthy. He died in 1948. Though his descendants are hard-
FIGURE 15. Present descendants of Arun Singh, the elders of the
Pradhan's house, husk corn. Amar Singh is at the far right.
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working and honest, they do not command the respect that he did. They
are interested only in advancing the prosperity of their respective
families.
The personalities of the heads of these two wealthy families, more-
over, seem to be the biggest drawback to their assuming active leadership
roles. Both are heavy drinkers, deferential to the upper castes, and spend
most of their time at work in Banaras. Perhaps they feel that the prestige
of bigness and the involvement in village quarrels are not worth the eco-
nomic loss that might result. As long as they are able to go about their
own business, they seem ready to show outward deference to the Bhumi-
hars and leave them free in the political arena. The wealth and manpower
that these two Kurmis command place them in an ideal position to
assume the leadership and direction of their caste. Had their personalities
been different, they could have proved a definite threat to the Bhumi-
hars.
A number of points emerge from the information we have been able to
gather about village leadership in the pre-Independence period that can
be contrasted to the picture today. During this time, the major source of
prestige lay in the status of specific castes and certain families and in the-----
respect traditionally due to positions of authority. People belonging to
influential families were primarily concerned with maintaining their
social status and not solely with increasing material gains. Agriculture
was not a capitalist venture, nor was there any involvement with outside
business activities. In addition, the two major power figures in the
village, the headman and the zamindar, were appointed by the British
and were hereditary positions, while the men who served on the village
panchayat were selected by villagers. The source of power for both the
headman and the zamindar came from holding a position of authority
which had the effective backing of an external source, the British Raj. . /
These positions of authority were also more effective in gaining com-
pliance with their decisions than are the positions of the present-day big
men. Pre-Independence leaders were said to be rarely opposed, and the
headman settled village disputes so that few reached the courts. The
result of this was that, although there were other influential men in the
village, the positions of the headman and zamindar remained unques-
tioned, if not unchallenged. They provided the basis for a panvillage
leadership that most obeyed. Others who would challenge them were to a
large extent dependent upon the zamindar; the basis of their power lay in
holding land, and land derived from the latter. Villagers maintain that
the opposition which sometimes arose against these men was not of the
same intensity as the present factional conflict which divides the village. 4
While a change has taken place in the type of leadership at the village
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~ level, there is a certain amount of continuity between the leading families
of the past and the present-day big men. Neither the descendants of Sita
Ram Kurmi nor the only son of Cheddinath Singh have the personalities
or interest to follow in their forebears' footsteps, but the big men of to-
day still come from other families that were highly regarded in the past.
A particular family may rise or fallon the wealth and prestige scale as the
years go by, but this is a slow process rather than a sudden change.
Money and prestige are hard to come by and take time to accumulate.
The only family in the area which may be considered nouveau riche is
that of Krishna Singh, the most powerful local big man from the neigh-
boring village of Ramapur.
BIG MEN IN ARUNPUR TODAY
The men who are considered big in Arunpur at present are all Bhumihars
concerned almost exlusively with advancing their own families' position
through the acquisition of material goods, and whose major source of
power and influence comes from their wealth.
The new formal, state-administered system of Local Self-Government
through elected officials has replaced the old village head and his pan-
chayat. Although one of the big men has become the elected head of the
village (the pradhan), and this does add a certain amount of prestige and
power to his present bigness, the other elected council members derive no
influence from their position. The post is a meaningless honor since the
statutory panchayat never meets.
Today, the villagers say, no one obeys anyone. All think themselves
big. If some listen to the elected village head, it is because of the office,
not the man. When I inquired about why one or two big men were
obeyed in the past and now no one is obeyed by all, I was told:
It is the age of money and labor, so every man is influential now and there is
competition to see who is bigger and who is to be followed more. Formerly,
men were interested in prestige-now all run after money. Previously, there
was a direct exchange of goods [via ;a;maml, and now there is an indirect
exchange based on money. So people now run after money.
The Pradhan put it this way:
In the old days there were only one or two influential men in the village. To-
day there are more, but they don't command the same obedience. Today
everyone considers himself big. Several families in the village own about
equal amounts of land and money. If there was only one with more wealth
than the rest, the situation would have been different. But now we think in
terms of not letting another achieve more than us; so we compete to keep the
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same distribution of wealth and influence in the village. It is [this way]
because of education and wealth.
People in Arunpur said that this represents a great change in the ad-
ministration of village affairs since Independence. They alternately give
the reasons as the decline of morality (dharma) or the lack of fear for
authority on the part of the people. They also cite the distrust of elected
officials to account for the downgrading of authority. Because of this,
disputes can no longer be settled within the village, and the slightest pro-
vocation results in a court case. It is also the explanation given for the
fearless behavior of faction leaders, who will listen to no one in settling
their grievances.
The political arena of this village has changed to the point where
leadership or big man status is no longer inherent in any position but is
now a commodity on the open market and something of value for which/,
many can and do compete. Previously, the British-appointed headman
was the acknowledged chief of the village. Today there is no such posi-
tion of authority to which all will accede, and in its place have emerged
new big men who are organized into two competing parties. Other people
who could possibly be leaders, by virtue of their caste rank or education,
do not enter into the picture. The Brahmans in Arunpur, for example, do
not command respect and they have neither the knowledge of religious
matters nor the prestige that usually adheres to this caste. The highly
educated B.A. 's and M.A. 's in the village take no interest in community
affairs. To some extent, their education and exposure to city life has
alienated them from their neighbors. Those who live in the village and
work at the Intercollege restrict their social intercourse to their fellow
teachers and pattidars. Others who work outside come home only on an-
nual leaves. Furthermore, in almost every case these educated men
belong to one of the big village families and are themselves swept up by
factional rivalry. At the same time, little opportunity is left for the
younger, educated ones to assert themselves independently when one of
the older men fills the position of family head.
The abolition of zamindari has also had several important effects that
can be related to the rise to preeminence of the big men. While land
reform did little in the way of conferring ownership on the landless (see
Chapter 2), it did confirm the Bhumihars as absolute owners of land they
previously held as fully secure tenants with fixed rents. Those large pre-
Independence families that had enjoyed privileged relationships with the
zamindar (i.e., the khandans of the village founder and of the mukhiya)
and had held a higher proportion of large landholdings now gained abso-
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lute control over most of the principal means of production in the vil-
lage. The richer landlords were then able to purchase land that came onto
the open market and to direct any surplus into economic activities, espe-
cially business. Their success as entrepreneurs has accelerated the eco-
nomic disparities within the dominant caste, and these rich Bhumihars
are able to expand their economic and political control of the village (see
Wood 1973 for a similar case in Bihar).
There are five men in Arunpur whom the villagers and local people
consistently named as big men and whom we observed to be the most
powerful and active in making decisions that affected others. This was
corroborated by noting to whose door outsiders, such as the Community
Development Village Level Worker and election candidates, would con-
sistently go. These big men came from Bhumihar families in the two
main puras, and certain events over the years have resulted in the forma-
tion of alliances among them. The big men of Arunpur are, at the same
time, considered the leaders of the two village factions.
The Pradhan of the village, Prasad Singh (age forty), is the head of
one of the oldest and most respected families in the village that is
descended from the founder (see Chart 1). He is considered one of the
main leaders of one faction. Amar Singh (his father's elder brother) was
also highly regarded, but his active participation in these matters greatly
decreased in the past few years, due to advanced age and ill health. Still,
he was greatly respected and his advice always sought. He died in 1970,
after I left India.
The Pradhan comes not only from a distinguished line of ancestors,
but his joint family household of forty-four members is the largest in the
village. They own much land, have a half interest in a brick and truck
business, and can boast of the many educated boys in their family. Their
fortunes are on the rise. The Pradhan's pattidars also include people of
some importance. One was the previous pradhan of the village for ten
years and is the most knowledgeable man in the village in religious mat-
ters, village history, and local customs. Another relative was the chauf-
feur of a high State Congress Party leader for many years. The Pradhan
can make use of a large number of contacts outside the village through
his family and kin, ranging from the District Magistrate and Collector
and members of the State Legislative Assembly to the Block Develop-
ment Officer, the local Police Sub-Inspector, and a whole variety of
minor government officials.
The Pradhan has a quiet, unassuming, yet firm manner and is respect-
ed by all, even members of the opposing faction. Before starting his brick
and truck business with Krishna Singh of neighboring Ramapur village,
he worked for ten years as a distributor for a textile cooperative in
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FIGURE 16. The Pradhan.
Banaras. He says with great pride that he never accepted any bribes dur-
ing that time, nor as village head will he now give bribes to officials to
receive money from the government for village use. The Pradhan rarely
has time to perform his official duties, however, and feels that it is best
to refrain from attempting any pan-village program that might further
enflame party rivalries. During his term of office, he received govern-
ment aid to help two Chamars build their homes and to build a drinking
well near his Nai's house.
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Through partnership in the brick business and by his past friendship
and close association with the family of Krishna Singh, the Pradhan can
always call upon the latter for help in any factional dispute. Many
villagers, and especially the opposition, think of Krishna as the real head
of this faction. Krishna, the Pradhan, and another Bhumihar from Little
Pura, Raj Kumar Singh, are three allied leaders.
Raj Kumar Singh (see Chart 2) is a thirty-two-year-old man who,
though not the eldest male, is the head of his joint family of twenty-two
members. He is outgoing, hard-working, and passed his high school ex-
amination from Arunpur Intercollege. His family connections are also
prestigious, for he is a member of the khandan that originally populated
FIGURE 17. Raj Kumar Singh.
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his pura and from which the village headmen came. His family is doing
extremely well in agriculture and is in the process of building the largest
brick house in the village from the profits they have made. Some 40,000
rupees have already been invested in this project, and another 20,000 will
be needed to finish the job to their design and satisfaction.
Perhaps because he is the youngest and most educated of the village
big men, Raj Kumar is cultivating a certain style of politeness and sophis-
tication in manner and speech. Like the Pradhan, he is equally fluent in
Hindi and Bhojpuri. One of his admirers, an elderly Brahman, stated:
Raj Kumar is walking on the path of nobleness [raisatl. and all are watching
him. He helps the poor. He brings ~eeds from the city and tells others about
these new types. If people want to obtain some to sow themselves, he will
even take them to the office in the city. He has prestige [and not his rivals]
because when the Police Inspector comes he always stays with Raj Kumar.
The faction that opposes Raj Kumar and his allies in the village is led
by Chandra Singh (age fifty-two), who belongs to the same khandan (see
Chart 2). When Chandra was eight years of age, his father died, and as
the eldest son he assumed full responsibility for his family. After strug-
gling for several years to make farming a going concern, Chandra finally
met with success. His next project seemed to be an involvement with the
smuggling of ganjha from Nepal. It used to come to the nearby railroad
station and other village stations, and from there distribution was made
through his agents. Both the station master and one of the Pradhan's
pattidars used to make some share of the profits. It is said that money
made in this way was used to finance the construction of his large house
(the first brick house in the village) and later to start a lucrative cold
storage business dealing with potatoes.
Many people in the village and surrounding area are indebted to Chan-
dra for either money or grain, and many fear his power. In the past, he
was known to be a vengeful person who would stop at nothing to achieve
his goals. People often accused him of "making the village burn" with
rivalries and disputes.
Today he has abandoned what even he refers to as his past "bad
ways" and laments that he wasted so many years of his life in a mood of
anger and revenge. Chandra now devotes most of his time to buying
potatoes at a low price and reselling them after they have been kept in
cold storage in Patna while the price rises. This business brings an annual
profit of about 50,000 rupees. His youngest brother looks after the farm
work at home, while a second brother is in the army and lives in Delhi.
However, he still considers Krishna Singh of Ramapur to be his arch-
enemy and would do anything to belittle or humble that man and his
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FIGURE 18. Chandra Singh, drinking tea while campaigning for the Jan
Sangh, is flanked by a Saranpur supporter on the left and Lalji Singh
standing behind him.
family. Chandra also regards the Pradhan's family as foes because of
their close association with Krishna and because of several disputes with
them over land.
After his initial conflicts with the Pradhan's family, Chandra stopped
going to their pura, where most of the people support his rivals. He visits
only the house of his ally there, Narain Singh. Otherwise, Chandra's
most frequent companion is a fellow Bhumihar from the nearby village
of Saranpur. He said that this man used to be his bodyguard, and people
say that he still performs this function.
Chandra was on guard whenever we met him and seemed to act stiffly,
in an affected manner. His speaking tone was soft, but more like that of
a man who is revealing some intimate or hidden information. On every
occasion he would say that he wanted to compromise and forget the an-
tagonisms of both parties. But, he would continue, the other side was not
willing. Chandra always asked what his bad points were and what other
people in the village thought of him. He was particularly concerned
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FIGURE 19. Jai Singh, on the left, and his staunch Arunpur supporter
campaign for the Jan Sangh in the constituency.
about the opinions of his rivals, Raj Kumar, Krishna Singh, and the
Pradhan and his family men.'
The second man in this party is Jai Singh, a forty-four-year-old po.t-
tidar of Chandra. He is by far the most colorful man in the village. Tall
and very fat, with a loud raucous voice full of good humor, he is easy to
make fun of. At the same time, for our purposes he was the most open
and best informant in the village. Whereas most of the other big men
were to some extent always on their guard, Jai was fully relaxed and
could say anything that carne into his mind. Of course, he does this with
others as well, and it has earned him the reputation of being a kind-
natured, slightly foolish loudmouth, who is basically good but is being
misled by the evil Chandra.
Jai compared himself with his ally:
Chandra is too formal a man. He is a polished man, but inside his heart is
not so plain. Not only Chandra but many others are of his kind. I vomit
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anything I feel; I never hide it. I am like a sleeping lion and these polished
men are snakelike and poisonous. I don't care if a man disturbs me a little,
but if somebody goes beyond his limit, I can never excuse him.
Jai was also most fond of boasting how he could make big men
small-the Police Sub-Inspector, the Intercollege Principal, or Krishna
Singh-or how he had the most contacts with important men outside the
village. He would repeat the fact many times that he was educating and
also bearing the cost of marriage of his sister's son. He said his purpose
in doing this was to show his fellow khandan members and the other
villagers how wise and prosperous he was. He hoped they would respect
him more for it.
Jai is considered a big man because he thinks himself big and, by his
actions and participation in village affairs, has made others regard him
as such. Compared to the other bare admi, however, his wealth appears
negligible, and there are no other adult men in his household upon whom
he can call for immediate support. Yet he is still the man most often
called upon to participate in big men panchayats and to settle the internal
disputes of low castes, which might otherwise have to be heard in a caste
panchayat. One reason for his popularity may be that, while other big
men spend much time outside the village, Jai remains mostly at home
and has more free time to devote to such activities. Jai's good nature has
kept him close to all, while the others have lost contact with the people,
have no interest in them, or feel that it is beneath their dignity to meddle
in low-caste disputes unless it provides some advantage. In turn, villagers
feel the distance between themselves and these big men and have lost
faith in the latter and their concern for the well-being of the village.
Only Jai talks of doing good for Arunpur as a whole. The Pradhan has
this desire as well but readily admits that he has no time for such a pur-
suit and says it is best to let factional enmity die down before attempting
any new plan for village improvement. Jai's feeling may be seen from the
following remarks:
I have an idea, a map in my mind, that if I am selected [not elected]
pradhan I will try to utilize all the help gotten from the government to uplift
the Chamars and other poor people.
I have the idea to send my son for higher education abroad, and I hope he
will be the first man in the village who will help me in abolishing all the con-
servative ways and style of life, such as casteism and creedism.
I try to help others, but because you know a man can do what he likes
only if he has power, and power can be obtained by position, I became the
thokdar [in charge of tubewell water distribution]. I had a good, big dream
of making Arunpur a good village.... That is why I requested the engi-
neer, who was originally fixing the [government] tubewell near Main Pura,
j
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to fIx it near Little Pura, so that I might succeed in utilizing my power in the
impartial distribution of water to rich and poor, high and low castes. But
after that I wasn't successful, and my dreams remained dreams.
Jai says that he contested the last election for pradhan in 1963 for the
reasons stated and succeeded in becoming the person in charge of water
distribution (thokdar) solely for his pura when the government tubewell
was constructed in 1953. Even though the Pradhan is theoretically
responsible for the distribution of water in the entire village, most low-
caste people still go to Jai with their requests.
Like Chandra, Jai is not often seen in the streets of Main Pura. He oc-
casionally sits there, in the hut of an old Brahman, but is most often at
the house of the third member of their party, Narain Singh (age fifty-
three). The latter belongs to a Main Pura Bhumihar khandan which set-
tled in the village several generations after it had been founded and is not
related to the village founder's descendants. His ancestors came to Arun-
pur about one hundred years ago and today most of his other khandan
members live either in Banaras or in Calcutta. His closest pattidar in the
village is related to him through a common ancestor of three generations
ago.
Narain spends most of his time in Calcutta, where he owns a cloth
shop and some property, and is rarely in Arunpur. His wife and children,
however, remain in the village. A younger son, who is an M.A. from
Banaras Hindu University, joins him in the city part of the year. The
farming of the joint family land, shared by Narain and an elder brother,
is looked after by one of this brother's sons. I met Narain on only half a
dozen occasions. Though he has only a primary school education, his
long residence in Calcutta has made him well versed in state and nationl:ll
politics and in the changes that are occurring in Indian society. He has
hopes of highly educating all the boys in his family. He speaks with ad-
miration of the way in which girls in Bengal study through high school,
but believes that this would not suit life in the village. Like most of the
other big men who talk of changes that they think are drastically needed
(e.g., the end of casteism and Untouchability, education of women,
higher age at marriage, and lessening or abolition of purdah), Narain is
not willing to adopt any of these measures on his own. For the most part,
he successfully keeps his life in Calcutta and in Arunpur separate. His in-
fluence in the village derives mainly from his wealth and alliance with
Chandra Singh.
Chandra, Jai, and Narain on one hand, and the Pradhan and Raj Ku-
mar on the other-these are the big men of Arunpur who, through a
series of past events, have allied themselves into two opposing factions.
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Before closing this section, however, something must be said about the
influence of Krishna Singh in Arunpur and his involvement in the politics
of this village. His activities show the way in which the village political
arena is not tightly bound but expands to include the bonds of friendship
or enmity across village lines, much as kin and economic relations do.
Krishna has been closely associated with the Pradhan's family for many
years, and it is this alliance which led him to intervene in Arunpur poli-
tics. He is one of the wealthiest men and the most powerful man in the
area which extends to all the villages around Arunpur and even beyond.
Krishna is regarded as one of the more spectacular examples of a man
who has greatly increased the wealth, power, and prestige of his family,
all within the last thirty years. Born into a comparatively poor Bhumihar
family sixty years ago, Krishna and his brothers have had to live with the
rumor of a tainted family ancestry. Villagers constantly juxtapose this to
Krishna's present wealth and influence to underline the fact that he is a
bora admi par excellence; his origin and high-pressured tactics can never
earn for him the raisat he so desires.
In his youth, Krishna was a primary school teacher and became friend-
ly with Ajay Singh of the Pradhan's family, who was active in Gandhi's
Non-Cooperation Movement. After leaving his teaching position to help
FIGURE 20. Brahman priests officiate at the ceremony to sanctify the
land upon which Krishna Singh's house will· be built. Krishna's two
brothers are standing, while a third squats with his wife behind him.
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raise the family's fortunes, Krishna continued his close relations with
Ajay. The latter also increased the social standing and network of Krish-
na's connections by his friendship and help in arranging well-placed mar-
riages for Krishna's family members. Finally, when Ajay had the idea of
founding the Arunpur Intercollege, Krishna was also asked to join in the
task and, by clever means, succeeded in wresting much of the land on
which the Intercollege stands from some Kurmis. He was also able to
convince others to donate money and worked through all the legal
tangles of getting the school established, although it is said that he never
gave a pie himself.
I was told that Krishna's father used to lend money and that often
Krishna would take an unpaid debt to court and contrive to have the
security (usually land) fall into his hands. By 1947, he had considerable
property as well as experience in court matters. Others, especially those
who had rais-like qualities and shied away from court dealings, would
employ him to act on their behalf in legal affairs. As his father grew
older, Krishna took his place in attending panchayat meetings. But
whereas the father was known to act impartially to end disputes, the son
sided with one party and sought to intensify the conflict.
A shrewd and capable man, Krishna has earned a reputation for
knowledge of legal matters along with an ability to acquire another
man's land and to cause divisions between men. In this way, he succeed-
ed in breaking the unity of the Kurmis in his village who were numerical-
ly predominant and dared to oppose this Bhumihar. As a personal favor
in return for Ajay's friendship, Krishna is also credited with creating two
factions within the khandan of the last British mukhiya at a time when
they were all united against the house of Amar Singh (Ajay's father) and
the Pradhan. Krishna has also increased his family's property from 15 to
2OObighas.
During the year we were in Arunpur, a number of events occurred that
adversely affected the social standing of Krishna's house and seemed to
have brought what prestige he previously had to a new low. His son was
involved in an embezzlement case with the government; his new house
that was being built on another's property with stolen material was
begun with inauspicious omens (the foundation was built on an old Mus-
lim burial ground); he falsely accused a worker at the government Seed
Store of stealing from his supplies; and the gauna of his daughter was
marred by conflict and dissension (see Case 8).
Arunpur villagers speak of Krishna as a big man, but one to be espe-
cially feared rather than respected, who has gained his present power by
the use of force and foul means. They do not have much to do with him
personally. If they need help in some matter, they go to one of the
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leading Bhumihars in their own village. Krishna's link with Arunpur is
through his close association with the Pradhan's family. He has done
many favors for them, especially in the purchase of land, and they, in
turn, have added some respect to his family's name. He wields influence
not only because of his wealth, but also because of the positions he holds
and the contacts he has. As Pradhan of his own village, pramukh of the
Community Development Block, and an executive of the Intercollege, he
has a wide, strong network of influential contacts that was crystallized in
the machinery he set in motion to free his son in a court case. He is close
to members of Parliament and the Legislative Assembly from his district
and to State Congress Party leaders. He has influence with civil servants
in the courts and the administrative service, and especially close contacts
with the local police station, as well as elsewhere. His relatives are in
positions of importance ranging from a younger brother who is the sar-
panch of the statutory nyaya panchayat to an affine who is a judge.
Krishna is disliked and envied by most villagers and only grudgingly
respected by a few other big men. His power and ability to crush others
make people fear to cross him or utter a bad word against him. Even the
Pradhan once severely reprimanded his younger brother when he learned
that the brother had been speaking about Krishna to us. "You have to
live in this place," the Pradhan said, "and so long as you do, do not
speak against Krishna." Because his power is so great and he does not
hesitate to use it to achieve his ends, Krishna is considered to be the real
leader of the Pradhan and Raj Kumar faction. It is specifically he who
has antagonized Chandra, Jai, and, to some extent, Narain. All three are
extremely jealous of Krishna and the wealth and power he has acquired.
CuLTURAL CATEGORIES AND VILLAGE LEADERS
While there was no one in Arunpur who was considered a rais, other
powerful men did conform to the cultural definition denoted by bara ad-
mi. This type is best recognized as the village politician who takes an ac-
tive role in local affairs and characterizes the influential men in Arunpur.
Villagers clearly articulated that when a man becomes a bara admi, it is
because of his ability to control other men and resources by sheer power,
force, and deceit.
Big men remain big because of their power, irrespective of whether or
not people like them or actually receive benefits from them. An individ-
ual cannot actively change the status of a big man simply by withholding
support from him. I used the word "leader" to denote a person who is
voluntarily followed and whose support is based on mutual aid, rather
than on fear or domination. A person can make a deliberate choice
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among existing big men, often the heads of rival factions, in selecting
whom they wish to follow and support. Thus, I use the word "leader"
(in the sense of agua) in referring to Arunpur big men in their active role
as faction heads with a specific following.
A number of characteristics are shared by all of the big men of Arun-
pur, despite their personality differences. Although their age varies
greatly (thirty-two to fifty-three years), they look like other villagers in
their outward appearances and manner, albeit somewhat more pros-
perous. None wears the Western clothing so popular with the younger
generation. All wear the traditional kurta (long, loose shirt) and dhoti
(long piece of material wound around the waist and between the legs).
The most important ascribed qualities are that they belong to the domi-
nant caste of Bhumihars and to families who had a recognized status in
the past. Each of them is also the sole effective head and decision maker
within his own family. In addition, all have achieved wealth by making
agriculture a profitable venture and in some cases by involvement in out-
side business as well. To this extent, they are innovative in accepting new
seeds, machines, and other changes which will increase their productive
output. They have also fully accepted material betterment as one of the
ideals (if not the major one) in their lives; bigger and better houses, better
clothes, education, and marriages, and a general higher standard of liv-
ing. Their families' wealth varies from the seventy-five bighas of land
and approximately 60,000 rupees annual income of the Pradhan to the
twenty-four bighas and 9,000 rupees received in produce sales by Jai
Singh. Chandra, Raj Kumar, and Narain follow the Pradhan in land and
other income, respectively.
Although their education varies from just primary school for the older
ones to high school for the younger, all big men are convinced of the im:
portance of education and are sending their sons on for higher studies.
An added factor in the complex scene of rivalry and enmity between the
two factions of big men is that one side is more conspicuously highly
educated than the other. The Pradhan and Raj Kumar party has a greater
number of intercollege students and graduates in their families. The
leaders themselves are more educated than Chandra, Jai, and Narain.
The consciousness of a feeling of inferiority in this respect has led to such
comments as the following, made by a member of Narain's family and a
close associate of Jai:
I know that you [myself and assistant] are research scholars, but I know no
less and I will make you dance. Look, don't think that Jai is a stupid one.
He knows more than anybody knows in the village. For example, in that
house [the Pradhan's] there are many B.A.'s and M.A.'s, and whenever
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they come here to take water from the tubewell, Jai "teaches" them how to
take water. So? He permits them to take water and tells them how many
hours should go to whom.
In their capacity as faction leaders and brokers, the big men act as
mediators between the villagers who need help and the officials or other
outsiders with whom contact must be made. Each one, therefore, takes
care to extend his network of contacts with important people outside the
village through whatever ties he can utilize. Ultimately, a man's contacts
are his most important assets, and it is they, not his wealth, which really
buttress his position. Wealth, of course, is an invaluable means of gain-
ing such contacts. To boast of how many influential people one knows
and can depend upon for support is common. Big men also have an ac-
tive concern and stake in controlling what goes on in the village, as well
as a personality suited to accomplishing their ends.
None of these big men, however, is a leader in the sense of a person
whose foremost concern is with the welfare of the village. Nor does any
actively involve himself in social service or the promotion of the type of
?change that the Community Development program thinks village leadersshould bring about. Although all recognize the need for change in socie-ty, they are not interested or willing to take on the role of the social in-
novator, except where personal advancement is concerned. These men
are the leaders of factions that are concerned with organizing the com-
petition for resources and power. The next chapter will deal explicitly
with the organization of factional activity and discusses the ties that bind
followers to their leaders.
NOTES
1. Bhargarva's Dictionary (1964) gives an additional gloss of "rich person."
2. A low-caste man with the qualities of a rais will be referred to as being "like a
rais. "
3. To insult and be involved in the death of a Brahman is regarded as a critically
grave sin.
4. The position that a major aspect of leadership has changed is not to be mistaken
for the view that there was no conflict in the past. Granted that enough ambigui-
ty in the village authority structure and political system of pre-Independence In-
dia was present for considerable conflict to take place, other studies emphasize
the unique roles of the mukhiya (village headman) and zamindar. Mayer points
out that as the only villager with statutory authority until 1950, the mukhiya was
the chief representative of the British Raj in the rural communities and a leader
of the villagers in dealings with officials. He was not, however, a despot. His
status was shared with other members of his caste and he had also to reckon with
leaders of other castes (Mayer 1960:93ff; also Retzlaff 1962:1-26). Nor was the
position universal (Miller 1975:114).
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The zamindar is pictured as having even greater power (Islam 1974; Rangnath
1967:269). A recent study by Chakravati (1975) documents, with fascinating case
material, how the abolition of jagirs (large landholdings) and subsequent land
reforms in 1954 provided the basis for the redistribution of power in a Ra-
jasthani village. Information relating to the past histories of two Bengali villages
also point to the preeminence of British-appointed leaders (Nicholas 1968a:253,
256-257).
While both positions ended abruptly with legislation leading to their demise,
there was probably a more gradual reduction in their actual exercise of power.
Mayer states that the years before Independence saw a gradual decrease in the in-
fluence and power of the mukhiya in Malwa region until he was reduced to the
level of mediator (1960:96). Doubtless the position also depended upon the per-
sonalities involved. Headmen in Arunpur are presented as having been par-
ticularly strong individuals.
5. I have since learned that Chandra died in an unfortunate accident. I have also
been told that partibandi has considerably abated following his demise.
CHAPTER 7
The Political Arena in Arunpur: Factions
The villagers' term for factionalism is partibandi. Parti is the English
word which has become a part of their vocabulary ever since national
political parties were introduced. On the local scene, the word refers to a
cluster of people who have some common interest for a particular pur-
pose, and who can stay together if it is to their advantage. It is a volun-
tary association of men. Bandi means a "prisoner" and comes from the
verb bandhana, "to bind" or "to enslave." In conjunction with parti,
bandi are the people who are bound together by a particular interest into
the same party (see also Bailey 1968:281).
As Bailey notes, village people usually speak of "parties" or parti-
Il bandi (his do/adoll) in a derogatory sense (1969:51) and blame it for the
increase of conflict since Independence and the ensuing disunity in com-
munity life. Narain Singh, one of the Bhumihar faction leaders in Arun-
pur, explained his opinion of the connection between the changes that
have occurred since Independence and the increase in factional conflict.
Since Independence, every man has been given individual freedom to rise as
much as he wants. Thus every man has a competitive feeling and his own
way and style of life. No one has faith in others. Every man is a separate
faction now, and men of similar views are forming larger factions-though
everyone is still conscious of his own self. This partibandi has given birth to
selfishness in the village, and that is why sticks are brought out daily, men
are being abused and trust is changing into distrust. No one looks for a pan-
chayat decision, for they fear the partiality of the judges.... Jajmani rela-
tions are also losing their stability. See, Ashok the Nai was our praja [client]
and has now left us. The Chamars have stopped taking away the dead
animals.
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Factions, however, are not permanent groups. Not only do the person-
nel shift according to the issue in dispute, but the multifaceted links be::.--
tween leaders and their individual supporters, rather than between these
members, are primary. As is evident from the cases to be discussed in this
chapter, factions are organized for conflict and engage solely in political
activity.!
ORIGIN OF PARTmANDI IN ARUNPUR
The history of the present factional alignments consists of a number of
events which reveal different cleavages that have occurred in the past.
The first of these relates to the original conflict that existed between the
two groups of Bhumihars who live in separate puras in the village. From
the beginning, when the first settlers came to Little Pura and allied them-
selves with the zamindar by becoming his revenue collectors, the descen-
dants of Arun Singh opposed them. They were joined by most of the
other Bhumihar khandans in Main Pura. The leading families in this
earlier pura fought against the British during the Independence struggle,
whereas the Little Pura group did not.
Crosscutting this original breach between these two puras was the
cleavage that later developed within the single Bhumihar khandan of Lit-
tle Pura. Cases 10 and 11 earlier outline disputes in which two men stood
together against their other pattidars.
Amid this background of preexisting tensions, the year 1952 seems to
mark a watershed in the history of Arunpur politics. India had gained In-
dependence just five years earlier, and this was quickly followed by the
Uttar Pradesh Abolition of Zamindari Act (1950). Cheddinath Singh,
the last person to be headman and powerful on a panvillage basis, died in
1952. In the same year, the new system of Local Self-Government by
elected councils (panchayati rail was introduced, and one of the pattidars
of the present Pradhan became village head. The Arunpur Intercollege
was also founded at this time, by the joint efforts of one of the Prad-
han's family members, Ajay Singh, the ex-zamindar Babu Sahib, and
Krishna Singh of Ramapur. Ajay Singh died a few years later (1957) but
his relationship with Krishna Singh had already been cemented into a
firm alliance between the two families. Partibandi is said to have started
in Arunpur due to this alliance and the indebtedness of Krishna to Ajay.
Relations between the Pradhan's family and the Little Pura Bhumi-
hars deteriorated rapidly after Independence. The latter reportedly were
responsible for a number of thefts that took place in Main Pura. Krishna
Singh, already known for his ability to make two men fight and for his
cleverness in legal matters, set out to divide the Little Pura Bhumihars
and succeeded in doing so extremely well. The following dispute was
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mentioned by all the leaders of the two factions as being the cause celebre
for village partibandi.
Case 12: Competition between Little Pura Bhumihars
for a Kurmi's Land c. 1952-present
A Kurmi in Arunpur wanted his four bighas of land to be registered in
the name of his only offspring, a daughter living in her husband's village.
Chandra Singh helped the man remove the legal claim his mother's
brother's son also had on the land. After this, Chandra began to culti-
vate the land for the Kurmi on a half-share basis.
Krishna Singh encouraged Raj Kumar Singh, a member of Chandra's
khandan whose house bordered on the land, to attempt to gain control of
that property. After the Kurmi died in his daughter's husband's home,
Chandra got the woman to agree to sell him the land. Krishna heard of
this only a day before the transfer was to be concluded. That night he
went to the woman's village with the Pradhan and asked her to sell the
property to them and Raj Kumar. They managed to get her to agree to
this and the deed was duly registered in the District Office the next day.
She, in turn, received 2,000 rupees as advance payment for the land.
When Chandra heard of this, he filed a suit against the three parties-
Raj Kumar, the Pradhan, and Krishna. He then approached the Kurmi
woman and offered her 4,000 rupees if she would testify in court that she
was not the true daughter of the Kurmi man and that, indeed, he had no
offspring. If she did this, Chandra said, then she could keep the money
already received for the land from Krishna et aI., plus the additional
4,000 rupees to be paid by him. The land would then come to Chandra by
default as he had cultivated it for the true owner, the deceased Kurmi.
The woman appeared in the Banaras Lower Court and kept her state-
ments vague. Ultimately, though, the case was decided in favor of
Krishna and his friends. Chandra then appealed to the High Court in
Allahabad to get the decision reversed. The Commissioner in charge of
reviewing the case accepted a large bribe from Chandra and it became
known that he would decide the case in his favor when it came up for
review. Krishna, however, subsequently learned that this Commissioner
would retire in two years and managed to keep the case inactive until
then by giving occasional bribes to the appropriate officials. By the time
we arrived in the field, Raj Kumar decided to take possession of the land
by force. Although Chandra did not resist, he reactivated the case in the
Banaras Lower Court.
Six months later, the court again decided in favor of the Pradhan, Raj
Kumar, and Krishna. Twenty-four bise each of the land went to Raj
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Kumar and to the Pradhan, and ten bise went to their supporters-a pat-
tidar of Raj Kumar2 and the Pradhan's barber. They attempted to give
the remaining twelve bise to Chandra if he would agree to acquiesce to
the decision. Chandra refused and was trying once again to appeal the
case to the State High Court.
The most immediate result of this lengthy contest, started on the insti-
gation of Krishna Singh, is that the unity of the Little Pura Bhumihars
has been irrevocably breached since 1952. The thefts that this khandan
had successfully carried out in Main Pura, especially in the Pradhan's
house, were immediately stopped at the same time, for each rival would
accuse the other of being the culprit. Thus, in order to return a favor to
his old friends, Krishna created a situation whereby a single lawsuit
brought about a state of permanent (Le., until the present day) partiban-
di in Arunpur. Any disputes between two individuals in the village
thereafter, especially over land, were almost inevitably caught up in this
conflict. Because most villagers do not have the resources required to
wage a successful contest over the possession of land (inevitably involv-
ing recourse to the courts), they must appeal to a big man for help. Once
a disputant enlists the aid of a village big man aligned with a specific fac-
tion, a rival big man will enter the fray on the opposite side. In addition,
if a villager should be opposed by a man or men belonging to one fac-
tion, he will ask a rival faction leader for help. Disputes are escalated to
the field of factions in this way.
Leaders will help individuals by fighting or interceding with others on
their behalf and by lending them money or other material aid while the
dispute is being waged. In return, they will expect their supporters to re-
main loyal to them and to aid them as the occasion arises. If disputing in-
dividuals should belong to two separate factions in the same caste, then"
there is a direct connection between these factions within other castes and
those of the Bhumihars. In Arunpur, this crosscutting of ties among dif-
ferent factions occurs in the case of the Chamars. They have opposing
parties among themselves, and each member can appeal to the Bhumihar
for whom he works for support.
Case 12 also makes clear that factional conflict is not solely concerned
with material gains and that other considerations enter into a determina-
tion of the costs and rewards of an encounter. If material gain was the
sole concern, then Chandra should have accepted the twelve bise offered
as his share of the pie. But partibandi involves more than that; there is
the cost (or reward) of pride, prestige, honor, family name, influence,
and comparison with one's rival. Competition takes not only the form of
abuses, fights, and court cases, but also generosity to friends and clients,
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donations to schools, giving and receiving more in marriage, and better
education and jobs. The field of competition which factional activity en-
compasses becomes increasingly large.
Besides the greater frequency with which disputes are now escalated in-
to the political arena via factionalism, the case points to the increasing
preference for choosing the alternative of the law courts rather than the
village or big man panchayats to settle disputes between rival factions.
As one villager put it, "When there is a quarrel in our pura or among our
partymen, we settle it amongst ourselves, but if it involves the Little Pura
people [and their ally Narain Singh], we take them to court." Cases that
end up in the courtroom drag on for an indeterminate time, with the
result that, as in the situation just cited, opposing parties remain so for
the entire period. This adds a quality of permanency to village partibandi
alignments (see also Nicholas 1965:30). At the same time, any other
dispute arising between these parties while the initial conflict continues is
immediately escalated to the villagewide political arena.
In 1965, there was a meeting of the statutory judicial (nyaya) pan-
chayat that attempted to reach some compromise in this matter of the
Kurmi's land. Ten panchayat members from seven villages around Arun-
pur were invited, and Krishna Singh represented Ramapur. Chandra
Singh said that he presented the head of the meeting with a petition in
which the following points were made:
I have no trust in Krishna Singh, the present panchayat member, for the
following reasons:
1. He has defrauded two Banaras merchants of their land.
2. He has played a bad role in Mohan Ram Chamar's land dispute [see
Case 18 following].
3. He is partial to the Pradhan and his family.
4. In addition, he still owes me some crops dating from my grand-
father's time which now comes to about 100,000 rupees with interest.
The meeting was adjourned after the petition was read. Krishna asked
the head of the panchayat to call another meeting to protest Chandra's
behavior. The head refused because, although he agreed that the petition
was in poor taste, all the accusations were true. The key point of the issue
was the public announcement made regarding Krishna's indebtedness to
Chandra, which explains much of the latter's antagonism toward the
former. Everyone knew of this fact already, but Chandra utilized the oc-
casion to make a public announcement on the matter and thus strike at
Krishna's "bigness" and prestige.
The situation arose some sixty years earlier, when Chandra's grand-
father lent fifty maunds (4,000 pounds) of grain to Krishna's father, who
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never returned the amount. The interest on this debt now comes to some
100,000 rupees, as Chandra will not accept a return of only the basic
loan. Krishna cannot and will not pay this amount and it remains a blot
on his family's name. The opposition often taunt Krishna behind his
back for being unable to perform the ancestor sacrifice performed every
year at sacred Gaya in Bihar. One of the prerequisites for performing this
sacrifice is for a man to announce, with a drum, that if anyone has given
him or any of his ancestors something not yet returned that person must
come and take it back. "Whenever Krishna will play his drum," Chan-
dra says, "I will put my palm before him and say, 'Give it back.'"
Thus an outside man, Krishna Singh, has become inexorably tied up
with Arunpur partibandi because of his previous relations and present
closeness to the family of the Pradhan. In return for the respect and add-
ed prestige that Ajay Singh, the founder of Arunpur Intercollege, gave to
Krishna's family, the latter helped him and his family to get land and to
oppose Chandra on several other occasions. The initial cleavage between
the Pradhan's khandan and that of Chandra Singh in Little Pura during
the Independence struggle accounts for the origin of partibandi in Arun-
pur. Krishna came to the aid of the former and caused a split within Lit-
tle Pura which also added Raj Kumar Singh to their coalition. Jai Singh
followed his close pattidar Chandra (see Case 11, earlier) and subsequent
developments added Narain Singh to this second faction.
Case 13: Narain Singh Cheats a Brahman of His Land
(before Case 12 Started) c. 1952
Narain Singh was a friend of Amar Singh (then the head of the Prad-
han's family) as well as of the united (i.e., nonfactionalized) khandan of
Little Pura Bhumihars. A Brahman who lived next to Narain agreed to
sell him five bighas of land for 1,700 rupees. Narain bought the land on
the condition that he give 250 rupees in advance and the remaining mon-
ey at the time that the transfer of ownership was registered. The Brah-
man accepted. After the deed of sale was registered, Narain said that he
had left the money in the village and would give it to him there. The
Brahman believed him, but upon reaching Arunpur was unable to get his
money.
The Brahman owed 200 rupees to a Little Pura Bhumihar, Rampat
Singh (uncle of Raj Kumar Singh). Someone, perhaps Amar Singh of
Main Pura, told the latter that as the Brahman had sold all his land he
was going to leave the village without repaying this debt. Rampat called
the Brahman, who explained that he had received only 250 rupees and
not the full amount. Rampat advised him to ask Narain once again for
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the remaining money. When the Brahman did, Narain replied: "I know
that you are being backed by Rampat Singh. I have so many rupee notes
that I can buy him, too." Word of this boast was carried back to Ram-
pat, who became so angry that he bought the Brahman's land himself.
Then he took some laborers to the fields and started to cut down the trees
standing there.
When Narain heard of this, he ran to his friends and relations (some of
whom were also related to Rampat) and asked them to help him fight
against the Brahmans. People came with sticks, swords and spears and
camped near Amar Singh's house. However, when they went to the "bat-
tlefield" and discovered that the opposing party were not the Brahmans
but some of their own kinsmen, they refused to fight. The land remained
in the hands of Rampat Singh.
Case 14: Amar Singh Backs a Brahman Against Narain Singh c. 1958
Another young Brahman sold his land to Narain Singh under some
sort of pressure or deceit. After this sale was registered in the court,
Amar Singh (then head of the Pradhan's family) suggested to this Brah-
man that he file a suit against Narain saying that his land had been oc-
cupied by force. The Brahman's case was lost after three to four years,
although Narain later gave him 1,100 rupees as compensation for the
original low price.
In both of these cases, Narain Singh obtained land from the Brahmans
and his supposed friends (Rampat Singh and Amar Singh) sought to
create trouble. According to Narain's version of Case 13, Amar Singh
acted as a middleman between himself and Rampat and Amar was the
one who inflamed Rampat against Narain with false words. Narain also
says that Amar was jealous of the fact that he (Narain) could be friendly
with the Bhumihars of both puras and hence sought to harm him. What
finally seemed to ally Narain with Chandra Singh was Amar's position in
Case 14, in which he tried to turn the Brahmans against Narain.
Every big man in the village seems to have his own sphere of influence,
which extends over his neighbors in the immediate vicinity. One khandan
of Brahmans lives just next to Narain Singh's house and they are often
forced to sell their land to meet expenses. Narain feels that he can exer-
cise the most pressure in obtaining their property at low prices because he
lives the closest. Since he and Amar Singh have parted company, Narain
accuses the latter of attempting to create obstacles in the way of such
purchases.
The final breach between the two men occurred in 1966, and since that
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time relations between their entire families have been severed. This dis-
pute concerned the ownership and rights to use a village pond and the
land near it. A Kahar who has cultivated the pond to catch and sell fish
for the past fifteen years claims that payment of rent on this property en-
titles him to enjoy complete possession of it. The Pradhan, of Amar
Singh's house, says that the pond belongs to the village and this has
forced the Kahar to file a court case against the Pradhan and the village
(gram sabha). There are some mango trees located on land just beside the
disputed pond which are also considered to be part of the public proper-
ty. Narain has claimed them as his own and has clashed with the Pradhan
and his family and supporters. In the ensuing fight, Narain received
several severe blows on his head. After that, however, he successfully
claimed the mango trees as his own.
FACTIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CONFLICT
The origins and subsequent development ofpartibandi in Arunpur reveal
how the major families of Little Pura and Main Pura Bhumihars have
become divided among themselves. Before going on to discuss how parti-
bandi has extended to encompass other villagers in this conflict, I will
present several additional case histories. They reveal two main points: (1)
that factions are a convenient and suitable way to organize competition
arising from conflict of interests, in the absence of any other group
capable of mobilizing support for political action, and (2) that there is a
tendency for all disputes between key faction members to escalate to this
field in the political arena.
Case 15: The Village Panchayat Elections c.1952-1963
After zamindari and the office of the British-appointed headman were
abolished in 1952, there was talk of the new statutory panchayats that
were going to be introduced in the villages. Baljit Singh, a deeply
religious man who is a pattidar of the present pradhan, called a meeting
of the whole village at Narain Singh's house. Partibandi had not yet
started and the last British headman was already dead. Baljit explained
that the new panchayats were being created for the uplift of the villages,
that there should be no disputes over the elections, and that a unanimous
choice of a man who will do good for the community was preferred.
Someone suggested his name and he became the first pradhan.
Baljit Singh served two terms in office. People say that he did nothing
that was either good or controversial. The only material achievement of
his term was the construction of a village council house (panchayat
bhavan). In 1963, elections were held a third time for a new panchayat
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and village head. Partibandi was deeply ingrained among the Bhumihars
and, as Baljit Singh was not a favorite among the low castes, the faction
of Amar Singh decided to support one of their family members, Prasad
Singh. He was perhaps the only man respected by all for his honesty,
humility, good nature, and kindness.
Chandra Singh knew that he was too unpopular in the village and
asked his pattidar Jai Singh also to contest the election. Jai stood for the
post, even knowing he would lose, because "Indian castes are like dogs.
As one dog cannot tolerate the other's presence, in the same way a man
cannot tolerate the rise of another caste-fellow. What big fools we are! I
contested the election against Prasad Singh because he was a Bhumihar
of the rival party. If he were a Kurmi, I would never have fought against
him. It is a question of prestige. If I should lose to a Bhumihar, it does
not make that much difference because he is my equal. But if I should
lose to a Kurmi, it would be the question of my life and prestige."
The election for village pradhan was conducted by secret ballot. Jai
lost by 150 votes. Both sides had already selected their panchayat
member running mates by a show of hands. After Jai lost the election, all
of his candidates withdrew their nominations. No meetings of this new
statutory village panchayat have taken place, nor has the panchayat tax
been collected. The present pradhan has made no attempt to activate the
panchayat because of partibandi and it is a completely dormant institu-
tion in Arunpur.
Although villagers think that the idea of having local panchayats ini-
tiate and work for the uplift of their community is basically a good idea,
the almost universal opinion of the new government panchayat system is
that it is not working. In a questionnaire I administered to all household
heads, one of the questions was, "What has the panchayat done for the
village?" A few people listed the building of the panchayat house and the
paving of some village lanes. The majority replied, "Nothing but cause
fights between us"; "It is no good because it produces selfishness"; or
"Nothing but trouble us (or bother the poor)."
Panchayat elections are not viewed as the basic cause of partibandi in
Arunpur. Villagers, however, believe that these elections intensify fac-
tional feelings, as voting for a man is interpreted as belonging to his par-
ty. Elections are held by secret ballot, but by discussions everyone knows
just how others feel and will vote. One of the teachers at the Intercollege
analyzed the situation as follows:
Previously, people could remain neutral from both factions if they wanted
to. But now, in an election, both parties put up their candidates and a vote
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for one or the other means you are a member of that party. [Question: Why
should this be so? If I vote for a candidate in an election, no one supposes I
must follow him on every point. Isn't voting separate from other aspects of
life?] Things are not separate like that here. The people are ignorant and il-
literate and do not understand about the vote. Therefore, if they will vote
for one party, the other side will say to them, "You did not vote for me.
Therefore, it means you have joined the other side." And so, the association
between voting and faction membership has grown up.
By far the most pointed criticism leveled against the new government
panchayats strikes at their very basis, that is, the difficulty of obtaining a
group of respected panchayat members through universal suffrage. On
this point I quote directly at some length the incisive comments made by
the pradhan of a neighboring village on the ill effects of voting for pan-
chayats, although he presents a rather idealized picture of days gone by.
In the old days there was one man in the village whom all selected as
pradhan, because in the eyes of the villagers he was the only man worthy of
this place. Those days, every man had a feeling of social and moral fear,
which is lacking in these voters. The old system was a closed system; it
checked disputes and allowed for more peace and harmony which has been
destroyed since elections were introduced. There was no rush or crowd to
occupy positions. But these days there is competition for any post in the
village. Naturally, the most improper and unlikely man for that place plays
all types of games in order to win. Such games and activities are immoral
ones. It is the election system which introduces malpractices and evil ways.
Because everyone has an equal right to contest for a position, but because all
are not equally qualified and able, so there is more opportunity for the
wrong man to win.... All these factional fights and court cases are
nothing but the manifestations of this conflict. I openly say that voting must
be finished, but the government is not going to do this because it must eat
away the humanity and peace of the nation.... What a strange thing that
equal wise men elect those of unequal qualities. It usually happens that the
man who is not wise gets the position and the wise man is thrown away.
Even wise men become unwise at the time of election because they are car-
ried away by feeling of prestige. To be elected or to elect a particular man
becomes a question of prestige. Suppose a big man suggests that his depen-
dents vote a certain way and they don't. Then the big man is no longer wise
and human. He takes a stick in his hand to break his dependents'
heads.... Often many of the fights in the village panchayat are a result of
what has happened two years back. Even I feel uncontrollable anger if
someone disobeys me.
Elections for the pradhan and panchayat members were to be held
again in April or May of 1969, but they were indefinitely postponed.
There was much talk, however, of the forthcoming contest and both fac-
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tions were planning different strategies to capture the prize. Chandra
Singh and his party members were determined to back Jai Singh again if
the present pradhan, Prasad Singh, were to stand for reelection. If Raj
Kumar Singh's uncle (Rampat) were to be nominated instead of Prasad,
then they would back one of their Chamar supporters. The major con-
cern of Chandra and his allies was to put down the Pradhan and his par-
ty. Therefore, they were carefully deciding whom to back and said that
"one must know whom to favor in order to create a breach in someone
else's group."
The Pradhan seemed willing to stand again although he knows that he
will never have the time to do anything good while in office. But he is the
only one who has the respect and support of so many villagers and it is
likely that his family and party men are urging him to contest again. An
alternative for his party would be to back some lower-caste man, yet
there is a reluctance on their part to lose whatever prestige and power
comes from being the backers of a pradhan.
The only other person who has openly made known his desire to be the
next pradhan is a Kurmi man of little means who has passed the eighth
grade and whose son has completed his B.A. Interestingly enough, both
factions seem reluctant to back a Kurmi who is not obligated to either
party. It would seem that their willingness to support a Chamar means
that the latter can be easily manipulated and would pose no threat to the
Bhumihars, whereas a Kurmi pradhan might not prove so malleable.
Villagers maintain that these elections are responsible for the inten-
sification of party rivalry (see also Weiner 1965b). It seems more likely,
however, that the intensity of partibandi is associated with the general in-
crease of competition for new resources. Elections are, in a sense, a new
resource and thus become encompassed by factional strife. One would
expect that in the absence of political parties or any other politically ac-
tive corporate group in the village, factions would be the most likely can-
didates to organize the competition for, say, an electoral contest. The
leaders and their followers are already bound together in the hope of pur-
suing mutual self-interest and can extend their cooperation to include the
struggle for any new resources which may enter the political arena.
THE DYNAMICS OF FACTIONS: ESCALATION OF CONFLICT
TO THE POLmCAL ARENA
Factions and factional rivalry also seem to expand this arena to include
disputes that would normally not be considered as involving scarce
goods. This escalation of otherwise "nonpolitical" events by factions
seems to be inherent in Arunpur partibandi. If the personnel involved in
such disputes are key members in a coalition (i.e., a leader or any of his
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family members) who can easily command the support of others in a cri-
sis, then this type of escalation is most likely to occur. The following two
incidents occurred while I was in the field and illustrate this point.
Case 16: The Molested Boy 1969
Rama Singh, one of the young (age twenty) pattidars of the Pradhan,
was known to be mischievous, disrespectful, and often badly behaved.
More particularly, he had instigated and was carrying on an affair with a
fourteen-year-old boy, Mohan, from Narain Singh's house. Both fami-
lies knew of this, but as it was a matter of prestige for all concerned,
nothing was said and it was hoped that the situation would soon come to
an end. Rama's father had even beaten his son many times in an attempt
to stop such behavior, but to no avail. He continued to intimidate and
molest the younger boy.
One day, after school, Rama attacked Mohan, who fought back and
managed to escape to a shop on the main road. Rama caught him there
and afterward Mohan came home weeping. One of the men of Narain
Singh's house went to speak with Rama's father, while Narain's son went
to the shop to find out what had really happened. When he arrived, he
found Rama was still there and was threatening a young boy to stop him
from telling about anything he had seen. Narain's son said, "You would
hit the one who tells the truth?" Rama abused him and in return was
beaten. Narain's son later realized that he had acted in haste but was too
angered to restrain himself at the time.
That evening, Rama's father came to Narain Singh's house and called
for the latter's son to come out. A pattidar of Rama's was also with him
and advised him to return home since his son was a good-for-nothing and.
was probably in the wrong. When other pattidars later came from
Rama's house and abused them, Narain's son went around the village
calling many of his supporters who came to his house and stayed there
with weapons (sticks, spears, sword, and so on). Finally, a pattidar of
Narain, known to be neutral in the factional rivalries and, in fact, quite
friendly with the Pradhan's family, was sent as the mediator to settle the
dispute calmly.
Case 17: The Dog Fight 1968
One morning, two dogs of Chandra Singh were fighting with Raj
Kumar Singh's dog and badly mauled it. One of Raj Kumar's younger
brothers, hearing his dog's cries, came and found Chandra's son just
looking on (some versions say that he was also pelting Raj Kumar's dog
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with stones). At this, he started to abuse the young boy for not stopping
the fighting dogs.
In the evening, Chandra and his brother returned from the courts in
Banaras and eventually learned what happened. At this point there are
two different versions of the story. Chandra states: "Without thinking,
at about 11 p.m., I started abusing Raj Kumar from my doorstep. I soon
realized that this was a mistake but it was too late to stop. Raj Kumar
and others had already run to my house-they were eight and we were
two [Chandra and his brother]. Jai Singh and Dharma Singh [a pattidar
of Raj Kumar who supports Chandra] soon reached here and requested
us not to fight, for if anyone is killed it will be from the same khandan.
But Raj Kumar would not listen and took an oath to kill me the next
morning. Now it became necessary for me to call some relatives to save
my life. Twelve men from my mother's brother's village came and were
armed, but nothing happened and so they returned. I also sent my sup-
porters to request Raj Kumar to compromise, but he refused saying that
he would 'meet me on the battlefield.' "
Raj Kumar's version differs only in that he says that Chandra had first
called the men from his mother's brother's village and only after that did
he dare to abuse them. Then Raj Kumar and his men ran to Chandra's
door to fight. When one of Raj Kumar's brothers was about to crack his
stick over Chandra's head, Jai Singh and Dharma Singh came and inter-
vened in the fight. Neither was willing to take sides with Chandra on this
occasion. Raj Kumar, however, was so provoked that he vowed to kill
Chandra and by 2:30 A.M. sent a message to the Pradhan for help. Many
of his supporters assembled. The Pradhan and other elders of the village
were also called to Little Pura for advice. Still, Raj Kumar would not
listen. Instead he asked his men to form small groups and to approach
the railroad station from different directions through the fields to catch
hold of Chandra's men hiding there. But the latter, apparently, had
already left.
The next morning, an informal panchayat was held of both factions at
Raj Kumar's house which settled nothing. Eventually the trouble died
down.
These two cases are good illustrations of the patterned sequence of
phases which occur in encounters between factions. Such encounters are
representative of a more general type of conflict, the "social drama,"
where marked disturbances in social life serve to make visible the existing
power alignments (see Turner 1957:91-92, 131; also Swartz et al.
1966:32ft). The processual form of the "social drama," applied to these
two cases, clearly reveals the dynamics of factional conflict.
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First, there occurs an initial breach of a norm governing relations be-
tween persons or groups interacting within the same system of social rela-
tions. This would be the actual situations which began cases 16 and 17:
the fighting dogs and subsequent exchange of harsh words between
Chandra's son and Raj Kumar's brother, and the misbehavior of Rama
with Mohan.
The initial breach is followed by a phase of mounting crises during
which, unless the conflict can be quickly sealed off within a limited area
of social interaction, there is a tendency for the breach to widen and ex-
tend until it becomes coextensive with some dominant cleavage in the
widest set of relevant social relations to which the conflicting parties
belong. Following the initial crises in these two situations, both sides
claimed that they attempted to seal off the matter. In Case 17, Raj
Kumar said that his younger brother mentioned nothing about the morn-
ing events, fearing it would only worsen matters, and that it was not until
Chandra started hurling abuses that he learned of what had occurred.
Chandra also said that neither his son nor anyone in the house wanted to
tell him of the dispute. It was only after noticing how morose his son
looked that Chandra persisted in his questions and was reluctantly told
of what had happened by the women of his house.
Despite this, the conflict was not sealed off. In fact, a major quality of
factional disputes which I observed in Arunpur is this very inability of
people to seal off any conflict involving key party personnel. Such con-
flict automatically escalates and cannot be settled in any other way. Fac-
tion leaders appeal to other followers for support, and the breach widens
until it becomes coterminous with faction membership. Hence, men
came running from Chandra's mother's brother's village and Raj Kumar
called upon his supporters from Main Pura. The breach had widened to
its largest boundary. In Case 16, Narain's son reacted similarly to the
threat by calling upon his men in the village to keep an armed watch at
his home.
Next, redressive actions are speedily brought into operation by leading
members of the relevant social group. The mediator in the Rama-Mohan
case was a pattidar of one faction who was also friendly with the other
faction. The fight between Chandra and Raj Kumar became more seri-
ous. Many more people were involved in attempting to settle the dispute
and an informal panchayat was called on the spot. Although nothing
came of the meeting, the interference of members of both factions did
succeed in averting the immediate threat of bloodshed, and the matter
ended after that.
Finally, there is a reintegration of parties to the dispute or a recogni-
tion of the schism. Needless to say, the parties concerned were not reinte-
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grated after the performance of these social dramas. Indeed, it may well
be that in the case of factional conflict these dramas serve the purpose of
enacting a ritual of integration to symbolize the tie of each leader and his
followers in opposition to those of the other faction.
RECRurrMENT OF PARTIBANDI PERSONNEL
It now remains to consider the way in which leaders recruit members to
their factions. The following three cases illustrate this process.
Case 18: Krishna Singh and Amar Singh Cheat a
Chamar of His Land c. 1953
Mohan Ram Chamar bought some land from the zamindar Babu
Sahib, during the days of British rule, which had been previously
cultivated by Amar Singh's family. Krishna Singh of Ramapur agreed to
come as a witness for Mohan Ram in the transfer of the deed. Several
years later, when Amar Singh (through his son Ajay) became close to
Krishna, the latter advised him to try to retrieve this land. One day,
Krishna and Amar summoned the Chamar to a panchayat. Krishna
turned a false witness and said that the Chamar's land belonged to Amar
Singh and that if the former wanted to keep the two bighas, he would
have to pay for it.
In the meeting, Mohan Ram showed the receipt of the original sale to
the two Bhumihars, who took it and tore it up. Mohan then appealed to
Chandra Singh, for whom he used to work. Chandra (and Jai Singh)
helped the Chamar; they filed a suit against Amar and Krishna and after
four years Mohan won back his land.
Case 19: Chandra Singh Helps a Kurmi Fight Amar
Singh's Family 1958-1962
Bhaggu Ram, a Kurmi, had some land which Amar Singh and Raj
Kumar's uncle (Rampat Singh) claimed as their own. The Kurmi had
planted some potatoes there and one evening Amar and his partymen
uprooted them and took them all to their houses. Some of Chandra
Singh's and Narain Singh's potatoes in adjacent fields were also carried
off in the process. As Chandra did not want to go openly against other
Bhumihars, he requested Bhaggu Ram to take action against Amar and
the others. Bhaggu refused.
After some two or three months, the entire store of the Kurmi's potato
crop was burned. He became angry and ran to Chandra to ask his help in
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taking revenge. At first Chandra refused, because Bhaggu had not
helped him earlier, but eventually he agreed to help. Chandra gave the
Kurmi three bighas of his own land to cultivate rent free for three years,
so that the man could sustain his family and fight a court case against
Amar Singh. Eventually the Kurmi won back his land.
Case 20: Raj Kumar Singh Helps a Brahman and Some
Chamars Fight against Jai Singh 1966
Jai Singh was appointed to be in charge of the distribution of tubewell
water (thokdar). It is said that he started abusing his power and giving
water only to those he liked. He also asked farmers to bring him meat, by
way of bribery, if they wanted to receive water quicker. One day, one of
the Brahman men abused him: "Oh yes, I will supply the meat of a he-
goat's genital if you give me water quickly." Jai became angered, abused
the Brahman and threatened to cut off his water altogether.
The Brahman learned that Jai was having an affair with a Chamar girl.
He informed the Chamars, who caught Jai in the act. Then, backed by
the Brahman and with the help of Raj Kumar Singh and men from the
Pradhan's house (and his supporters), the Chamars gave Jai a severe
beating. The latter filed a suit in court against the Brahman and several
others, and they received jail sentences of some three to six years. The
case was subsequently appealed to the High Court in Allahabad and the
earlier decision was reversed.
In the process the Brahman spent about 3,000 rupees. Krishna Singh
and his younger brother, together with Raj Kumar, helped to fight the
case. The former gave 600 rupees and the latter gave 50 rupees. To this
day the Brahman speaks of Raj Kumar Singh as his "leader," the rais,
and the only one he will obey and follow.
As can be seen from the foregoing three cases, personnel of different
factions are recruited primarily on the basis of indebtedness to a leader
for aid rendered in the past. If a poor man is confronted in an encounter
by one of the village big men, it is impossible for him to win the contest
by pitting his meager resources against those at the command of the big
man. This simple economic fact forms the major tie between a leader and
his supporters. I usually found that the more severe the dispute and the
greater the help received, the closer the tie between the two men. Since
any man may come into conflict with another and request help from a
third party, there are no set structural principles (e.g., kin or caste ties,
indebtedness, patron-client ties, and so on) exclusively involved. All are
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potential lines of support and a faction leader seeks to mobilize any of
the possible connections he may have.
One of the most direct ways to gain supporters is to activate kinship
links. The Pradhan's family can count on their pattidars, as well as a
neighboring khandan of unrelated Bhumihars, for support in any fight
against Jai Singh, Chandra Singh, or Narain Singh. Narain is not so
lucky in this way, for his sole pattidar in the village is known not only to
be neutral in factional conflicts, but perhaps even to be closer to the
Pradhan's family. The Little Pura khandan of Bhumihars is, of course,
split. About three years ago, one of Raj Kumar's pattidars switched his
allegiance and is now firmly in Chandra's party. In return, Chandra has
helped him to start in the business of storing and selling potatoes.
The Bhumihars in Main Pura who are unrelated to either the Prad-
han's or Narain Singh's family have allied themselves with different fac-
tion leaders. the elderly "outcaste" Bhumihar lives close to Narain and
supports him. It appears that the Pradhan's family men, especially the
elders, are more strict in applying sanctions for infractions of caste rules,
and perhaps they feel that intimacy with an "outcaste" is not befitting
their prestige. In turn, the old Bhumihar is probably more relaxed with
easygoing Narain.
A second Bhumihar, living in his wife's village, also sits more often at
Narain's place. He may have felt somewhat rejected by the close-knit at-
mosphere of the Pradhan's family, pattidars, and immediate neighbors.
Narain Singh would also be more likely to welcome an outsider because
he lacks the manpower the Pradhan can command.
A third Bhumihar, who is distantly related to the Pradhan (and hence
in his khandan), was definitely allied with Narain and Chandra Singh. I
could never find out the reasons for this, for he would not speak with
me. On the rare occasions he met my assistant, we thought it unwise to
bring up the topic. Finally, there are three Bhumihar brothers known as
the Kolhas (see note 1, Chapter 9), disparagingly referred to as adroit
fence-sitters who shifted their loyalties easily.
The links between the Bhumihars and the lower castes are for the most
part even more tenuous. Some clients (prajas) feel a moral obligation to
support their patrons Uajmans) and also realize that not to do so might
be risking one source of income. Other castes, however-Kurmi, Lohar,
Teli, Kabar, Kohar, and so on-are by and large independent of such
disputes. The Chamars must usually follow the master who provides
them with food and land in return for labor, and to whom they are also
indebted.
The Untouchables and other extremely poor villagers cannot afford to
remain neutral in partibandi, nor do the leaders permit them to remain
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so. An explicit case in point is small Noniya pura, comprising mainly
Noniyas, Kahars, Dharkars, and Musahars (the latter two Untouchable
castes). Here is what an old Dharkar told us about how the poor are
pressured in conflicts between the Bhumihars. The added complexity in
this case is that Noniya pura is tied closely to Little Pura as a whole and
thus crosscuts the feuds within it:
I am so indebted to them [Little Pura Bhumihars] that though I may
change my mind, I cannot change my heart. Oh, we are bound to do
whatever they like or they will beat us; they will not let us go out of our
houses because their lands are around the village [Le., our pura]. The paths
run through their fields. Their eyes are always on us as we are nearest to
their pura.
[Question: Why then don't you join Amar Singh's party? They are also
Bhumihars who are equal in strength and power.] Suppose there are two
suns of the same intensity and they are emitting their rays equally, but the
distances are different. One is far and one is nearer. Then the intensity of
the one nearer is a little more and the thing which is nearer to it will be
warmer. In the same way, the people of Little Pura are nearer to us so they
influence us more, even though those of the other pura are equal in strength.
Suppose today we give our promise to those in Main Pura, but then we
change our minds. How will they know? But the most secret activities of
ours are open to those of Little Pura, so we cannot change from them. We
must follow and obey them.
The third point is because they have given us money and helped us in our
bad days. Chandra Singh, Jai Singh, and Rampat Singh have given me
money which equals 300 rupees. So I am bound to listen to them. And I
hope they will help me until I die. Then they will give the clothes in which
the dead body is carried away. So to the man who can help us from birth un-
til death-even if he is cruel in other aspects-we are morally bound and
must behave as he wants. They are rich because they have wealth, power,
and means. They are everything to us because we have none of these things.
Although a man may make use of many different connections to bind
another man to him, the follower does not always respond in the desired
way. There are two opposing values put on the nature of the leader-
follower tie: loyalty or self-interest. A leader who gives help will not
forget when he is later deserted. Jai Singh once yelled at the Chamar of
Case 18 for not supporting him in the village elections:
When the bamboo stake was pushed up your buttocks you didn't dare to
open your mouth then, did you? I am the man who helped you. But now you
never think that I will make a suitable pradhan but have the idea of bringing
forth a new man from the Chamar pura.
Similarly, he shouted at a Kurmi:
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You say kind things about me to my face but you beat me on my head with
shoes.3 [Followed by a string of abuses] ... You are dishonest. I sold you
half a bigha of land near your house for 1,500 rupees because I had prom-
ised to do so, even though your own pattidar later came and offered me
double that amount. But in the panchayat election you turned against me
and voted for Prasad Singh. Not one man in your house voted for me.
Whom should I trust?
One of the men whom the Pradhan can implicitly trust is a village Nai.
Arunpur is this barber's mother's brother's village. Some years ago, the
land that he still owned in his natal village was forcibly occupied by some
men. The Pradhan and Krishna Singh helped the Nai regain possession
of the land. "Therefore," he says, "if the Pradhan tells me to go out and
stand in the mud, I will do so." He is known to be a blind follower, ready
to beat or even kill (it is said) for his leader. He received ten bise of land
as a reward for his support of the Pradhan's party in Case 12. The Nai
not only provides physical force, when necessary, but often attends to
matters in the court when the Pradhan and Raj Kumar are otherwise
engaged.
Opposed to the loyal follower is the supporter who is known as a
"contract witness," the person who joins a faction only because it best
serves his own self-interest at that particular time. A number of people in
the village are known to play this game and some of them have the
reputation of being characterless men, willing to do anything to take ad-
vantage of a situation. Others, like the wealthy Kurmi berated by Jai
(cited previously), try to tread a middle course between the opposing
Bhumihars so that they will not suffer any disadvantage, but this is a dif-
ficult task. Men who are not that deeply involved in factional hostilities,
but who may become involved on occasion, do not display the same
deep-rooted enmity that key faction personnel do. The fact that the son
of an elderly Brahman had been involved in a court case with Jai only
two years before did not stop him from having friendly relations with the
latter. The Brahman also claims Raj Kumar as his leader because he had
helped in that case against Jai. Other villagers reacted against the idea of
being friendly with both sides, however, and cited the Brahman as an ex-
ample of a man who switches loyalties easily.
Some pattidars of the feuding Bhumihars also alternate between the
two parties or else make an unsuccessful attempt to remain neutral. But a
neutral person suffers most when he needs something from one side and
is then accused of trying secretly to play both sides at once. If such an in-
dividual, for example, asks Jai for tubewell water, he is told, "Why
don't you ask your party man, the Pradhan? Why ask me?" The other
faction will similarly rebuke the man. No neutral man can benefit or even
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survive in Arunpur politics unless he is strong enough to stand against
both factions and is not dependent upon either for help. When someone
fights against such a neutral man, no one else will come to his rescue.
Just as the faction leaders often complained about certain villagers for
their shifting loyalties, so a leader himself is often accused of not being
fair to his followers. One of the notorious "contract witnesses" of the
village explained his unusual logic as follows:
This style of switching from one party to another was introduced by the
big leaders fnetasJ of the country like Nehru and Gandhi. They themselves
had introduced factionalism-they divided the nation into two parts, as well
as 400 million of the public divided themselves into two parts. Now, even a
child knows what factions are and a leader never cares for unity. He always
tries to bring some men into his party to oppose someone else. In the old
days, even an old man of fifty years did not know about all these things.
They were gentle, but now the word "gentle" has become outdated. I never
trust men like Amar Singh or Chandra Singh because they are too selfish.
They never care for their party members but rather they care for themselves.
As a big and fat buffalo never cares for the wooden stake that binds him
and breaks it into pieces whenever he likes in order to move to greener pas-
tures, this is the same situation with the big men. They are leaders, but when
the time comes and they get a good opportunity, they will push us back and
run to the spot [the advantage]. But they are not the only clever ones. We are
cleverer than they; we can "cut their noses." And because I also believe in
hurting others, I can beat them if they [the leaders] think themselves too big
and too wise. I am their teacher and I always try to find out where there is
more advantage. That is the place I like best. But above all-I believe in
love. If there is a little loss, I can withstand it if there is more love.
In addition to the tension that exists between a leader and his
followers, there is also strain among the big men who have joined togeth~
er to become leaders of coalition factions. This is most true of the
alliance between the Pradhan's family and Krishna Singh's, which came
to a crisis while I was in Arunpur. At that time, Krishna's eldest son, a
building contractor, had attempted to embezzle state government materi-
als on one of his contracts. Since his business was tied up with his
father's brick and truck business, in which the Pradhan is a copartner,
the latter was also involved in this matter. The Pradhan's family was
greatly angered by their innocent involvement in something that was go-
ing to bring a blot on their partner's name as well as soil their own
prestige. A man close to both leaders commented:
Both Amar Singh's [the Pradhan's uncle] and Krishna's families have got-
ten on well so far ... and have done good turns for each other. Amar's
son, Ajay Singh, by sitting with Krishna, gave him a status which his family
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never had. Krishna, in turn, helped them to acquire a lot of land which they
had lost previously in their bad days. This was the basis of their relation-
ship. But now it [the mutual aid] is no longer needed. Krishna has carved
out a name for himself, and Amar has enough land and money to buy more.
They don't need each other so badly now.
The Pradhan and his family have come to feel that perhaps it is time to
exclude Krishna from the alliance, for he is no longer needed (Le., nec-
essary to be a winning coalition), and the advantages gained were being
diluted by the costs of maintaining the relationship. This is particularly
true because the Pradhan and his family have increasingly come to
believe that their weight in the alliance is equal to that of Krishna's while
the rewards they are receiving are much less.
Neither is there much social intercourse among the family members of
the Pradhan's house and those of Raj Kumar. They do not have kaccha
(boiled food) eating relations with each other. On one occasion, when the
Pradhan's younger brother came to eat at a feast in Raj Kumar's house
at our insistence, the women did not even know who he was. He said it
was the first time he had ever eaten there!
There is competition between Chandra Singh and Jai Singh over who
will be known as the real leader of the party and the bigger man.
Although Chandra has more wealth and a more logical, clever mind, Jai
is more open and better liked. Chandra says of Jai, "He tries to appear
as the biggest man outside our village, in the other villages, but is laughed
at even in Arunpur. Nobody, not even a fly, will believe and support
him." On the other hand, Jai has this to say of his ally:
It is true that my pattidar [Chandra] is dishonest, greedy, and clever and is
always after cheating somebody. He is the root of all trouble in our pura
and the entire village. He is the one who decides all things, but I do not sup-
port him in all his dealings for I want no part of another's property, nor
would I give mine to anyone.
Thus, when the power of coalition (Le., faction) members becomes too
unequal, or when the advantage that is gained by joining a coalition
becomes less than the costs of maintaining it, it appears time for the
coalition to disband and realign (see also Mayer 1966:116 and fn. 18). I
predict that this is what will happen to the Krishna-Pradhan alliance in
the near future. While Jai continues to chafe under his subordinate
status, he may eventually ally himself with another big man or attempt to
remain neutral.
Despite the existence of such cracks in partibandi alliances and ties, an
unstated fact seems to be that there is some satisfaction with the way in
which this form of conflict has been organizing the political arena and
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achieving goals. Of course, leaders of both factions often said that the
time, energy, and expense involved in pursuing lengthy court cases is a
waste and that they truly desire partibandi to come to an end. But
although time does have a way of healing old wounds, no one has made a
real effort to stop this conflict. While in the field, We noted that on
several occasions Jai went to Raj Kumar's home and sat with his uncle
(Rampat), and that the latter also returned the visit. In addition, Narain
has been trying to extend his friendship toward the Brahmans whom he
has treated so badly in the past, and they have been responding favorably
to his gesture.
But will this put an end to partibandi? I think not, even though both
the sides may change and the coalitions may be drastically altered, for
factionalism has been an integral part of village life. So long as the In-
dian village remains a focus for changes that are occurring in the nation
at large, and until such changes have become integrated into new cultural
norms, factions will continue, in the absence of other groups, to be a way
of organizing conflicts arising from the introduction of new resources in-
to the political arena. Factionalism is another expression of the competi-
tion between men inherent in an Indian village. This point will be dis-
cussed more explicitly in the final chapter.
THE ORGANIZATION AND INTERACTIONS OF PARTIBANDI CONFLICT
Villagers see the major causes for the intensification of village partibandi
as fights over land, tubewell water, and elections. All of these limited and
prized resources in the community are now available for allocation
among a greater number of people than ever before. Individuals compete
for these goods and, in the process, such competition becomes the raison
d'etre for factions. At the same time, the competition in home building,
acquiring wealth, education, philanthropy, and arranging better mar-
riages becomes both the expression and end result ofpartibandi rivalry.
Although the villagers state that progress is made for the individual
families who participate in this sort of competition, partibandi on the
whole is felt to be destructive to the betterment of the village. No con-
structive cooperative action, such as building a girls' intercollege, paving
the village streets, repairing the broken water taps and meaningfully run-
ning a youth club, can be undertaken, because of opposition from one or
the other faction (usually Chandra's). Even when two "neutral" people,
such as my assistant and I, tried to get the cooperation of Chandra's par-
ty to repair the Primary School well and put a roof on the Girls' School,
it was with extreme reluctance that they eventually donated some money.
Because ofpartibandi, they send their children to the primary school in a
neighboring village; hence they felt in this case that there was no sense in
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giving rupees to a plan from which they would receive no benefit. There
was also some suspicion that we might be acting as agents of the
Pradhan.
Social intercourse between villagers also suffers from this conflict. In
the past there was a single fire to celebrate the festival of HolL In the
morning, all would play Holi, wildly spilling colored water on one
another. They would put on new clothes in the evening, walk in the
streets, and embrace each other and ask forgiveness for their past errors.
Now there are separate fires in each of the two main puras and at the
houses of each faction leader; some people refrain from playing Holi at
all because of factional feelings. Villagers will not attend special singing
or religious performances because the event is sponsored by a rival leader
or because such individuals will also be present. If men from the two fac-
tions do meet on such occasions, they sit separately. Even the social rela-
tions of women, normally not affected by these disputes, can sometimes
be severed. Although a girl from the Pradhan's house, who was leaving
for her husband's village, did go into the homes of Jai and Chandra to
bid the women farewell, she did not enter Narain's home. Visits between
women of the two houses have ceased since Case 16 occurred, in which a
boy of Narain's family was involved in a fight with one of the Pradhan's
pattidars.
Decline in the participation of Holi and other previously panvillage
celebrations,4 as well as those agricultural functions that used to be more
communal in the past, cannot, however, be attributed solely to fac-
tionalism. They are part of the more general decline of joint community
activities that has its roots in changes that are affecting the transforma-
tion of a personalistic system of social relations into one based on an im-
personal order (see Beteille 1974b:99ft). Thus, while villagers often see
factionalism as the dragon behind much of the lack of panvillage
cooperation, this is often due to other causes. It can also be seen that fac-
tions do organize political conflict in the villagewide arena in the absence
of any other political groups capable of so doing.
The people of Arunpur referred to partibandi as separate from, for ex-
ample, conflict within the family or between other kinsmen, and this is
important in the attempt to distinguish between political activity occur-
ring at all levels of village society and that of this particular arena. The
relevant features of partibandi that can be abstracted from the case
histories are: (1) concern with competition for the allocation of scarce
and valued resources, (2) dependence upon a group's (i.e., others') con-
sent to the decisions made regarding the desired allocation, (3) exploita-
tion or manipulation of a dispute by a big man to further his own in-
terests or advantages or because one of the conflicting parties enlisted his
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aid and (4) escalation of seemingly nonpolitical events (Le., children or
dogs fighting) to the villagewide political arena when the personnel in-
volved are key faction members.
The focus of factions are the leaders; without leaders, factions would
not exist, and without followers, there are no leaders. Interaction among
leaders and followers has two main aspects. First, there is the nature of
the resources at the command of leaders and second, there is the tie be-
tween leader and follower.
Leadership, as Bailey states, is an enterprise (1969:36). Each leader
strives to gain access to more resources than his opponents and to employ
them to greater advantage. Yet the resources which a leader has to gain
his ends are limited and thus he must choose between different strategies
of action depending upon the costs involved. Sometimes a leader makes a
bad investment and does not receive at least the equal of what was in-
vested. Thus Jai spoke most bitterly against those whom he had helped
and who later deserted him. Or if a man loses in a contest in which he has
expended much of his resources (such as Chandra's drawn-out fight
against the Pradhan and his allies in Case 12), then his cost has again
been greater than his gain (if any).
There is a difference in the resources of a leader and his supporters,
just as there is between two leaders. It is by the expenditure of these
resources or the promise of doing so that a leader attracts others to his
side. "What passes between them [leaders and supporters] is not so much
an interaction as a transaction" (Bailey 1969:36) in which both in-
dividuals must feel that they have gained something or the relationship
will not be continued (see also Mayer 1966:112). There are two specific
types of transactions between a leader and his supporters: those of pa-
tronage and brokerage (Mayer 1966:113-114).
Patronage resources are actual (hence, limited) benefits promised and
delivered by the patron in return for services rendered. Most patronage
benefits in the village today come from the government through the
Community Development and Local Self-Government (panchayati raj)
programs. There is a great struggle to capture those offices (such as prad-
han) which provide accessibility to resources that can then be used to
forge new links with other individuals. Examples of the Pradhan's pa- .-/
tronage in Arunpur are the construction of houses for two Chamars in
his party, a well for his Nai follower, paved streets passing by the homes
of other supporters and the rent-free use of the panchayat house by a
teacher in the Intercollege. Krishna Singh, as Secretary of the Intercol-
lege, for example, can provide another form of patronage by agreeing to
employ someone as a teacher or clerk, or to provide student scholarships.
In brokerage transactions, the leader becomes a middleman and prom-
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ises to obtain favors for his supporters from a third party. These are the
main transactions in an arena characterized by a "politics of scarcity." It
is here that a faction leader's contacts with influentials become an in-
tegral part of his resources as compared to those of other leaders. Every .
time an Arunpur big man intercedes between two parties-the villagers
on one hand and the police, courts, Community Development officials,
schools, and so on, on the other-he is performing brokerage transac-
tions. The performance of this function also ties the members of a fac-
tion to their leader because of their differential access to such influential
people. It is more crucial to be able to command brokerage transactions
than it is to command the more limited resources of patronage.
The two opposing cultural values that villagers attach to the quality of
leader-follower interaction-loyalty or self-interest-hinge on whether or
not a faction member will continue to support a leader for reasons other
than receipt of benefits. Examples of this are the readiness of the Nai to
"lay down his life" for the Pradhan, or the Dharkar who says that he
will never waiver in his support of the Little Pura Bhumihars against
those of Main Pura. In both cases, a moral tie augments the purely trans-
actional one. Bailey makes a distinction in sociological terms that is
similar to this insight of the villagers. He distinguishes between members
of a faction according to whether the bond with a leader is moral or pure-
ly transactional. l
Because factional politics in Arunpur means Bhumihar politics and
because the Bhumihars as a group command and control more resources
than any other caste group, this form of conflict occupies the major part
of the village political arena. Effective competition for new resources
that enter the village as well as old ones takes place only within the domi-
nant caste of Bhumihars. The contest between the different factional
coalitions is more or less evenly matched and the expenditure of
resources is great. This is in stark contrast to the conflict that occurs be-
tween Bhumihars and their Untouchable laborers.
NOTES
1. Much has been written about factions in India. Recent articles by Nicholas
(1965; 1966; 1968a; 1968b), augmented by the work of Bailey (1968, 1969), have
superseded earlier work. Carter (1974:102fO has a good discussion of various
positions.
2. Three years ago, this pattidar of Raj Kumar joined the Chandra-Jai faction. His
involvement in the case, however, goes back several years before this faction
shift. One of the main reasons that many party loyalties remain stable over a
long period oftime is because of the lengthy process involved in settling disputes,
especially through the courts. But, as this case reveals, this is not always so.
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3. This is one of the worst possible forms of insult.
4. The year I was in Arunpur, an innovation appeared. The Kurmis started their
own fire in their separate pura. Also unrelated to factionalism is the fact that
college-educated men or those who work outside the village (but are home on
holidays) do not participate, either.
5. Bailey describes a factional core as consisting, in addition to the leader or
coalition of leaders, of those followers whose relationship to the leader is
augmented by other moral and multiplex bonds (1%9:47). There is some lack of
clarity, however, about the presence of cores in factions. At one place he writes,
"faction leaders, who by definition have only followers and no core (this will be
discussed later), must spend much of their time and energy in keeping the fabric
in repair" (43). In the later discussion, he states, "every faction has a leader,
whether it be one man or a clique (core) of several men, each with their own
followers" (52). He further states that "the faction which is most successful in
the competition for new resources develops a core and in time the core expands
to the point where a new kind of group, which is no longer a faction, has come
into existence" (53).
CHAPTER 8
The Political Arena in Arunpur:
Class Conflict
The horizontal cleavage among castes that are competing for power and
valued resources in Arunpur has many of the characteristics of class con-
flict but has thus far not become separate from caste status. The feuding
Bhumihars combine on any occasion in which they come into conflict
with their laborers, the landless Chamars. Each of these groups is united
by the consciousness of a common economic position in relation to the
other group, as well as by the knowledge that they either enjoy or are
denied the authority to exercise power. The access to property and power
which is linked to the caste status of Bhumihar is matched by the com-
plete inaccessibility of these resources to the Chamars. The existence of a
separate "caste culture" or lifestyle for each group further widens the
gulf between them. Because of the completely dominant positions of the
Bhumihars, Arunpur is still a closed society. Status, wealth, and power
by and large all accrue to this caste.
The rest of the villagers have associated themselves with the upper
castes in this conflict with the Untouchables even though the Kurmis,
who own small amounts of land, cultivated almost entirely by them-
selves, and other castes that do not require agricultural labor playa lesser
role in this conflict. I Yet the gap in caste status and economic and politi-
cal power is almost as great between these lower castes and the Bhumi-
hars as it is between them and the Chamars. If economic and political
power were the sole measures of class membership in India, it might seem
more likely that the low castes (indeed, even the Brahmans) who own lit-
tle or no land would join their common interests and needs with those of
the Chamars. All castes chafe under Bhumihar domination.
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The phenomenon of caste associations in politics on the wider Indian
scene reveals that the inability of many to compete on the open market
from a position of equal strength can become a unifier of different
groups of people under certain conditions. Caste associations exist to
protect the interests ofthese groups against others (e.g., Srinivas 1962:7;
Gough 1960: 44; Mayer 1967a; Rudolph and Rudolph 1960; Kothari
1970). Instead of the fission within a caste that occurs in the vertical
cleavage of factions, there is a fusion of different castes in opposition to
others.
Two main factors have inhibited the growth of class feelings that cut
across caste lines in Arunpur. The traditional sense of a deep status dif-
ferentiation marking off all castes from the Untouchables still remains.
No matter in what situation of misery a man may live, to be above the
Untouchables is some consolation in itself. This consolation would be
lost if castes low on the hierarchy joined hands with the lowest of the
low. Such an identification is inadmissible as long as one believes in the
divine ordering of the hierarchy. This also explains why conflicts involv-
ing Chamars and non-Bhumihars, described in this chapter, relate not to
economic conditions but to questions of status. Where discrimination
against Untouchables is joined to purely economic issues, a backlash oc-
curs. Hostility is expressed by others who have otherwise remained neu-
tral on the question of the rights and wages of laborers (see also Juyal
1974).
Second, the closed village society is opening up so that wealth (via
education, new jobs, and the availability of some land on the market)
and power (through elections) are becoming somewhat more dispersed
throughout the population. The people who now have the opportunity, if
not always the actual chance, to compete with the Bhumihars for these
resources are the lower Touchable castes. Because they now see a way to
gain access to valued commodities, these castes have chosen to stand
against Chamar aspirations. It is rarely possible for them to prevent the
Bhumihars from taking a large share, but it must make no sense to the
lower castes to divide things even further by adding the Chamars to the
field of competition. This ability to participate in a monetized economy
has achieved, for some castes, a greater chance to separate caste from
class (or land ownership). Cash transactions have introduced a new flex-
ibility into the system.
The Chamars and other Untouchables, however, have gained no such
advantages. If anything, they have become more unequal than ever.
Before Independence, they used to till the land; now they have none.
Like many others who lost land held on sharecropping arrangements, the
Chamars did not gain from zamindari abolition. Rather, they were
-
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reduced almost completely to landless laborers and found ready employ-
ment with Bhumihars and Brahmans unable to farm their holdings them-
selves. A surplus of labor combined with the lack of alternatives has
reduced Chamars to a condition of what they call mazburi-complete
dependence.
While others are making new strides, the Chamars have not remained
oblivious to or altogether impotent in their backward situation. There
has been some increase of education and job opportunities for a few
among them. Combined with exposure to outside influences, via Banaras
and mass communications, this has been enough to awaken a conscious-
ness of common interests. Much is also heard about Chamar unity at
election times. Then, too, Chamars in Arunpur know of the great leaders
among their caste: people like Raidas, Ambedkar, and the then Congress
Party leader (neta) Jagjivan Ram. They are also aware of the achieve-
ments of Chamars elsewhere in India.
The catalyst to the deep-rooted dissatisfaction among them was the ar-
rival of myself, my husband, and my assistant in the village. It was the
behavior of the latter, especially, that created a potentially explosive
situation.
CASTE CuLTURE OF THE CHAMARS
At first glance, Arunpur society seems to be a unified whole. People look
and dress alike, live in similar types of houses and their customs-for ex-
ample, arranged early marriages, joint families, position of women, and
so on-seem also to be part of a shared culture. An extended stay in the
village, however, reveals many areas where this shared culture differs
along caste lines. People often speak of the dharma (duty or morality)
and rivas (customs) peculiar to each caste, and these are regarded as in-
heritable along with~rank. For example, certain castes could give rise to
the aristocrat style of leadership (rais), while others could not. These dif-
ferences are most clearly revealed when the Chamars are compared to the
Touchable castes. '
Much of the traditional stigma attached to Untouchability, such as not
being able to go through certain parts of the village and polluting others
by touch (which still holds true for some ritual occasions), has been
discarded. Today a Chamar is no longer barred from wearing clothes
that were previously in the domain of other castes if he can afford to do
so. Yet they are still forced to live in separate areas and cannot pray in
any of the village temples, take water (with the rare idiosyncratic excep-
tion) from any village well, or give food to and dine with others.
They have also been caught up in a statewide movement of their caste
group to raise their status by abstaining from those activities that had
.....
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FIOURE 21. Entertainers at a feast honoring a Chamar woman who died
at a very old age.
specifically branded them as Untouchable in the past: namely, carting
away, eating, and skinning dead animals to make leather goods (see also
Lynch 1969). Only two or three old men still work leather into irrigation
water bags, but no one would cart away or skin an animal. Chamars
from a neighboring village may be called upon when required. Chamar
women assist in childbirth by cutting the umbilical cord, burying the
afterbirth, and attending to the woman while she is in a polluted state,
but there was even mention of abandoning this practice. Some felt that
the reward received was not enough to compensate for the disadvantages
of performing these polluting functions. Another occupation, peculiar to
the Chamars, is that of exorciser of disturbing spirits (an ohio who deals
with bhuts and prets). Being an exorciser is not looked down upon,
however, but is regarded as a skill because of the widespread belief in
these spirits among all villagers.
Chamar separateness is revealed in other ways as well. Although their
ideal is the joint family, the majority live in nuclear households or in
joint households of only two generations' depth. Because of the dif-
ficulties of remaining together under severe economic pressures, the
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Chamars rapidly partition their families while continuing to live under
extremely crowded conditions in the same house. In one case, four
brothers who are economically independent of one another still share the
same small three-room house. It contains a total of thirty-eight people.
As Chamars have neither the land nor the money to build new houses,
the situation will grow to impossible proportions by the next generation
if continued unchecked.
Relations within the family do not have the same formality which gov-
erns those of upper-caste homes, particularly those of the Bhumihars.
Role expectations are much more fluid. They do not practice the custom
of touching the feet of their elders as a sign of respect, which other castes
do. Every visit that we made into the Chamar pura was accompanied by
the screaming exchange that went on between the men and the children.
The latter were unmanageable, and no one ever succeeded in getting
them to quiet down. Many times Chamars said, referring to the chil-
dren's behavior, "This is the significance of caste (jatO; see how low-
caste children are born low, and so there must be caste." On other occa-
sions as well, such as talking about the misbehavior of Bhumihars with
Chamar women, we were told that Chamars deserve to be Untouchable
because they act in such a "low" way.
Marriages that are arranged at an early age can end in divorce or deser-
tion, which are practically unknown among the upper castes and com-
paratively less frequent among other castes. A common practice among
the Chamars is for a widow to live with her husband's younger brother.
There was even one instance of a woman living with her deceased hus-
band's elder brother. This is an illicit relationship, not only because a
woman must completely avoid males older than her husband, but
because the elder brother had a wife and children as well.
A woman is much more independent in a Chamar household and be-
comes decreasingly so as her caste rank increases. A young Chamar bride
may assume the practice of covering her face before elders, but this is
quickly disregarded after one or two years. Then she can move freely
through the village, and her work as a daily wage laborer for the Bhumi-
'- bars puts her in the position of being an important provider. Women
thus take a more equal part in family decision making. Bhumihar
women, on the other hand, generally do not work outside of the home,
and although their freedom increases somewhat with advancing age, they
practice some form of purdah most of their lives. The Chamars say that
their ideal is to have their women in purdah. This should be understood
as a desire for greater economic prosperity, which would enable a family
to keep a woman's services in the home, and not as a move away from
female independence.
....
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FIGURE 22. Enjoying the antics of a performing monkey in Chamar
Pura. The woman at the extreme right is of the Teli caste.
I was told that there is a direct relationship between not practicing pur-
dah and their custom of very early marriage:
We marry off our daughters so young [eight to ten years old] to save our
prestige. If they don't work, they don't eat. And if they do work and they
are free, not in purdah, anyone can do mischief with them. Therefore, we
marry them young to save them from this mischief and gossip.... We will
only change [this custom] when our caste says to. We will only raise the age
of a girl's marriage in our caste if the girls are put in purdah.
The rest of the Chamars' situation can be subsumed under the condi-
tions imposed by poverty. Education is practically nonexistent among
them because children are needed to work either in the house, in lieu of
their mothers, or in the fields. Many small boys go to a weaving center
near Banaras and for eight to twelve rupees a month spend their entire
day working as apprentices. "When we do not have enough to eat, who
will think of education?" these people say.
Without education, land, or wealth, most Chamars are forced to rely
on the work provided by the Bhumihars, and in the process their lives
become closely intertwined and dependent upon that of their master's
(rna/ik). These positions of labor are not necessarily inheritable from
father to son, but indebtedness tends to tie the son to his father's rna/ik
as well and a bondage much like serfdom is imposed. One Bhumihar
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revealed to us that when one of his family's agricultural workers attempt-
ed to leave their service and support himself by driving a rickshaw, they
beat him up and broke the rickshaw one night. After that, he returned to
his service as a laborer.
Some Chamars have been able to find other occupations beside that of
laborer, but they are few and work mostly in sari weaving. The greatest
ambition of those who can foresee any possible changes in their lives is to
have some business of their own. Only one Chamar succeeded in opening
his own shop for the assembling of scales used in science laboratories.
Together with his wife's brother, he borrowed 1,000 rupees and started
the business. He told his story as follows:
I used to work in a factory before, doing the same job which I now do on
my own. After working there for five to six years, about seventy people
were laid off and I was one of them. There was a dispute about bonuses and
salaries. For six months I sat home and did nothing. Then I began to plough
the fields of a Brahman for six months. But how can I live on two rupees a
month, ten bise of land, a little roasted gram, sugar cane juice and half a ser
[one ser = two pounds]of flour which doesn't even fill my stomach?
This is the village of Brahmans and Bhumihars; there is no life for people
like us, for Untouchables. They pay you less after lending you some money
and then go on multiplying the interest, which you are unable to pay. You
can't leave the job or be free of them, for they will ask you to reimburse the
loan before you leave. You are forced to work until late at night. Our
women also work for small wages; we all get abuses and beatings and our
women are violated. So I thought I should utilize my skill and begin to
assemble these scales.
But the Chamar was finding it difficult to manage and was constantly
short of money. At one time he had fifteen scales ready and had sold
only five. His wife was reduced to going from door to door in the village,
begging for grain. She said that her children had not eaten for two days.
The villagers whom she approached were asking too high a rate of inter-
est for a two months' loan. If she took one ser (two pounds) of wheat
flour, one and a quarter sers would have to be returned. She finally re-
ceived grain from us. The plight of this Chamar and his family also re-
veals the conditions under which those who are agricultural workers live.
THE CONDmONS OF MAZBURI: AGRICULTURAL LABOR
AMONG THE CHAMARS
" As agriculture is the predominant mode of production in village India,
the basic cleavage within the rural class structure is between owners and
nonowners of land. Those who are excluded from the land are also ex-
....
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cluded from power. The vast majority of nonowners who are engaged in
agricultural labor as their sole means of income in Arunpur come from
the Chamar caste. Other low castes that may be nonowners are able to
participate more easily in alternative occupations.
While Indian agrarian society might be divided into Marxist categories
such as semifeudallandowner, capitalist farmer, independent producer,
and landless rural proletariat, the class division that has the most
significance for the people of Arunpur is the indigenous one dividing
malik (master) from mazdur (laborer). It is only in this division that a
true commonalty of interests is perceived. An Arabic term denoting a
"proprietor" in Muslim law, malik was the synonym most often used for
a zamindar in Mughal times (Habib 1963:140). Today it has the primary
meaning of "master. "2 Traditionally a malik had mastery not only over
the land but also over the men who worked on it, and this control, along
with the deference that it implies, is a significant aspect of village life to-
day (see also Beteille 1974a:65ft). Mazdur has meant, and still means, a
"servant" or "laborer." When the Chamars of Arunpur refer to their
condition of life and work, they use the term mazburi-a condition of
"helplessness," "compulsion," and "constraint." The twin pillars of
Chamar dependence lie both in the lack of alternative sources of income
available to them and in the large surplus labor pool available to their
masters.
Chamars have an interest in the land primarily through the institution
of sharecropping (mati), by which they cultivate a man's land in ex-
change for exclusive use of a certain portion of the land, plus food,
clothing, monthly wages, and a share of the seasonal crops when they
participate in harvesting. 3 For the most part, the terms of sharecropping
are the same, although there is some variation. There are also discrepan-
cies in the amounts mentioned by the Chamars and their Bhumihar or
Brahman maliks, the latter being higher.
The major function of the Chamar laborer is to be a ploughman (hal-
waha) of his malik's fields, because a Bhumihar or Brahman will not per-
form this task. Additional chores include planting, weeding, irrigating,
harvesting, caring for animals, and performing other manual work. He
receives ten bise of land for his own use (or one bigha if he works year
round), two rupees per month, breakfast (sugar cane juice and roasted
grams), lunch (bread and some molasses or lentils) and clothing4 in
return for six months' labor. Additional payments come in the form of
food and occasional money at the time of festival celebrations or ceremo-
nies in the malik's house. A few Bhumihars give their ploughman a half
ser (one pound) of grain daily instead of lunch. One or two gave an extra
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FIGURE 23. Ploughman holds two ploughs.
bisa of land or an additional rupee per month. The ploughman receives
three to five sers per day when the seasonal crops are cut. This period
usually lasts about one or two months during the year.
Most high-caste farmers employ only one laborer of this type; those
Bhumihars with twenty or more bighas have an extra ploughman. A par-
ticular sharecropping arrangement I found, in the case of a Bhumihar
who had no interest in agriculture at all, was to give part of the land on
half-share to some paftidars and the remaining three bighas to a Chamar
who received only one third of the crop. In another case, some Musahars
cultivated one bigha (twenty bise) of Bhumihar land for vegetables, out
of which their share was four bise. The Bhumihars provided half the
seeds and expenses involved in the Musahar's four-bise share while the
latter provided not only the other half of his expenses but his free labor
on the remaining four- fifths of the bigha as well.
The tie between a ploughman and his ma/ik is very strong, for the
Chamar is totally dependent in this situation. The ma/ik gives him the
only piece of land by which the Chamar can support his family and at
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times he will also receive seeds. Most important, he can borrow money
from his master. It is the fact of almost universal indebtedness that
makes it impossible for the mazdur even to consider leaving his malik's
service. The debts of the father are passed on to the sons, and so high-
caste men, who will not touch the plough, are supplied with a constant
stream of labor.
Some Chamars work as agricultural laborers (nonploughmen) for a
daily wage. If they are employed for the entire year, they receive the same
food and clothing as a ploughman, but instead of land are paid thirty
rupees per month. Two farmers paid as little as eight and twenty rupees
per month for full-time Chamar workers. Others who worked on a daily
basis in the village, such as ploughmen in the half of the year they were
unemployed, would earn anywhere from one to two rupees per day or
one and a half sers (three pounds) of grain plus breakfast.' Other castes,
however, such as the Lohars, Kahars, or Kurmis, received a minimum of
three rupees per day for any job they performed.
Men receive anywhere from two to five sers per day when labor is con~
tributed on a seasonal basis at the harvest; the average seems to be about
three and a half to four sers. Other specific types of labor about which
we were told are remunerated as follows: 6
1. Potato worker: One and a half to two sers per day plus breakfast
and lunch.
2. Potato or sugar cane laborer: One to three rupees per day.
3. Transplanting of padi: Two sers plus breakfast.
Women and children who work daily receive half a rupee plus break-
fast and lunch. At harvest time they receive one anda half to two sers
each day they work cutting the crops. Men, women, and children all
work approximately twelve hours a day (sunrise to sunset) with about an
hour free for lunch. In the hot season, this break is extended another two
to three hours during the noon period. Work is often carried on until 10
to 11 P.M. at harvest time.
Chamars must still perform forced labor (begar) in addition to the
various types of labor for which they are paid. At times of marriages or
other ceremonies in the malik's household, or during the six months of
the year when a ploughman is not employed by him, Chamars may be
called upon to work. They must perform begar whether they wish to or
not. Usually food, and occasionally some money, is given. Similarly, an
independent village rickshaw driver may be pressed into service by some
high-caste man. He will have to work for a set fee for the day (e.g., five
rupees), which would be less than the amount he could earn if he went to
the city or operated in the local open market.
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The main complaints of the Chamars about the conditions of their
labor are that they do not receive a fair wage or get enough to eat. A
Bhumihar (or Brahman) will give them land, they say, but then not let
them plough it or give them water and seeds at the right time. While the
mazdur ploughs his malik's field some eight times, his own ten to twenty
bise are not overturned even four times. They accuse the Bhumihars of
wanting to keep them in dire poverty so that they will remain their depen-
dants. Bhumihars, I was told,
are afraid that if there is enough food in our stomachs, we will no longer
work for them. They keep us in debt by cheating us and charging high inter-
est rates which we can never return. They treat us like shoes and abuse our
women. They beat us if we work elsewhere or come late to them. They are so
big, they can do as they like. How can we dare to oppose them? Then we
cannot even go out of our houses, for all the land around is owned by them.
The Bhumihars are equally antagonistic toward the Chamars, and
respected men said on more than one occasion that "Chamars need to be
beaten to be brought under control." Unfortunately, this feeling seemed
to increase after our arrival in the village. Bhumihars also complained
that their laborers were lazy and undependable and alternately said that
they do not respect their maliks or would not dare to oppose them. While
the actual beating of Chamars is not unusual, most Bhumihars seem
satisfied with only verbal abuses.
Some Chamars do feel, however, that they have been helped by this
system of labor or by the Bhumihars. One worker admitted that he gets
more from the traditional system of sharecropping with side payments
(mafi) than he could make if he drove a rickshaw. Two brothers who
worked for a faction leader from Little Pura, Jai Singh, bought three
bise of land from him to build their house and to plant vegetables on the
property that is near their home. These Chamars also received a govern-
ment grant from the Pradhan, a rival faction leader, to build their house.
For the most part, however, Chamars are bitter about the village pan-
chayat and the way in which government resources have been distributed
(or not distributed) to them. The two brothers, above, told that of the
Soo-rupee grant originally allotted by the government, 100 rupees were
"eaten up" along the way. The Pradhan also was accused of "eating
up" 1,Soo rupees given by the government to purchase some land near a
well in their pura so that needy Chamars could build their houses.
Money, they claimed, that was allocated some two or three years ago to
repair their two wells and to construct fodder bins for their animals could
never be obtained. Finally they accused other villagers of cheating them
of the use of public land. They used to tie their animals in the area near
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the village pond whose ownership is now disputed. The Kahar who is
contesting ownership of this property denies them the right to tie their
animals there now. The village street that connects their settlement to
Main Pura and lies just near a wealthy Kurmi's home has been ploughed
by that Kurmi until all that remains is a narrow lane.
These tensions and antagonisms felt by both the Chamars and their
Bhurnihar and Brahman masters originate from the intimacy of their tie
in agricultural production as well as from the great disparity in their rela-
tive access to land, other resources and power. Disputes between Cha-
mars and others in the village tend quickly to escalate. A Chamar in trou-
ble will seek help from fellow caste mates who are willing to support him
in the conflict, while the upper-caste man never has any trouble in getting
others to stand behind him. They come to his aid readily because of the
question of prestige involved. At the same time, there is the general fear
that if Chamars are not constantly suppressed and kept in their place,
they will no longer supply a cheap and satisfactory pool of labor for the
village farmers. The disputes in the following section will illustrate the
processual form and escalation that occurs in conflict of this type.
DISPUTES BETWEEN MALIK AND MAzDUR
Many conflicts in the village occur because a malik is not satisfied with
the job performance of his Chamar laborer or the way in which he has
carried out the terms of their work agreement.
Case 21: Malik and Mazdur Dispute 1969
Two men were arguing loudly in a village lane. The Bhumihar was
abusing his Chamar ploughman for coming to work late and told him
therefore to return the shirt he had just given him, costing twelve rupees.
The Chamar replied that he was eating at the time and hence could not
come, adding that the shirt he had received was worth no more than four
rupees. He also accused his malik of giving only one-quarter ser of grain
daily instead of the regular one-half ser.
After a heated exchange in which the Bhumihar threatened to beat his
laborer and the latter dared him to do so, they both departed. The
laborer went home and got his shirt to show to people and asked them to
judge its worth. When the malik heard of this, he beat his laborer. The
Bhurnihar's other pattidars looked on but did nothing.
The laborer was advised by another Chamar to report his beating to
the Police Sub-Inspector at the Dallia Police Station. His malik then
threatened that since the Sub-Inspector was also a Bhumihar and unless
there is evidence of the beating, he would not believe the Chamar. The
latter ultimately did nothing.
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Perhaps the most significant point about this dispute is the way in
which it reveals Chamar powerlessness (mazburi). Before us and others
in the village (non-Bhumihars), the mazdur had threatened to leave the
employ of his ma/ik. He said he had worked and listened to the malik for
three years, but would now rather starve or jump into a well. He also
warned that the population of high castes in India is small when com-
pared to that of the Untouchables and SOOl! the rule of the latter would
come. Although most of the bystanders agreed that the Bhumihars were
hard masters, they made fun of the Chamar's declaration of in-
dependence and his big hopes. The aggrieved worker also knew the
validity of the threat of how the Police Sub-Inspector would deal with
him and thus saw no point in going there. As Case 25 will show, should a
Chamar appeal outside the village, the feuding Bhumihars in Arunpur
close ranks and unite against him.
The Bhumihar malik, on the other hand, declared that the Chamars
had gotten out of control. When he learned of the remarks about the
small number of high castes in India, he said to us:
But remember, one Bhumihar can beat one hundred Chamars. I was trying
to show him how a Bhumihar can beat many Chamars. But now that I came
to know he has such ideas [Le., regarding Untouchable rule], we must
prepare ourselves inanother way and teach them a lesson.... It is the Con-
gress Party which has given them so much power and now the Socialist Par-
ty wants to do that.... And the second man around here who is provoking
the Chamars is you [my assistant]! You have made them sit on our heads.
But they are fools. They do not understand that you will not remain-that
you will not be here for more than two months. After that, who will protect
them? We Bhumihars will not say anything now, but after two months ...
These types of conflicts are bound to increase as Arunpur Chamars
become more politically conscious and aware of their rights. If the Un-
touchables in this area should also have a political party that articulates
their own specific interests, then these intravillage and local conflicts
could escalate into even wider political issues. Right now, however, there
is no group, organization, or party that has either effectively unified all
Chamars among themselves or with other Untouchable castes, or has
taken up their cause.
Case 22: A Mazdur is Denied a Traditional Payment 1968
A Chamar was called to plough the fields of his ma/ik but refused to
do so. He told us that there is a custom followed in the village whereby
after the potato crop is dug out of the soil by the ma/ik and his workers,
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the ploughman is then free to pick up all the potatoes that may have been
left in the field as his own. He does not have to return any of these to the
mo/ik. In this manner, a mazdur may sometimes pick as many as two to
three maunds (160-240 pounds). This year, when the Chamar's ma/ik
dug up his field, he did not call his ploughman and instead made sure
that all of the crop went to him.
The Chamar further explained, "These are the only attractions that a
mazdur has to work for more than the agreed upon number of months.
That is why I refused to go to the field to plough today. The Bhumihar
abused me, threatened to beat me and also said that he would even pick
up all the crops produced in the ten bise of land he has given to me."
Bhumihars often accuse their laborers of doing mischief when the crop
is being collected. Potatoes lend themselves easily to this. A female
worker may slip a few in her sari to take home or may give them to her
children. It is also easy for potatoes to be dropped in a corner of the field
and then collected later in the night. By far the most usual method of en-
suring that a laborer will receive his share of the crop is to see that many
FIGURE 24. Chamar and Musahar laborers pick what remains in Chan-·
dra Singh's potato fields.
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of the potatoes purposely remain in the earth, to be dug up later when the
field is in the hands of the laborers. The Bhumihar in the case just men-
tioned said that the Chamar had told the truth but questioned whether he
should be expected to leave all the potatoes to his laborers. In this situa-
tion, more than two maunds had been left in the earth after the initial
harvesting. The Bhumihar picked up most of this amount and then called
upon his ploughman to pick up the rest. The latter refused, saying he had
been denied the right to the entire amount. "So," said the malik, "do
you think that in the name of a custom in the village a farmer will give up
all of his property?"
Disputes, as in this case, arise when the laborer claims that he has not
received a fair payment. This most often occurs at the harvest time when
a certain number of head-loads of the crop cut are allocated to the
workers as their share. Sometimes, if the Chamar is to receive a set ratio
of the amount harvested, say 2:1 or 3:1, conflict often arises from the
simple account keeping of the number of loads. Interestingly enough,
however, those conflicts which seem to escalate most quickly from a
dispute between the original parties concerned to a much wider network
are those involving prestige issues as opposed to purely material interests.
Case 23: Kurmis and Chamars Dispute Access to a Lane 1969
One evening, during the busy harvest season, my assistant and I were
standing in the main lane of Chamar Pura and talking with a group of
men. All of them were standing at a distance from this main lane. As
some Kurmis owned the fields just outside Chamar Pura, there had been
constant friction between these men coming from the fields along the
Chamar street, carrying heavy loads, and the Chamars who felt that they
had a right to congregate in their own pura where and when they wanted.
On this particular occasion, a dispute started between a Kurmi and the
Chamars with whom we had been speaking. Seeing some people standing
in the road [which were us], the Kurmi mistakenly thought them to be
Chamars. He abused them; the Chamars answered back. The Kurmi be-
came increasingly angry, dropped his load, and challenged them all. As
the words flew back and forth with greater rapidity, I succeeded in taking
the Kurmi away from the scene and tried to explain that it was we, and
not the Chamars, who had been standing in the road. He acknowledged
his mistake and promised the event had ended.
Then the Kurmi returned to Chamar Pura, collected his load and went
home. There he gathered his family members and came again to the
Chamars, stick in hand. My assistant interceded and finally mediated be-
tween the two groups when one of Chamars was about to be beaten.
J
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Case 24: A Chamar Touches a Brahman's Cot
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1969
One evening, an old Brahman woman put out her cot on the village
lane in front of her door. An old Chamar woman came by and, not see-
ing the cot in the dark, brushed by it with her foot. The Brahman woman
abused her. The Chamar version also states the the old Chamar woman
was beaten. Then a Chamar man started to abuse the Brahmans for put-
ting their cots in a public lane.
The Brahman woman's son was told by other villagers that the Cha-
mars were abusing him. He ran to the Kurmi's house which is nearest to
Chamar Pura, and yelled for the Chamars to come and face him there.
Two men came; one was beaten by the Brahman with the aid of the Kur-
mis.
Other Chamars then came with sticks to beat the Brahman. The Kur-
mis told them, "What are you doing? You know that he is alone now and
you can beat him, but he can kill the whole Chamar Pura in an hour if he
wants. So why are you doing this?" The Chamars also understood that
the Kurmis would have helped to beat them too, and they returned.
Sometime later, a Bhumihar who heard of the dispute came near Cha-
mar Pura and shouted: "I know that Vijay Misra is of my rival faction;
but he is a Brahman and if you are abusing a Brahman it means you are
abusing a high caste and I can't tolerate that. So be quiet or I will beat
you, too!"
Case 25: Little Pura Bhumihars Fight the Chamars 1969
Most of the village wells had dried up by early March due to an ex-
tremely dry winter and hot season. The two wells in Chamar Pura also
went dry. One of the Chamars was holding an elaborate double wedding
for his two daughters at the end of April. Many relatives and guests from
the grooms' sides came to take part in the marriage celebrations.
Because much water was needed to provide for the many guests, two
Chamars wentto the government tubewell and put their pitchers into the
tank where only Touchable castes usually take their water and bathe. A
young Bhumihar man yelled at them not to take water from there. The
Chamars persisted and then the Bhumihar beat and abused the one with
the pitcher, Viren Ram. The latter's brother, Maggu, abused the Bhumi-
har in return and said, "We must take water and this belongs to the
government, not you." The two Chamars then ran to the nearby bazaar
of Dallia, fearing retaliation from the other Bhumihars.
They tried to contact the Police Sub-Inspector at Dallia, and stayed
away from their home for three days. Finally, they appealed to the Su-
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perintendent of Police in Banaras who said that it was up to the Dallia
Sub-Inspector to make an investigation. Meanwhile, when the Little Pu-
ra Bhumihars learned that the Chamars had fled to Dallia, and suspect-
ing that they were reporting the matter to the police, they tried to destroy
the thatched roof of the Chamars' home and did some damage to it. 7
A week after this event, the Sub-Inspector came to the Pradhan's
house in Main Pura. Everybody, including the college-educated teachers
in that family, knew what had happened but remained silent. They felt it
was a Bhumihar affair and hence they must stand united together against
the Chamars. The police investigated the matter in the village, although
they did not go into Chamar Pura. Finally, a complaint was signed by the
Chamar who was beaten and his brother against nine Little Pura Bhumi-
hars of both factions.
In a letter I received after leaving the field, I was told that the Little
Pura Bhumihars, as a whole, subsequently filed some court cases against
some Chamars for destruction of crops by animals as well as cheating.
The original court case filed by the Chamars was dropped; somehow the
"Bhumihars of Little Pura have become successful in dividing Chamars
into two groups. They instigated one group to beat the people of the
other group."
Whereas the first two cases described in this section involved disputes
between individuals over the amount of payment or work to be received,
these last three involved access to public resources and quickly escalated
until they were regarded as reflecting upon the power and prestige of
each group involved. In two instances, the Chamars were denied full ac-
cess to the village lanes and had to defer to other castes if they wished to
use the same area. The Chamars are also systematically denied access to
the government tubewell water both for the irrigation of their fields and
as drinking and bathing facilities. That this is not so much a caste (Le.,
ritual) matter is clear from the preferential treatment the Bhumihars give
to the Musahars, who are even lower in the hierarchy than the Chamars.
Not only can they take drinking water from the same area that other
caste people do, which is forbidden to the Chamars, but they can also
bathe in the tubewell tank. The Chamars are forced to bathe in the earth-
en canal. It seems that the potential disobedience and power of the
Chamars because of their greater numbers, combined with the sole reli-
ance upon them as cheap labor, leads the Bhumihars to interpret every
dispute as a sign of Chamar "revolution."
Once the original breach occurred in the last three disputes, it quickly
widened until it involved all the Chamars ready to support their caste
fellows against the upper castes. I doubt, however, that the Untouch-
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abIes united as a whole in these disputes, although I have no specific in-
formation on this point. But certainly, the support the non-Chamar
disputants received cut across all other caste and factional cleavages.
In all these cases, the Chamars were verbally abused and someone was
beaten. They tried to defend themselves, but most villagers regarded our
(and especially my assistant's) presence and encouragement of these peo-
ple to be the major reason for their outspoken behavior in defying high-
caste people. The Chamars received no assistance when they tried to
appeal to the Police Sub-Inspector for help. Instead, they found that the
officials joined the already closed ranks of the high castes in the village.
Even when a court case was filed by a Chamar, it was impossible for
them to continue in that fight. They have absolutely no resources and are
hopelessly pitted against adversaries who have much more.
The Chamars, however, feel that the biggest obstacle to their achieving
any substantial gain, whether it be by raising their caste status, improv-
ing their economic situation, or fighting against the Bhumihars, is not
the lack of material resources so much as the lack of strength that comes
from unity. Unlike the factions among the Bhumihars, which were vil-
lagewide, openly spoken about, and easily visible on any of a number of
encounters, those among the Chamars were more difficult to learn
about. Primarily, this was because proportionately less of our time was
spent among them and it was never on the terms of intimacy required for
obtaining this type of information. The following discussion of factions
or parti among them is drawn together from their comments on a num-
ber of different occasions.
FACTIONS AMONG THE CHAMARS
Chamars speak of two opposing parti within their own pura and say that
their presence is the major obstacle to unity among them. One of the
chief determinants of faction membership is the extent to which a man is
economically self-sufficient or is tied to the Bhumihars. The origins of
these present factions are said to lie in two events in which certain
Chamars opposed the Bhumihars.
Case 26: A Chamar is Beaten by Bhumihars c. 1962
A Bhumihar once came to Raju Ram, a Chamar, to mate his goat with
the Chamar's. Some argument arose at this time; each version of the
situation says that the other man was verbally abusive. To take revenge
for the Chamar's insolence, the BhuInihar and some of his family mem-
bers and neighbors caught Raju one night and carried him off to their
house. There, they tied him to a tree, p-ut the rope around his mouth as
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well, and then poured cold water over him in the chilly, winter night.
They beat him with sticks until be became unconscious. At this point
they untied him and sent word to his mother and wife. (One Bhumihar
said that these women were also beaten, but it seems unlikely).
The women, in turn, ran to the pradhan who returned with them to see
what had happened. Raju filed a suit against the Bhumihar when he re-
covered. When the Police Sub-Inspector came to investigate, the
pradhan remained silent, as another Bhumihar was involved. Chandra
Singh, the opposing faction leader from Little Pura, helped the Bhumi-
har fight against Raju in court, as did Jai Singh and Narain Singh. They,
as well as other Bhumihars, pressed their Chamar dependents to boycott
Raju and one of them even closed his drainage line. Although Mohan
Ram, one of the few independent Chamars, never came out openly in
support of Raju, he stood by him. They formed one parti and the other
Chamars formed a second.
Case 27: Some Chamars Oppose the Pradhan c. 1963
When the village pradhan was supervising the paving of some village
lanes with bricks provided by the government, he was also to see that
some of the bricks were used to repair village wells. One of the two
Chamar wells was included in this scheme. The bricks used in paving the
streets, however, were quickly used up and the Pradhan then ordered the
workers to take the bricks that had been set aside for well repair in order
to complete the construction.
Some Chamars, led by Mohan Ram and Raju Ram, opposed this. The
Pradhan called them to his house one evening and threatened them. In
this way, those who feared him formed one party in opposition to
Mohan and Raju, who went against the Bhumihars.
The leader of one party, Mohan Ram, is literate and owns a small
amount of land with his brother. His is the largest joint household in this
caste and consists of nineteen people. His eldest son has a B.A. and
works as a Village Level Worker in the government Community Devel-
opment Program. Although indebted to one of the Bhumihar faction
leaders for possession of his land (Chandra Singh in Case 18, earlier),
Mohan is usually referred to as anti-Bhumihar, that is, willing to stand
up to them.
Raju Ram also supports Mohan and has left the village and settled on
the main road in a small hut since he received his severe beating from the
Bhumihars. He has his own rickshaw and goes to the city daily. Another
rickshaw driver, Viren Ram (of Case 25, earlier) is also in sympathy with
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these two men and is the one who is most concerned with the progress
and uplift of his caste. Viren is deeply religious and has forsworn meat
and drink; he has been trying to get his fellow Chamars in Arunpur also
to give these up, especially drink. Viren, together with Mohan Ram and
Raju Ram, may be seen as the core of the anti-Bhumihar faction and
they are supported by their family members. AIl of them work indepen-
dently, and because of this they are less likely to suffer the hardships that
a bound Chamar, opposing his malik, would face.
The other faction, or "pro-Bhumihar" party, is led by an older man
who does not advocate opposing this high caste. The majority of the
Chamars who work as ploughmen or as daily laborers for the upper
castes follow him. At the same time, from many of our conversations
with these people, it seemed that a second line of cleavage was being
formed. Age often became a factor in conflict. Older men would become
angry when the younger ones started to reveal certain things to us. The
latter would become impatient, in turn, and say that times have changed
and they no longer have to suffer the indignities their parents did.
Conflict among the Chamars is also bound up with the wider frame-
work of village partibandi, and they maintain that the Bhumihars extend
their feuds in order to cause dissension among the Untouchables.
Case 28: Bhumihar Involvement in a Dispute Among
Chamar Pattidars c. 1963-1969
There was a dispute among pattidars (two brothers and the sons of a
deceased third brother) who had divided their joint property but con-
tinued to live in the same house. The question was, who should remain
living in the house? One of the pattidars, the eldest brother, works for:
r
eceased
6.
(malik:
Chandra Singh)
6. -deceased
/:,
Chotu
(malik: Raj Kumar Singh)
6.
Viren Ram
(Independent)
/:,
MagguRam
(malik: Jai Singh)
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Raj Kumar Singh and is opposed by another, who works for Chandra
Singh. In a court case that was filed, each of the pattidars was supported
by their maliks, who are also leaders of rival Bhumihar factions.
While this dispute was going on, Chotu, the son of the eldest pattidar,
then tried to evict the sons of the deceased third pattidar (Viren and
Maggu), one of whom works for Jai Singh. He threatened, abused, and
beat them. One day, these two sons went to speak with Chotu and a fight
with axes and sticks ensued. This case also went to the court and Chan-
dra Singh and Jai Singh helped the two sons by bailing them out of
prison. Chandra and Jai are also eager to lend Viren and Maggu all the
money they need, but only to meet their court expenses. The case (or
cases) between the pattidars continues.
There seem to be two levels to the strategy of the Bhumihars who in-
volve themselves in Chamar disputes. On the one hand, each malik may
feel bound by the traditional obligation to help his laborers, while this
also presents an opportunity to enter into a court case in which another
Chamar is supported by a rival leader. Thus, Bhumihars can extend their
own factional rivalry to the field of Chamar interaction. On the other
hand, part of the strategy also seems to be that by providing support to
the Chamars so they may fight each other, they cannot be unified in their
opposition to the Bhumihars. Furthermore, lending money for non-
productive causes such as court cases is another sure way to see that a
laborer remains in debt and dependent upon his malik.
Six months after leaving the field, I received a letter- written by a close
friend from Arunpur who is a teacher of English at the Intercollege and
whose elder brother is the Pradhan. Though understanding and sym-
pathetic to the plight of the Chamars, he claims he is impotent to act
because of his own Bhumihar caste loyalties and fear of his kinsmen's
reproaches. He wrote (in English):
There is a case of beating in the court. This case was started only on the in-
stigation of Bhumihars.· There is [also] a burning problem among the Hari-
jans [i.e., Chamars] about spirits and ghosts [pret and bhut/. Everyday there
is a panchayat among them. Mohan Ram and Hans [Mohan's son] have
spent five hundred rupees on bhut. Ballu and other people have spoiled their
houses in this. One day some Chamars came to my house for panchayat and
wanted to beat Kallu who is ohia [exorcisor of spirits] because Kallu took
money from Ballu and Mohan to control the bhut. But Kallu did not do so
[control the bhut?] and asked more money. Anyhow this dispute was settled
in the panchayat. In this way Chamars are entangled in their own problems
and superstitions, how can they face Bhumihars?
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CHANGE AND CLASS AMONG ARUNPUR CHAMARS
Amid all their problems of poverty, mazduri, relations to the Bhumihars,
and the internal conflicts that have divided them, the Chamars still have
a desire to change their situation. Their opportunity to do something
seemed to come when we arrived in the village and showed them a respect
and type of behavior no other people had ever accorded to them. My
assistant involved himself most in their affairs, much to the anger of
some other villagers, and he gave the Chamars a much higher expectation
of what could possibly be achieved.
One of the first things my assistant did, after becoming reconciled to
the fact that we had to interact with aU castes in the village, was to call a
series of rather clandestine nighttime meetings which some ten to twelve
Chamars attended at our house. His plan was to have them form a com-
mittee which could then decide and act on behalf of the rest of the com-
munity, so that something constructive might be done about their work-
ing and living conditions. The main topics of discussion at these meetings
were certain complaints of Chamars. They also wanted to introduce
some reform in their caste and repeatedly asked us to show them the way
and tell them how to act.
They wrote a letter to Jagjivan Ram, then the Minister of Food and
Agriculture and of their caste, asking his help in these matters. After the
Chamars received a reply which advised them to see the Director in
Charge of Harijan Welfare, they decided to formulate their complaints
in another personal letter to this Congress leader. My assistant helped to
draft a letter which drew attention to Chamar needs for (1) drinking
wells, (2) a place to throw garbage, (3) a place for the children to play, (4)
some land to build a guest house, and (5) change in the treatment of their
women. .
After the letter was posted, some two weeks passed and still no answer
had beenreceived. The Chamars came daily to inquire about the matter
from us. Finally, it was learned that Jagjivan Ram was coming to
Banaras and my assistant suggested that they go there and meet with
him. Another letter was written which was to be given personally to Mr.
Ram. On the day of his scheduled talk, some six weeks after the original
letter had been sent, three Chamars prepared to meet him in Banaras.
One of them, who had carried the letter, later said that he succeeded in
sitting behind the Congress leader on the stage. "But in listening to his
views on Christianity, I forgot to notice when he was leaving." The
Chamar then managed to push through the crowd and get near the offi-
cial's car. By shouting loudly, he was noticed by Mr. Ram, who stopped
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his car and took the letter. When my assistant asked why the villager had
become so engrossed in the talk, he replied:
Because I was thinking that, really speaking, if we leave our religion and go
into that religion [Christianity] we will always be considered as newcomers.
But, how good it would be if some high-caste Hindus had a place in their
hearts for Chamars. Then they [the Chamars] would really be proud of their
Hinduism.
The second major plan of the Chamars was an attempt to negotiate
with the Bhumihars, through my assistant, for higher wages and better
working conditions. After several nighttime meetings, the following de-
mands were agreed upon as being acceptable terms of their labor:
1. A ploughman or full-time agricultural worker should receive sixty
rupees per month9 + one half paua (one quarter pound) roasted grain
and one half paua molasses.
2. Ten hours of work a day with a two-hour break in the middle.
or,
1. One bigha of land plus eight rupees per month for six months'
labor.
2. Ten hours a day of work.
and
.3. Women should receive food once a day or one half ser (one pound)
flour + one half paua roasted grain and a jug of sugared water.
4. Women should work ten hours a day.
5. One day in a month free for all workers.
6. At harvest time: (a) women should receive three sers (six pounds)
daily.
(b) men should receive one head-load out of six-
teen cut.
My assistant started to speak with some of the Bhumihars with whom
he was on more friendly terms, notably faction leaders Jai Singh and
Chandra Singh, after these demands were agreed upon. Their reaction
was one of dismay; when the Chamars don't even work honestly for their
present wages, what was the sense of increasing them? In the context of a
discussion about the need for a leader (neta) who can help both the poor
and the rich, Chandra said,
But how will the man whose leg is not hurt feel the pain of others?
Somebody comes from outside, initiates a "strike," and then goes away.
Then the strikers as well as the other party suffers. In the same way, people
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come from somewhere, plead for change in the village, such as mazduri,
and then go from here, leaving the villagers to remain and suffer.
The position and seeming arrogance of my assistant not only angered
most of the Bhurnihars, but was even regarded as being anomalous by
some Chamars. One of them was led to comment:
The man who thinks of helping this pura is a fool. He loses his prestige
because everyone knows that if he comes to help the Chamars, whom
nobody likes, he becomes a stone in the eyes of high-caste people. And the
Chamars, who are lazy, are not going to start the work [of repairing their
wells]-and so this man gets a bad name.... You [my assistant] just said
that you will give the people bricks to fix their wells, but still they didn't
start. Yet everyone in the village who knows this thing [the offer of bricks] is
saying, "Look, look, they are helping the Chamars." So neither do you get
something [Le., prestige], nor do we [repair of the wells]. So that is why the
man who thinks of helping these people is a fool.
Thus, the only result of a rather abortive attempt to help the Chamars
was, unfortunately, to heighten the already existing conflict between
them and the Bhumihars. It also added to the Untouchables' conscious-
ness of the inequity of their position as well as to the growing desire,
especially among the younger and sometimes more educated ones, to do
something to remedy the situation. Although before we came to the
village, there had been some expression of class conflict between those
with and those without land, between landlords and laborers, by all ac-
counts it now became more open. Not only did the Chamars feel that
they had an ally in us, but our intercession in physical fights on several
occasions assured them that Bhumihar wrath would be held in check so
long as we would remain in the village. .
We were not to remain for long, of course, and as Chandra Singh so
incisively noted, it is the ones whom we left behind, not we the inter-
lopers, who suffered most. Although the Chamars seem back in the same
position as before our arrival, that is, totally on their own and with no
outside resources on which to depend in their struggle, the form of the
conflict is bound to have changed somewhat.They dared to oppose the
Bhumihars on several occasions and, perhaps with the lessening of the ill
feeling between the pro- and anti-Bhumihar factions, they may be in a
position of more strength in the future. For the Chamars, who have so
far been effectively barred from any meaningful participation in the
"new" India, it seems that the only way they can change their class posi-
tion is by a conscious working toward that goal. It will take a concen-
trated and united effort on their part to arrest the stagnating conditions
of their lives as changes, which are affecting others, bypass the Chamars.
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NOTES
1. Their small number and situation of total dependence upon the Bhumihars have
prevented the Musahars and Dharkars from joining with the Chamars. In addi-
tion, Chamar belief in values sustaining hierarchy (that these castes are below
them; thus, they will not accept food or water from them), plus their physical
separation from other Untouchables, has prevented action based on the recogni-
tion of their common interests (see also JuyalI974).
2. Other meanings are "owner," "lord," and "husband."
3. Although it may be literally true that Chamars are "sharecroppers" insofar as
they cultivate the land and share in the harvest, in reality the land and share
received is so small that it may be better understood as part of a wage (mazduri).
4. The usual items given are two towels, two shirts, and two dhotis (long pieces of
cloth).
5. Cohn, reporting on fieldwork conducted in neighboring Jaunpur District in 1952
to 1953, writes that the daily wage for agricultural labor was two sers of grain
plus breakfast (1955:64). Fifteen years later, the wage had decreased!
6. These figures were given by Kurmi informants. Telis are known to pay two
rupees per day plus lunch and breakfast and Kahars will pay three rupees for
Chamar labor. This is higher than Bhumihars and Brahmans are willing to pay,
although four Bhumihars are said to pay two rupees per day to laborers.
7. In Kilavenmani village (Tanjore District, Tamilnadu), forty-two children and
women-including three old men-were burnt alive in a hut in the Untouchable
quarter on December 25, 1968. Ostensibly due to a dispute over wages, the
tragedy was closely linked to an effort of local landlords to root out "trouble-
some" farm laborers. As far as I know, no one was prosecuted in the case.
8. It is not clear, however, whether or not this case has to do with the information
that follows.
9. They originally wanted to ask for a minimum of three rupees per day.
CHAPTER 9
The Politics of Water
Qasses as well as factions are both ultimately concerned with the same
phenomenon-conflict-and represent two different ways of organizing
the villagewide political arena in India. This conflict is over the distribu-
tion of prizes a society has to offer its members, and these prizes are its
scarce and valued resources. The political arena has widened because
local authority is no longer vested in any specific position. There is no
counterpart to the formal power that the British-appointed headman
wielded, nor do the present-day big men and traditional panchayats
command the same respect as they had previously. The resulting con:t-
petition for leadership takes place in an arena containing expanded
resources. In addition to the old conflicts over land, prestige and dis-
play, power, followers, and women, there is now competition for water,
government aid, education, elective offices, and contact with influential
outsiders.
Although there have always been disputes over land, particularly
among kinsmen, those over elective offices and government tubewell
water are post-Independence phenomena. Competition for water is the
cause of most disputes; elections are held only every few years and
available land is in short supply, but water is almost always available for
distribution. At the same time, because of the great demand for irriga-
tion in agriculture, water is perennially scarce. Hence, constant and
fierce political activity revolves around this resource. The competition
for water also reveals the range of activity in the Arunpur political arena,
for it figures in conflict among factions, classes, and individuals.
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DIsTRIBUTION OF WATER IN ARUNPUR
The competition for resources is a complex matter in Arunpur, and the
lack of any definite and widely accepted rules according to which certain
things of value are distributed accounts for much of the conflict. The
distribution of water is a case in point. This section will describe how one
of the major factors influencing conflict is the lack of agreement regard-
ing who has the authority to make decisions about the allocation of water
from the government tubewell.
Case 29: Main Pura versus Little Pura for Mismanagement
of Water Distribution 1966-1967
A record book on water distribution kept by the Pradhan reveals that
the government tubewell, built near Little Pura in 1953, was to serve
Arunpur and five other neighboring villages. The village official in
charge of water distribution (thokdar) was the elected village head
(pradhan). Arunpur, however, had two such officials-one was the
Pradhan from Main Pura and the other was Jai Singh, appointed to pro-
tect the interest of the Bhumihars of Little Pura. Because the latter
managed to keep the Tubewell Operator (who implemented decisions
regarding allocation) on their side, they received the lion's share.
A new Tubewell Operator was appointed in 1966. He discovered this
monopoly and lodged a complaint with the Irrigation Department, Dis-
trict Magistrate, and Police Inspector (dated November 9, 1966). The
thokdars of the five other villages also made complaints, as did several
farmers. The Police Inspector was ordered to look into the matter; subse-
quently a lawsuit was filed against the Little Pura Bhumihars. After a
number of court appearances by both sides, a compromise was reached
and the case was dropped on May 24, 1967.
At the time of the inauguration of the government tubewell, and in-
deed at the present time as well, it was in the best interests of the Bhumi-
hars of Little Pura to unite together against the rest of the village (specifi-
cally, Main Pura). The twelve households of Bhumihars and Kurmis in
that pura hold 106 and 26 bighas of land, respectively. This is a propor-
tionately greater amount of land than the Bhumihars and other castes of
Main Pura own (see Tables 1 arid 2). In addition, their land is nearer to
the tubewell and a larger area can be irrigated in a shorter time compared
with land that is at a greater distance.
Most of the other five villages depend less upon this tubewell for water
today, as they have their own government tubewells or private pumping
sets. Only a negligible amount of land, lying near Arunpur borders, need
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be irrigated by its tubewell. The two exceptions are the villages of Saran-
pur and Ramapur. Saranpur, lying nearest to Arunpur and with a popu-
lation of about seventy-five people, has no other source of irrigation.
Krishna Singh of Ramapur is supposed to receive twelve hours of water
per week as a result of a confrontation between his younger brother and
Jai Singh (along with other Little Pura Bhumihars) in 1967. Krishna's
brother was denied water for his fields when he requested it on one occa-
sion. Then "one hundred" of Krishna's men returned to the tubewell,
armed with sticks, spears, and hatchets, and received the water that was
demanded.
The Little Pura-Main Pura dichotomy over water has remained be-
cause it coincides with their land interests and is reinforced by the actions
of the Tubewell Operator. He is a government appointee who looks after
the running of the tubewell, decides allocation priorities, implements the
decisions of the thokdars, keeps the records, and collects the fees for
water consumed. Since 1967, the Operator has been a Brahman who
comes from a nearby village. Although he is always supposed to remain
at the tubewell (even to sleep), he was scarcely ever there. He seems to
have informally delegated some responsibilities to two men from an Un-
touchable family of Dharkars that live near the tubewell. In return, they
were able to bathe in the tubewell tank and could take water from there.
The Operator had a close relationship with the Little Pura Bhumihars,
especially with the younger brothers of Chandra Singh and Raj Kumar
Singh who are in charge of their families' farming. The Operator readily
admitted to taking bribes from them, and, since they have the most land,
they gave the most. The people in Main Pura were reluctant to give such
gifts. When they did so, it was usually in small amounts. The Operator
also said that taking bribes presented no special risk because he shared
his "black" money with other officials. Nor was he adverse to falsifying
his records. An agriculturalist may receive more water than he should
and the excess amount will not be listed or, worse yet, will be charged
against another.
The Tubewell Operator was not only dependent upon the big men of
Little Pura and their families for bribery but also, as an outsider, for
hospitality as well. He would often eat at their houses and was most
often in their company on the days that he was in the village. Toward the
end of my stay, however, a dispute occurred between him and a Little
Pura Bhumihar. It created much ill feeling and the operator was trans-
ferred to another area.
It is hard to assess where the actual authority lies in making decisions
regarding the distribution of tubewell water. There is supposed to be an
agreed upon allocation of hours to Little Pura and Main Pura (including
the other puras). The thokdars, in consultation with the villagers, are
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then to draw up a schedule for the allocation of water under their control
and present this to the Operator. Actually, the situation is complex
because of a number of factors: the power of the Little Pura Bhumihars
to claim more hours, the monopoly of the remaining time for the rest of
the village by the Pradhan's family, his pattidars and another patti of
allied Bhumihars (the Choudhuris), I and the inability of the Operator to
make any decisions independently of the Bhumihars, especially those of
Little Pura. In addition, decisions must also take into account the nature
of the crops to be irrigated.
The roles of Jai Singh and the fradhan are equally hard to assess.
When Jai became the thokdar in 1953 to safeguard the interests of his
pura, factional conflict within his khandan had not crystallized to the
current extent. Although he officially resigned from this position a few
years ago, he is still influential in decision making (see Case 32). The
duties of the thokdar of Little Pura are now carried out by Chandra
Singh and Raj Kumar Singh's uncle, Rampat, as well. The Pradhan has
delegated his authority to a young (age twenty-six) Bhumihar of the
allied patti of Choudhuri Bhumihars, Kallu Singh. Complaints and the
threat and use of force became so divisive in his pura by March, 1969,
that the Pradhan established a committee of three villagers (a man from
his family, Kallu Singh and a Brahman-Vijay Misra) to supervise water
distribution.
A farmer, especially from one of the other villages, does not know
whom to approach with his request for water. The result is a situation of
uncertainty in which each dispute seems to be settled on the spot with
reference to the people involved, the force or threat of force they use,
and their whims regarding compromise. This uncertainty means that
every actual case of allocation is potentially a conflict situation. The
result has been not only to increase disputes in the village, but to cause ill
will and anger among people who would otherwise be friends.
CoMPETITION FOR WATER ORGANIZED BY FACTIONS
One way in which the competition for government tubewell water is
organized is by the two village factions. These delineate different chan-
nels of support which a farmer may call upon and which can prove
crucial in settling a dispute.
Case 30: Bhumihars of Three Villages Fight over Water c. 1957
Chandra Singh of Arunpur wanted his close friend from Saranpur,
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Nandalal Singh, to be in charge of water distribution (thokdar) for that
village. Saranpur shares water from Arunpur's tubewell. Chandra ap-
proached an influential Bhumihar of that village, Kumar Singh, who
agreed to back Nandalal, even though he knew that the latter was a
staunch follower of Chandra. After signing the thokdar nomination
papers, the Bhumihar (Kumar) told his friend Krishna Singh of Ramapur
what he had done. As Krishna was a rival of Chandra Singh, he had the
nomination paper legally canceled.
The next time tubewell water was flowing into Kumar Singh's fields,
Chandra retaliated by diverting the water. Then he locked the tubewell
engine room and removed various machinery parts to his house. Kumar
went to see the Tubewell Operator in Arunpur. There he met a member
of Chandra's khandan, Ram Singh, who belonged to the rival faction.
Ram helped Kumar enter the engine room and start the motor. The two
men then remained all night guarding the tubewell.
Chandra Singh then filed a suit against Ram Singh and some other
rival kinsmen of his khandan for having started the tubewell in the
absence of the Operator and for stealing part of the machinery, which
Chandra himself had done. Krishna Singh helped Ram Singh and the
other rivals of Chandra named in the court case. Krishna also succeeded
in bribing the Tubewell Operator who testified in court that the man who
appeared there as Ram Singh was not the true Ram Singh (though in fact
he was). As the "true" Ram Singh could not be found, the Judge dis-
missed the case.
Case 31: The Beating of Jai Singh's Mazdur 1969
The Musahar servant boy of Jai Singh refused to divert water from his
malik's field into that of a rival's, Raj Kumar Singh. Moti, Raj Kumar's
younger brother, beat the Musahar and diverted the water into his own
field.
Jai's son heard the noise in the fields and went to see what had hap-
pened. He then went to Chandra Singh's house, where some other Bhu-
mihars and ourselves had gathered. Some spoke of going to beat Moti
Singh, but Chandra only dispatched someone to summon up Jai Singh
who was visiting in a nearby village.
When Jai returned, the matter was talked out with an elder of Raj
Kumar's family (Rampat Singh), and water flowed once again to Jai's
fields. Jai said, several days later, that he had really been angry and
would have beaten Moti but for the restraining influence of the men
gathered at Chandra's door. He was, however, ready to file a lawsuit
against the next man who might try to divert his water.
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These two cases illustrate how factions organize competition for
water. They consist of networks of support between faction leaders and
their followers which are utilized in the struggle for water. Case 30
reveals the crosscutting ties and links between several villages which are
activated by competition for a single resource. The original issue in-
volved Chandra Singh of Arunpur, his man Nandalal Singh of Saranpur,
and a third Bhumihar of that village, Kumar Singh. Krishna Singh of
Ramapur became involved because of his friendship with the latter and
his enmity with Chandra. The aid of Chandra's own khandan rivals was
also enlisted. It is not unusual for factions in two or more villages to be
linked together in such a way that the friend of any man's rival is his
enemy, and the rival's enemies are his friends. When this case is con-
nected to the factions that exist in Ramapur, where Krishna's foremost
rival is his own pattidar, then we can see a series of alliances across three
villages; these can extend outward to encompass even larger areas.
SARANPUR
allied with Nandalal Singh
versus
allied with Kumar Singh
RAMAPUR
allied with Jangi Singh
versus
allied with Krishna Singh
ARUNPUR
Chandra Singh et aI.
versus
Pradhanand
Raj Kumar Singh
Case 31, although remaining a purely Arunpur affair, goes through
the typical developmental cycle characteristic of factional conflict (see
Chapter 7). The initial break of relations began with the demand that the
mazdur of Jai Singh divert water into a rival's field and was followed by
the beating ofthe boy. The crisis then spread to extend to the members of
the two factions in Little Pura. Raj Kumar Singh's uncle, Chandra
Singh's younger brother, and another follower became involved, the lat-
ter two demanding that Moti be beaten. Jai and Raj Kumar's uncle at-
tempted to settle the dispute peaceably, and it was mainly through the
restraining presence of Chandra Singh, ourselves, and other men that
Jai's temper was "cooled." This crisis also underlines the fact that con-
flict between factions always reinforces the schism between them; con-
flict reinforces the need for factions.
Allocation of water is also used by one faction to create divisions
within the other. I was told by members of the Pradhan's party that the
Tubewell Operator, induced by Chandra Singh, would refuse to give ex-
tra hours to the Kurmis in Main Pura. In this way, the Kurmis turn
against the Pradhan and other Bhumihars, for the latter would already
have irrigated their own fields and used up most of the time allotted to
Main Pura. In addition, the allocation of water is also used to force men
who attempt to remain independent of factions to recognize their folly.
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Such a man will be unsuccessful in obtaining water from the leaders of
either faction. Each side he approaches will taunt him to request help
from the other side with which he is also friendly.
CoMPETITION BETWEEN CLASSES
The allocation of water to the Chamars is perhaps the best example of
the way that Bhumihars use the distribution of resources to further their
own political ends. With water being such a scarce and valued resource,
it is understandable why the low and powerless Chamars suffer most.
The stronger villagers (Brahman, Bhumihar, and Kurmi) divert water
that goes into Chamar fields to their own. The latter, rightly, also see this
denial of water as reflecting the desire of high castes to keep them in
poverty and subjugation. Over and over again, Bhumihars would say
(and Chamars affirm) that, "If they get too much in their stomachs, they
will not work for us." Or, "They have fIlled their stomachs too well and
that is why they dare to act this way."
No Bhumihar cared to see that water was given properly to Chamars.
In each case that they did receive some, it was only because some upper-
caste men saw an advantage in manipulating the situation in that way.
The information presented in the following case histories, relating to two
separate occasions on which the Chamars received water, is not exhaust-
ive. Chamars and others had been talking for days, indeed months,
about their problem. Even in these situations, there were many dif-
ferences of opinion regarding what actually took place (especially from
the two factions), but the main points remain clear.
Case 32: Jai Singh "Gives" Water to the Chamars 1968
The Pradhan told some Chamars to take water early in the morning.
When they went to divert the water into their fields, they were then told
that two Kurmis and a Brahman were taking (and going to take) water. A
Chamar boy tried to divert water from the tubewell canal, but one of the
Kurmis and the Brahman2 threatened to beat him. Mohan Ram, a Cha-
mar leader, went to the tubewell and said that he was going to take water
into his fields. Some Bhumihars came and threatened to beat him as well.
Other Chamars restrained Mohan and they all returned home without
receiving any water.
In the evening, the Chamars said that they still had not received water,
although Jai Singh had promised my assistant and myself that he would
give them water on this day. The Chamars blamed the Pradhan, who is
supposed to have jurisdiction over water allocation to theirpura.
Jai Singh came the next morning to tell us that all who needed water,
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save one Chamar, had received it. He said that the previous day, when he
had gone to the tubewell to divert water for the Chamars, the Pradhan
and some other Bhumihars (of Main Pura) came there to take water for
themselves. After an exchange of verbal abuse, it was decided when and
whom among the Chamars would receive water. The latter agreed that it
was really Jai who had helped them.
Case 33: The Brahman Thokdar and Chandra Singh
Support the Chamars 1969
Beginning March 5, water was to flow into Main Pura's (including
Chamar Pura) fields for four days. The next day, Mohan Ram Chamar
went to the Pradhan to request water and was told: "First let those with
onions in their fields take water, and then you will get some for your
wheat." A Bhumihar of the Choudhuri patti, allied to the Pradhan, took
water for his onions and then for his wheat. The Chamars were bypassed
but they planned to get water somehow.
On March 7, a Chamar follower of Chandra Singh complained to the
latter that, "We have elected one man as pradhan, but if you go to his
house you will find eight people who act as pradhan." The Chamar
threatened to divert the water, even if it was flowing into Chandra's own
fields. Chandra at first retaliated with a clenched fist and then said that
he was a friend of Chamars. He berated the Pradhan and told the Cha-
mar to take water the next time it went into the Pradhan's fields. Chan-
dra also promised to help in this matter.
When only eight hours remained of Main Pura's allotment of water,
on March 8, a Bhumihar of the Choudhuri patti took water for his fields.
It was going to be taken by one of his pattidars after him.
The Brahman thokdar, Vijay Misra, and some other Bhumihars (one
of the Kolha patti and one belonging to that of Narain Singh) and
Chamars were discussing how to get water for themselves. The Tubewell
Operator came by and told them of a big fight at the tubewell. Mohan
Ram and some other Chamars had diverted water from the fields of the
two Choudhuri Bhumihars. Vijay Misra went to the tubewell and, along
with Chandra Singh's younger brother and an ally, supported the Cha-
mars' claim for water. Chandra's brother and the two Choudhuri Bhu-
mihars abused each other and accused each other of being dishonest.
Finally, it was agreed that the Chamars could take the water.
Several hours later, in the evening, a third Choudhuri pattidar came
and rediverted the water into his fields. Vijay Misra then advised the
Chamars to divert the water back into their fields. They went to do this
some time after 9 p.m. The Choudhuri Bhumihar and some other Bhu-
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mihars from Main Pura started pushing and abusing the Chamars. While
this altercation was going on, one Bhumihar in the group (a Kolha) took
water into his fields.
When it was finally decided that the Chamars could take the water,
again by the support of Vijay Misra, Chandra Singh's brother and his al-
ly, they received it for only a short time. At midnight, Little Pura Bhumi-
hars said, "It is the next day and so now we are taking the water." And
they began their five days (see also Case 36).
The significant points that result from an analysis of these (and other)
disputes between Chamars and village landowners relate to the lack of
authority in water allocation, the role of the disaffected farmers in Main
Pura, the threat or use of force, and the role of factions.
The lack of authority of anyone person or position to make decisions
about the allocation of water that are obeyed by all has been discussed in
the first section of this chapter. The Pradhan may direct or "suggest"
that the Chamars take water, but he does not enforce this decision and
instead departs to his business outside the village. Although the Pradhan
has delegated certain people to look after his own interests and those of
other Bhumihars and villagers (Le., his new committee of three thok-
dars) , no one is concerned with implementing decisions relating to the
Chamars. Each person they approach tells them to see someone else and
they shuffle back and forth in a futile gesture. Those who do intervene
have other motives for doing so and regard the Chamars as pawns in
their own power struggle.
Landowners with more power than the Chamars do not hesitate to
deprive them of this resource. When water is allotted to Main Pura (and
includes the rest of the village except for Little Pura), it is the Pradhan,
his pattidars, and the closely allied Bhumihar patti of Choudhuris who
receive the first share. Those who are not members of these two groups
must then fight among themselves to receive what little time remains.
These disaffected others are primarily from the patti of the Brahman
who was appointed a thokdar, Vijay Misra, the patti of Kolha Bhumi-
hars, and the two major Kurmi farmers. It is these people who most
often divert the water from the Chamars by threats or the use of force.
There is no way, at present, for the Chamars to react against this. The
one Chamar leader most willing to fight back, Mohan Ram, owns 1.25
bighas of land and is independent of the Bhumihars. But others, who are
dependent laborers and fear the repercussions of their actions, most
often restrain Mohan.
The information I have allows me only to guess at the reasons that Vi-
jay Misra chose to support the Chamars in Case 32 (unlike his position in
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Case 31). Four months before this incident, Vijay had a big dispute over
water with Kallu Singh of the Bhumihar Choudhuri patti, who at that
time was the only thokdar in Main Pura (Case 36, following). Vijay may
have backed the Chamars because he was still smarting from that humil-
iation and wanted to take the opportunity to get back at Kallu Singh's
pattidars. Clearly, he was still ill disposed toward these Bhumihars at the
time.
Village factionalism is also an important factor in the Chamars' quest
for water. A Nai, who is a "hardcore" follower of the Pradhan, recom-
mended that the Chamars fight against the Little Pura Bhumihars; Chan-
dra Singh similarly told them to fight against the Pradhan. Each one
blamed the other side for not giving water to Chamars and each one
promised support if they did take a stand. The Nai is known himself to
have a number of Chamar supporters, and his purpose in promising to be
their agua (leader) is clearly to strengthen the Pradhan's position. Chan-
dra's own thinking was disclosed when he reacted violently each time a
Chamar threatened to divert water going into his fields.
Water distribution among the Chamars represents another area of
village life which is used as a means to promote factional interests and to
gain supporters (this time among the Chamars). Jai Singh and other
Bhumihars in his party did back the Chamars in their conflict with Main
Pura Bhumihars. The role that Jai played in allocating (or in being at-
tributed with the allocation of) water to the Chamars further points to
the diffuse nature of decision making in the village mentioned earlier.
Although he is no longer thokdar and thus has no official power to make
such decisions, Jai does have informal power and authority in these mat-
ters. This is not only because of his past position, but also because of his
friendly nature and easy accessibility to villagers.
CoMPETITION AMONG INDIVIDUALS
Besides the conflict over water, in which people compete as members of
factions or classes, a third type of conflict characterizes competition in
the political arena of Arunpur that is not encompassed by these two
forms. This takes place among people who are in the same faction or
class and who are otherwise on good terms with one another. Although I
have information about this type of competition only for one resource,
water, an examination of the disputes in question reveals that a pattern
emerges that even makes it possible to predict the actions of people in
other specific situations. This is because there is a relatively stable
distribution of power in Arunpur at present and water is allocated ac-
cording to the structure of this hierarchy.
The pattern of conflict in this third field of the political arena involves
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the disputes over allocation to Little Pura and to Main Pura (including
the rest of the village). Then there is the conflict between the Pradhan
and his allies, who receive water first, and the other farmers. The posi-
tion of three other Bhumihars who have much land but have no pattidars
is also discussed.
Cases 34 and35: Disputes between Main Pura and Little
Pura over Water Allocation 1968, 1969
34. Water was running for ten days and nights into Little Pura's fields. It
was decided that water would then go into Main Pura for the same
amount of time. On November 19, water started going into Main Pura,
but on the third day (November 22), Jai Singh ordered that the water be
returned to Little Pura. The potato fields of his ally, Chandra Singh,
were drying up. A Bhumihar from the Pradhan's family and one from
the Choudhuri patti went to speak with Jai and the Tubewell Operator. It
was then agreed that water would not be diverted from Main Pura for
another two days-long enough to irrigate the Pradhan's fields. It was
also decided that water would start coming again to Main Pura during
the day. However, word was later sent that water would not be available
until the night of the 22nd. Some men in the Pradhan's family wanted to
beat the Bhumihars of Little Pura (meaning their rivals, of course) for
their behavior, but were restrained by a family elder.
35. Water was to go into Main Pura from Little Pura one morning, but it
did not. About fifteen to twenty men from the Pradhan's patti and that
of the Choudhuri Bhumihars went to the Tubewell Operator to find out
what had happened. Chandra Singh was there and said that the wat~r
was going into Raj Kumar Singh's fields for an extra six hours. Since Raj
Kumar is allied to the Pradhan's family, the latter kept quiet and re-
turned without taking water at that time.
It is generally acknowledged that decisions about which pura or village
should receive water are made by the people in Little Pura (especially
Chandra Singh and Jai Singh), who have influence and control over the
Tubewell Operator. Raj Kumar Singh and his family serve to benefit
from this because a greater number of hours are allotted to Little Pura.
This causes stress on alliances and friendships that run between the two
puras and people often talk disparagingly of the behavior of "so-called
friends." On one occasion, old Amar Singh of the Pradhan's household
went to see Raj Kumar's uncle to request help in getting water for his
fields. Amar related that his family had not taken any water during the
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previous period allotted to Main Pura because others needed it more.
The two old men exchanged hot words and ended up cursing each other.
The Pradhan's pattidars and supporters say that the Little Pura people
use water allocation to create divisions within Main Pura by cutting back
in the amount of time that is allotted for the latter. This leads the Main
Pura farmers to fight among themselves; it also makes certain people
more dependent upon the Little Pura Bhumihars. For example, the pat-
tidar of Narain Singh who attempts to be friendly with both sides will go
and beg for water from Jai Singh. The shortage of time allowed for Main
Pura creates conflict between men in the same pura as well. The follow-
ing dispute was between the thokdar Kallu Singh and the Brahman Vijay
Misra (before he became thokdar, four months later).
Case 36: Water Dispute between the Thokdar and a Brahman 1968
Water had been going into the fields of Kallu Singh, the thokdar for
Main Pura. Vijay Misra was to receive water next. Instead, a Bhumihar
of the Kolha patti asked Kallu if he could have the water, and the
thokdar agreed. When Vijay went to take the water, he found the Kolha
Bhumihar had already taken it and waited for him to finish irrigating his
fields. However, the Bhumihar then said that the water would go next in-
to the fields of a pattidar of Kallu Singh, Lakkhan Singh.
Vijay became angry with this and diverted the water into the canal
leading to his field. Some of the water ran out of the dirt canal and into
the potato field of Lakkhan Singh because of a difference in the levels of
the fields. When the latter heard that his potatoes were being "flooded,"
he, Kallu Singh, and some other pattidars ran to the tubewell with sticks.
Kallu cursed Vijay. The latter said that at the time he "wanted to beat
Kallu and his pattidars because they were proud of their education,
wealth and power."
One of the Kolha Bhumihars and Chandra Singh settled the dispute.
Kallu was later ashamed of his behavior and apologized to Vijay Misra.
In this case, the two Bhumihar pattis of the Kolhas and the
Choudhuris stood together against the Brahman, Vijay Misra. On other
occasions the Kurmis vent their anger at the Bhumihars, especially Kallu
Singh, the thokdar, and say that they are "low" men who seek to deprive
the Kurmis of those things they have a right to-such as, tubewell water,
student subsidies, and teaching positions at the Intercollege. The Kurmis,
Brahmans, and Kolha Bhumihars (who alternate in siding with Kallu
Singh's patti or with Vijay Misra and other farmers, as well as with the
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two village factions) turn against one another in the process of struggling
and manipulating to gain water.
The most luckless people in Main Pura are those Bhumihars who are
not in the Pradhan's faction and are known to be friendly with Chandra
and Jai. They are often denied water by the Pradhan and others who
control the distribution in that pura, as well as by their "friends" in Lit-
tle Pura. There is also conflict for water within a single patti. On several
occasions I noted one of the Pradhan's pattidars abusing and arguing
with him for denying a sufficient amount of water to his relatives.
I know of only one real attempt made to settle these disputes and fights
raging daily within Main Pura while we were there. It seems that matters
had come to a head and many were threatening to use force to take water
for themselves. The original decisions about allocation were disregarded,
and as soon as one man began to irrigate his fields, someone else would
divert the water to his own field. One of the Pradhan's family members
and the thokdar (Kallu Singh) called a meeting of the people from Main
Pura and from the Chamar pura. Several men were chosen to decide the
order of water allocation and all present agreed to the new schedule.
Soon after this water "panchayat" had taken place, however, one of the
Pradhan's pattidars demanded that he receive water earlier. He tried to
divert water which was then irrigating Vijay Misra's fields, and the two
came to blows.
THE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT
Political conflict in the villagewide arena has been approached from
another perspective than the one that characterized the two previous
chapters, which focus on the different cleavages present in society and
how these are articulated on a wide range of issues. By contrast, this
chapter contains information on a single resource to show how the dif-
ferent forms of conflict organization operate with respect to it. More
specifically, it reveals the complexity of even so small an arena as a
village and identifies a third field of political activity in addition to fac-
tional and class conflict.
The people involved in this third sphere of political action do not
engage in competition as members of different factions or classes (al-
though individual caste differences may be a part of the situation). A
man may be simultaneously acting in different roles when competing for
a resource. He may compete as a member of a specific pura for the right
to have water, only to find that this also draws him into disputes with his
allies in another pura. He may also come into conflict with men of his
ownpura with whom he is usually friendly. A noticeable difference,
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CHART 3. Conflict over resources: water from the government tubewell.
however, between conflict among individuals as opposed to that involv-
ing groups or quasigroups is that the breach does not widen as greatly in
most cases and there is a tendency for these disputes to be settled more
quickly.
By integrating the different fields of the villagewide political arena
identified through the study of a single resource, a certain predictable
pattern of conflict emerges which coincides with the distribution of pow-
er. Chart 3 indicates that the conflict over resources is of a segmentary
nature. 3 Although the specification of who will compete at each level will
differ according to the resource in question and the people for whom it
has relevance, it can be expected that the general pattern will remain the
same.
The diagram in Chart 3 reads from top to bottom; the groups on the
left are successful in competition at each level. In other words, water
from the government tubewell is a resource which has come to the village
and is theoretically available to all who have land. At the highest level of
conflict, the Chamars are denied water and it is allocated to the rest of
the village (Le., Main Pura and Little Pura). Little Pura gets water first
and a certain amount of time remains for Main Pura. The lion's share is
then taken by the Pradhan's faction-the Pradhan, his pattidars, and
subsequently the closely allied patti of Choudhuri Bhumihars. This fac-
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tion attempts to prevent the nonaligned farmers and those of Narain
Singh's faction from obtaining a share in the distribution of water. If
sufficient time is allocated to Main Pura, other supporters of the Prad-
han's faction will compete with one another.
An element affecting factional alignments is this competition between
.. allies over the distribution of water (or other resources). It would seem
that as available resources increase in abundance so that they can perco-
late downward among the population, there will be more conflict be-
tween the village big man and those who join his faction. The latter will
no longer be satisfied with simply basking in the light of the prestige /
gained by their leader, but will demand a larger share of the rewards that
accrue to their coalition. The necessary condition for the extension of
conflict seems to be that the specific resource in question is present in
sufficient quantity so that, after the big men have received their share,
enough still remains for which others can compete. The converse of this
is that a scarcity of resources makes the power of the leaders more
secure.
The introduction of new resources into the rural area has had a defi-
nite effect on village conflict. These resources are introduced from the
outside (Le., from the government) and are theoretically available to all
villagers. This results in conflict which filters downward along the power
hierarchy of the village[fhe greater the amount of a resource, the more
competition will be generated at the lower levels and it seems correct to
conclude that the introduction of resources into a "politics of scarcity"
will generate more, not less, conflict. While the distribution of many new
resources thus tends to follow a pattern congruent with the distribution
of power, the picture becomes more complex when the village is in-
corporated into a larger political arena. In such a situation, lines of
cleavage often submerged in village politics may come to the fore in the
politics of the region. J
NOTES
1. There are four different pattis of Bhumihars in Main Pura, that is, groups of
patrilineally related kinsmen. In the following caste histories of water disputes, I
shall refer to the different pattis as follows: (1) the Pradhan's family and their
pattidars, (2) the Choudhuris (a Bhumihar gotra name), neighbors and close
allies of the Pradhan (including the recently appointed thokdar Kallu Singh), (3)
the Kolhas (another gotra name), a patti of Bhumihars who are reputed to switch
their loyalties easily, and (4) Narain Singh and his pattidars. This does not in-
clude those Bhumihars who have no pattidars.
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2. Vijay Misra, who was to become one of the three thokdars (see Case 33).
3. It will be noticed that, unlike that conflict in which the segments are equal at
each level, conflict at the highest level is between decided unequals. In fact, ex-
cept for water, labor, and elections, Untouchables are rarely contestants in the
distribution of resources.
CHAPTER 10
Electoral Politics in Arunpur:
The 1969 Midterm Poll
A village is not an isolated system; the links between Arunpur and the
outside environment are manifold and expressed in varied ways (see
Chapter 3). In this connection, Beteille has remarked that "political
alignments and cleavages in the village have to be understood not only in
relation to other features of its social structure, but also in terms of the
divisions and tensions in the regional society" (1965:142). In the more re-
cent past, the villagers have had a history of involvement in outside
political activities stemming from the links of the zamindar and mukhiya
with the British Raj and participation of some villagers in Gandhi's Non-
Cooperation Movement. Subsequently, big men of opposing faction.s
aligned themselves with different political parties and carried their sup-
porters' votes with them.
The 1969 midterm election highlights the processes of interaction be-
tween two arenas. By concentrating on the political participation and
perceptions of villagers rather than on the activities of the candidates
themselves, I found several points of departure from previous elections
and from the dominant mode of Arunpur politics. Membership in village
factions had little impact on voter decision making in this election,
whereas horizontal ties of caste and kinship, overlaid by class interests,
were used effectively to recruit votes. This discontinuity between village
politics and regional elections serves to underscore the lines of divergent
interests within the village arena that, failing to find any suitable outlet
there because of continuing Bhumihar dominance, seek expression with-
in the wider arena.
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VILLAGE PARTICIPATION IN STATE POLITICS
During the period 1967 to early 1969, villagers participated in several im-
portant political events that affected the state and regional arenas. A
statewide agitation to replace English completely by Hindi in the govern-
ment and the schools was led by the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP) and
involved students and teachers from Arunpur. Both the Principal of the
Intercollege and Krishna Singh of Ramapur (the Intercollege Secretary)
opposed them on this issue and were supporters of the Congress party
position. Some village men who teach at the Intercollege also took part,
and were later imprisoned, in the strike of the Uttar Pradesh secondary
school teachers that started at the end of 1968. In the last quarter of that
year, the campus of Banaras Hindu University was racked with conflict
and violence, ostensibly due to student factions associated with different
political affiliations (the right-wing Jan Sangh against a limited left coali-
tion). Boys from Arunpur who attend the university expressed loyalty to
the SSP-left coalition.
These events, however, did not truly affect most of the villagers. In-
stead, the major point of articulation between the village political system
and that of the wider arena lies in the elections for state and national rep-
resentatives. Four national and local elections have taken place since In-
dependence, I and these were open to all villagers. The most important
element of the political environment at the time of the present midterm
poll was that the SSP candidate, who won in the 1967 general election
from the constituency to which Arunpur belongs, is a Kurmi. Many
BhUInihars and Brahmans harbored ill feelings from that time, and the
element of caste loyalties (or casteism) figured significantly in the subse-
quent poll.
A detailed discussion of the factors leading up to the need to call
another election only two years after the last one was held is outside the
scope of this work (see, e.g., Baxter 1975; Brass 1968; Burger 1969;
Graham 1968). It may be said, however, that the crisis was precipitated
by the severe setback of the dominant Congress Party in the 1967 elec-
tions when its majorities were either lost or greatly reduced in almost all
states. The Congress failed to win a majority in the U. P. State Legisla-
tive Assembly, and internal bargaining and a fragile alliance with the In-
dependents did not sustain them in power for long. Factionalism within
this dOIninant party and the new device of rampant defection ("floor
crossing") was marked by the startling defection of a charismatic Con-
gress Party leader in U.P., Charan Singh. He organized a new party-the
Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD)-that was to be "spokesmen for the middle
farmer and individual ownership." It was particularly to represent the
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interests of the Jat caste of peasant proprietors, living mainly in western
V.P., to which Charan Singh belonged (Baxter 1975:113ftV His chief
lieutenant was a Kurmi leader from Faizabad District, bordering on the
eastern region of the state.
Charan Singh assumed the office of Chief Minister of the state as the
head of the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD), a united front consisting of
non-Congress Party members of the State Assembly. They struggled
along for some ten months, when large-scale defections led to his resig-
nation and the imposition of President's Rule. New state elections were
set for February 9, 1969 and a prominent new party on the scene was
Charan Singh's BKD.
Out of the large array of candidates presented to the voters, only four
were serious contenders belonging to major parties. 3 Bhaggu Ram (Brig-
hunath), the Kurmi SSP incumbent, had won the election in 1967 with 55
percent of the constituency vote. In the midterm poll, he placed third,
with only 17.4 percent of the popular votes. The "flash" BKD also put
forward a Kurmi named Bal Dev. The Congress and Jan Sangh can-
didates were both Bhumihars who had many kinsmen and personal con-
tacts with leading Bhumihar families in the area. Raj Bihari Singh was
the eventual winner in the election. Jan Sangh's Vishwanath Singh,
however, was a most respected candidate. An independently wealthy ex-
magistrate with no immediate family members, he had failed twice
before to win an election as a Member of Parliament. Much was made of
his wealth and lack of relatives to claim favors from him, and he was put
forward as the selfless politician; this was in contrast to what was be-
lieved about the incumbent. Villagers said that Bhaggu Ram had been a
poor man with only two bighas of land before winning in 1967, but that
less than two years later he had twenty-six bighas and had constructed ~
three-story brick house. Of the other candidates, only the Independent
Chamar held appeal for Arunpur voters of that caste.
PERCEPTIONS OF VOTING AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES
Few people replied in the negative to a question asked of all household
heads in the village: "Is it a good thing to vote?" Although the majority
think that the idea of voting is a good one, they do not feel that they have
derived much personal benefit from elections; it is the politician, they
believe, who gains the most. This is particularly true among Chamars.
One of them declared, "They run after us at election time, but after-
wards we are forgotten and we don't have enough food and water."
Others, perhaps more radical in their outlook, believe that democracy
with one man and one vote is not really suited to their country. Corrup-
tion, selfishness, and casteism interferes with its workings in a popula-
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tion that is mostly illiterate. A few men went so far as to speak of a
revolution to overthrow the Congress Party and the need for a dictator-
ship that could deal effectively with the country's problems.
While it is said that elections have served to increase factional conflicts
within the village by extending them to yet another area of political com-
petition, it is the relation between voting and caste that is most decried
and decried most of all by the upper castes of Bhumihars and Brahmans.
There was unanimity in the view that since elections depend upon num-
bers, the caste with the largest population (in this case, the Kurmis) has a
decisive advantage. One ofthe primary school teachers commented:
In my village, people are going to vote for four different parties. BKD is a
new party-whoever is a Yadiv [Ahir surname) will vote for it and talks only
about Charan Singh. A candidate may have no substance, no qualifications,
but people of his caste will vote for him.
Similarly, a tubewell operator from a nearby village perceptively noted
that caste feeling influences the vote
because who knows the ideology of a political party? Voting is always a
game which is played with a familiar trick. That trick can be introduced
either by winning the vote of a man by party ideology, or by showing his af-
finity with a certain caste. As soon as the candidate and his followers say,
"Such and such is a man of your caste," the listener feels an identification
and some psychological satisfaction.
Casteism was regarded as being a particularly important issue upon
which this election would hinge. It is interesting to note that there is only
talk of casteism when high castes speak of politics and the vote. Other
forms of casteism (e.g., discrimination on the basis of caste in determin-
ing access to valued resources such as land, water, jobs, or status) seem
to be accepted as something natural and are certainly not lamented by the
upper castes. It is likely that only because they are outnumbered and
because numbers win elections that the latter spoke of and decried
casteism at election time.
A major reason given for the increase in exploiting caste loyalties dur-
ing elections is that lower castes no longer listen to high-caste men,
voting as the latter dictate, but rather vote for their own caste man. It
was widely recognized by the upper castes that although the Chamars
(and others) would say yes to whichever candidate they were urged to
vote for, they would actually vote for whomever they themselves decided
upon. This increasing independence of the lower-caste vote and the
decreasing effectiveness of pressure tactics was evident in the 1969 elec-
tion and clearly demonstrated by the Chamar vote (see later).
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Many Bhumihars and Brahmans also felt that the Kurmis had "be-
come too big" since winning the 1967 election and had begun to regard
the area as a sort of "Kunbistan." It was thought necessary to "teach
them a lesson" in the midterm poll. A Bhumihar Socialist, for example,
said that he would not vote for Bhaggu Ram again. It rankled him that
after the last election, when he and his other Bhumihar relatives had
worked so hard for the Kurmi SSP candidate, the latter discounted their
contribution. Instead, Bhaggu Ram said that it was really the Kurmi vote
which enabled him to win.
There were some in the village who did express a commitment to the
ideology of certain political parties and voted along these lines.· This was
most true of the upper castes. In addition to the faction leaders who have
a history of association with, if not commitment to, different parties (see
later), there is also a small core of four young, college-educated teachers
(three are kinsmen of the Pradhan and all belong to his faction) who had
supported and campaigned for the SSP in previous elections. They had
voted for that party's candidate in 1967 despite considerable pressure
from faction comembers and Bhumihars who switched to support the
Congress candidate from their own caste. One of these teachers said that
he wanted politics in India to be as "Marx philosophized it" and spoke
of achieving absolute equality. Another Bhumihar, related to one of
these Intercollege teachers and working as a truck driver in Banaras, is
also a staunch supporter of the SSP. Although he has little free time to
spend in the village, he tries to coordinate the young boys into a youth
club. He assembled about sixty boys from Arunpur and a neighboring
village before the election and explained the party platforms and symbols
to them. The boys and a few adults sympathetic to the SSP led a proces-
sion through their village and several others nearby. Many Bhumihar:s
and Brahmans were reportedly angered that a Bhumihar was openly can-
vassing votes for a Kurmi. He persisted in his support of the Kurmi can-
didate and was instrumental in arranging the SSP rally held at nearby
Dallia bazaar just before the election, which featured a major student
leader from the university.
SSP supporters decried anti-Muslim feelings as well as caste inequali-
ties; those who voted for the Jan Sangh candidate said that he stood for
the preservation of Hindu values and protection from the Muslims. A
religious Bhumihar explained why he would vote for Vishwanath Singh,
standing from the Jan Sangh: this candidate was a fellow caste man and
a relative. Furthermore, the party believed in traditional Hindu ways,
was against Muslims, and for caste and Untouchability.
While there were villagers who continued or decided to support the
Congress candidate in this election, many said that the party, so long in
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FIGURE 25. Raj Narain, member of Parliament (now Minister of Health
and Family Welfare in the central government), gives a campaign speech
during an SSP rally in Dallia bazaar.
power, had "done nothing for twenty years and it was time for a
change." An old Brahman, who claimed to be able to deliver fifty votes
from among his own relatives and the neighboring Lohars, stated:
We could see Congress and SSP for the last twenty years, who did nothing
for us. So we are thinking to vote for the dipak [Jan Sangh symbol]. Con-
gress did all kinds of bad things. It never cared for our thoughts of caste
(jati vichar) and now everything has become a hodgepodge (khichari). We
should not vote for Congress. We voted for the SSP and found it was worth-
less. We voted for Bhaggu Ram who built his own house and doesn't care
about us.
Now we are thinking of voting for Vishwanath Singh, for he is from our
area, the most educated candidate, and has no selfish ideas. We have all
decided to vote for Jan Sangh. I will canvass for them if they promise to get
my well repaired.
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Caste affiliation was a dominant consideration in voting, especially for
the Kurmis and the Chamars, but there were additional important fac-
tors. A tie of kinship or friendship with a candidate or his supporters
could determine the way a vote was cast. If a villager was known to be
able to influence others, candidates would approach such a potential
supporter through the latter's relatives. This was a particularly compel-
ling issue for those Bhumihars who were related to the Jan Sangh or
Congress candidates. Most of the Bhumihars who were considered to be
big men had ties of friendship and obligation to both candidates as well.
Ironically, they too (like the Chamars) often had to avoid expressing an
open preference for one or the other candidate at the risk of invoking the
displeasure of the person not supported.
VILLAGE FACTIONALISM AND THE ELECTION
Village factionalism was an important factor in previous elections, for
opposing village leaders aligned themselves with different parties and
carried their supporters with them. After the first election in 1952, the
elders of the Pradhan's house, many of whom had taken some part in the
freedom struggle, switched from supporting the Congress Party to the
SSP. They were joined in this move by members of Raj Kumar's family
and by a younger brother of Krishna Singh. Jai Singh and Chandra
Singh, of Little Pura Bhumihar families that had been allied with the
British, became Congress members, as did the third person in their coali-
tion, Narain Singh. Leader-follower ties were highly important, although
faction membership and voting choice did not always present a one-to-
one relationship. Even those castes that are economically independent of
the Bhumihars, such as the Kurmi, Kahar, Lohar, and others, as well as
the Brahmans and some other Bhumihars, said that they had looked to
the big men for advice because they were more knowledgeable and "ad-
vanced" in these matters. In this election, however, factions and family
members split their vote according to personal reasons, while other
villagers decided their votes independently, consulting only with their
kinsmen or caste fellows.
The Pradhan was inactive during the campaign and would not even
reveal his choice. He did not speak openly for any candidate, although he
had been an SSP supporter in the past. One major difficulty was that in
this election both the Congress and Jan Sangh candidates were Bhumi-
hars well known to him. At the same time, the opposing faction came out
in support of the Jan Sangh, a party that he might have preferred. His
family's vote was also dispersed. Most of them were SSP supporters (as
were the majority of their kinsmen) except for Amar Singh, backing the
Jan Sangh, and his "grandson" Chandra, who voted Congress. The
208 ELECTORAL POLITICS IN ARUNPUR
former's decision was based on two factors. First, the Jan Sangh can-
didate, Vishwanath Singh, was the first to come personally to him and
request his vote. Both he and his father are well known to Amar. They
have a long family connection and are also related. Second, Amar has
become more religious in his advanced age and expressed a belief in the
values and ideology of Hinduism, for which he believed the Jan Sangh
stood, and a hope that this newer party might accomplish more than
Congress or the SSP did.
Chandra Singh,' a teacher at Arunpur Intercollege, was extremely
angered at the ingratitude he said Bhaggu Ram had expressed to him and
other Bhumihars who took part in his 1967 campaign. He vowed never to
vote for him again. He supported the Congress candidate in this election
because he was indebted to him for certain past favors and because he
hoped it might reap him some monetary benefits at the Intercollege. Both
the Principal and the Secretary are Congress supporters. Chandra
originally said that he would not openly canvass for that party, though
later he did, and that he is still an admirer of the late Ram Manohar Lo-
hia and Raj Narain. 6
The coleader of the Pradhan's faction in Little Pura, Raj Kumar
Singh, and his family supported the Jan Sangh but were not active cam-
paigners in the village and local area, either. The major difficulty here
was that the opposing faction, composed of his kinsmen, had declared
themselves as Jan Sangh canvassers first, and hostile kin would not sit
together in the same jeep while visiting other villages. While neither Raj
Kumar nor the Pradhan adopted a public stance, those bare admi who
were members of the opposition faction campaigned openly. A schism
developed within their initial united stand for the Jan Sangh, and details
of this incident vividly portray some of the pressures that served to dif-
fuse the upper-caste vote along nonfactionallines.
Sometime in December, an influential relative came to Narain Singh's
house and convinced them to support the Jan Sangh candidate in the
forthcoming election. As Narain lives and votes in Calcutta, his older
brother's son, Lalji, was chosen to campaign for the dipak and to bring
the weight of his family connections with him. Lalji was a "life-
member" of Congress but now succumbed to pressure and took his rela-
tive to Little Pura, where his allies Chandra Singh and Jai Singh live.
Because they all felt united as faction coleaders, these two men, also
staunch Congresswallas in the past, agreed to support the Jan Sangh.
Chandra might possibly have been promised that the office of pramukh,
now held by his rival Krishna Singh, could be his if the Jan Sangh can-
didate won. Jai Singh, however, was particularly annoyed and reluctant
at having to switch his party and assured them that his ideology was still
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that of the Congress. All three then began to campaign in the villages of
the constituency.
In mid-January, Lalji was called to the home of a highly regarded and
influential rais from a nearby village. This man was also a relation of
Lalji's and requested the latter to campaign for the Congress Party. "As
my family respects him," said Lalji, "it was hard to say no," although
he declared that he would still cast his. personal vote i for the Jan Sangh.
The next day, a Congress neta and the Intercollege Principal came to the
village and asked Chandra and Jai also to return to the Congress fold
and join them in canvassing. Chandra refused, saying that he had
already promised to vote for Vishwanath Singh, but could "advise how
to win back people I have turned to Jan Sangh." My assistant, a staunch
Jan Sanghi, was appalled at this about-face. Chandra answered him: "I
should please by [my] talk the man who is pleasing me by [his] talk."
On January 20, several important Congress Party members, including
Kamalapati Tripati (President of the U.P. Congress Party), went to Lal-
ji's house as well as to see Chandra, Jai, and the Pradhan. They pre-
vailed upon Lalji as a "life member" of Congress not to vote for the Jan
Sangh and not to refuse their request, since he was their relation. They
further said that they would send around a jeep so that he could canvass
for the party. Lalji was faced with a terrible conflict; he cursed the Prad-
han, who had kept his voting preference to himself and managed to
avoid such a clash of loyalties. Jai Singh was also persuaded to return to
Congress, and he and Lalji went campaigning for that party in the last
two weeks before the election. The deserted Chandra tried to weave a
middle course, although he was angered by Jai's open switch and said
that as they' had given their word to the Jan Sangh candidate, it was a
matter of izzat (honor) not to change. He also added that he would not
let the Intercollege Principal, whom he opposes, think that he could iIi-
fluence all their faction's leaders.
Vishwanath Singh came again to Arunpur soon after all this occurred.
He went through the village and, at my assistant's urging, to all the puras
(including those of the Kurmis, other low castes, and Chamars). When
he came to where Chandra and Jai lived, he was admonished by the latter
for not campaigning hard enough, while Chandra said that Vishwanath
was wasting his time and energy in contesting an election that could not
be won. Nevertheless, Chandra agreed to go canvassing with a now deep-
ly discouraged contender. The Congress candidate, Raj Bihari Singh,
also came to Arunpur at least twice in the last few days before the elec-
tion, and it was said that even Chandra was seen riding in the Congress
jeep.
With Arunpur big .men voting along lines other than that of factional
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considerations, the attempt to mobilize support along these lines was
negligible. Members of the Kurmi, Kahar, Kalwar, and other castes said
that while they may verbally accede to any voting request a thakur might
make, ultimately they will decide among themselves for whom to vote.
The elderly Brahman who claimed he could deliver some fifty votes had
made the decision to vote for the Jan Sangh, however, on the basis of his
allegiance to, and advice from, Raj Kumar. When Jai Singh came to his
house with some Congress people, he stayed inside' 'because if I went out
they would take my promise [of support] and I had already promised my
vote to Jan Sangh."
While this decision to follow a big man was a voluntary one, the Un-
touchable Musahars and Dharkars had no such choice. They are in an ex-
tremely dependent position, and unlike the Chamars, followed the bid-
ding of their employers and patrons when voting. These castes are few in
number and live near Little Pura, where opposing faction leaders abide.
Their predicament is great because they cannot afford to incur the dis-
pleasure of either side. One Dharkar, after expressing his own opinions
of and preferences for candidates and parties, stated:
But I will vote for the man who is the choice of Little Pura.... Even if
those people tell us to stand in the sun for twenty-four hours, I will do so.
Our voting depends on them.... But if one thakur advises us to vote for
someone and another thakur [who opposes him] advises me to vote for
someone else, I will leave the village on election day as I did last time. For
me both men are equal and I cannot obey only one.
In contrast to this situation of the Musahars and Dharkars, where
economic dependence led to compliance in voting according to the will of
their maliks, the Chamars' vote was strikingly independent. Their nor-
mally weak corporate links within the village, hindered by economic
dependency and vertical ties of patronage with the upper castes, were
strengthened in this election.
CLASS TENSIONS AND THE CHAMAR VOTE
The horizontal cleavage within the village political arena between the
dependent, landless Chamar mazdurs and their upper-caste maliks
reveals a growing classlike struggle. This conflict cuts across factions
within the dominant caste of Bhumihars and serves increasingly to unite
rival leaders against their laborers. Despite such conflict, there appears
to be no change in the position of the Chamars in the village or in their
subservient economic and political condition. By taking an indepen-
dent stand in the wider arena, however, they expressed their solidarity
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with caste fellows in other villages and their desire to be free men within
Arunpur.
Chamars had voted Congress for the most part in past elections. At the
time of the midterm poll, they were initially undecided about which can-
didate they should support. A number consulted with my assistant and
he advised them to vote for the dipak, as did many of the leading
Bhumihars and Brahmans in the village who had influence over and
employed Chamars. My assistant also tried to arrange several meetings
between those Untouchables who expressed an interest in that party and
a neta in Banaras or the candidate himself. In the beginning of January,
one of the more religious men said that he was willing to meet with the
Jan Sangh leader, even though many of his caste men warned that the
party stood for a return of zamindari and Untouchability. Taking a letter
of introduction from my assistant, as well as a notice regarding the
deployment of government funds to construct wells for Untouchables,
Viren Ram (see Chapter 8) went to Banaras. He was also prepared to
canvass for the party if they could pay him just two rupees a day to feed
his family. This offer was never accepted. When the leader met Viren
Ram, he said that he had to go to court that morning and was too busy to
talk further.
In the third week of January, another meeting was arranged between a
Chamar, from the only family which owns a little land and could boast
of a college-educated son (see Chapter 8), and the Jan Sangh candidate.
Sometime earlier, this Chamar had declared the Jan Singh to be the party
of casteism, communalism, and Untouchability. Now, after speaking
with my assistant, he was willing to sound out the candidate and deter-
mine whether anything could possibly be gained from giving him the
vote. His family was particularly interested in getting the well near their
house repaired so that it could be usable. 7 The results of the meeting were
disappointing, if not unexpected. The candidate promised to help them
only after the elections were over. Other Chamars declared that they
would vote for the party which gave them money to fix their houses and
wells and to buy some land where they could tether and feed their ani-
mals. "Unless a party is doing this much," a Chamar said, "we aren't
going to vote for them. Who counts the price of our votes?" Even Viren
Ram, who had declared his support for the Jan Sangh through the urg-
ings of my assistant, became angry with the latter when he did not per-
sonally speak to the candidate on their behalf and extract a concrete
promise of help.
The Chamars had a meeting in their pura at the end of January and
decided to support the Independent Chamar candidate, a physician from
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Mirzapur District. They said that he had come to them one night and
asked for their vote. He told them, "After high-caste people win the elec-
tion, they will not let those of low caste even touch the chair they are sit-
ting on," and promised to help all. The Chamars also felt that a vote for
this man might raise their status in the eyes of others. News of the meet-
ing and their decision soon reached the Bhumihars. Although Chamars
generally denied any such decision when confronted with it by Bhumi-
hars, and reaffirmed their allegiance to follow their maliks' advice, occa-
sionally a younger man would be more outspoken in his views: "It is a
question of principle {siddhant}. I am voting for the hathi [elephant sym-
bol of the Chamar Independent]. What is wrong with that? I am voting
as I like."
Men from practically all Arunpur Chamar households subsequently
participated in the inauguration of a temple in Banaras dedicated to their
hero, Raidas. The meeting was said to have attracted some twenty thou-
sand Chamars and was marked by the appearance of the Independent
candidate on an elephant. He appealed for unity among the caste and a
vote for their caste man. It is also reported that he advised them not to
tell high-caste people that they would vote for him but to agree verbally
to whomever they suggested. For, he continued, if he loses, then Cha-
mars will be the enemy of the high-caste men in office. Arunpur Cha-
mars were impressed by the candidate's call for unity and most of their
votes went for him. Those few who had promised my assistant to vote for
the Jan Sangh persisted in telling him that they did so.
The inability of the Bhumihars to control the Chamar vote, as opposed
to that of the Musahars and Dharkars, lay largely with the former's
greater numbers, which allowed them to act with a measure of unity, and
with the secret balloting. This angered many, who abused Chamars for
their ungratefulness in not voting for Congress, or ridiculed them for
believing that their candidate could win. Even the group of college-
educated men who believed in the SSP ideology of caste equality spoke
of trying to keep Chamars from reaching the voting booth on election
day. "But I also feel this way," said one young man, "that they have to
come on my roads, in my streets, through my fields, and have to eat food
from my house. So they should stop doing all this if they don't like to
listen to us."
The voting decisions of the Chamars, as well as those of faction
members and other castes, were clearly influenced by many factors and
events external to village affairs. Contact with different parties and their
candidates, through village canvassing or campaign speeches at political
rallies, combined with other election activities. Toward the end of Jan-
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uary, there was an increased amount of election bustle: cars, jeeps, and
rickshaws with signs, slogans, and speeches traveled the Grand Truck
Road day and night. The Intercollege was also enmeshed in electoral
politics, and this involved the village directly through its several teachers
and students.
ARUNPUR INTERCOLLEGE AND THE MIDTERM POLL
Two men who are in a strong position to affect the voting of others are
the Intercollege Principal and the Secretary. The Secretary is Krishna
Singh, Block pramukh and close ally of the Pradhan. He too, however,
was forced to adopt a low profile in this election. He had joined the Con-
gress Party after Independence but openly helped his brother contest for
the District Board as a Socialist. This brother had worked with famed
freedom fighter Subash Chandra Bose in the Forward Bloc and later
supported the Socialist Lohia. Backing his brother led to Krishna's ex-
pulsion from Congress. For some fifteen years, as he explains it, he
supported the SSP and appreciated their views without ever becoming a
formal party worker; at the same time, he remained close to many Con-
gress Party notables. In the language question he favored the Congress
position and in this election, although he would not openly canvass, he
supported the Congress candidate.
When the Jan Sangh aspirant requested Krishna's support, he said that
he could personally vote for him but could not speak openly; rather, he
had already pledged to support Raj Bihari Singh and to win over other
big men as the Congress candidate had requested. At the same time, one
of the teachers at the Intercollege is a nephew of Raj Bihari and Krishna
feared possible repercussions if it was learned that he was for the Jan
Sangh. It is also unlikely that the Secretary, known for his great disli~e
of Kurmis stemming from the time they opposed him in his village, voted
for other than the Bhumihar Congress candidate in the 1967 election.
The Intercollege Principal, also a Bhumihar, was an active Congress
campaigner. He had been in the SSP but, failing to get on the party
ticket, stood as an Independent candidate for the State Assembly in the
last election. Bhumihars feared that his candidacy would serve only to
split their caste vote and pressured him into withdrawing his name.
Subsequently, the school was investigated for certain financial irregular-
ities; the head of the investigating committee was a high officer in the
state Congress Party. The Principal incurred a debt to this official when
he was exonerated of any wrongdoing. He also wanted the school to
become a Degree College and the decision whether to approve such a re-
quest lay with the state government and was often a political one.
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Therefore, the Principal had convincing reasons for supporting the Con-
gress as the most powerful party in the state and compelled many
teachers to do likewise.
He gave teachers free time from their classes to canvass votes, report-
edly harassed those who were SSP or other)supporters, urged the stu-
dents to back Congress (if they have "faith in him"), and spoke in the
same manner to the teachers. He also asked the latter to give a donation
to the party and even included those whom he knew to support other can-
didates. Most of the political parties had established some kind of office
in the constituency from which they could distribute material, have
meetings of party workers, make out voter cards, and so on. This kind of
work was done for Congress at the Intercollege. Teachers, clerks, and
students worked in the office there. Students were also canvassers and
might have influenced their more uneducated parents or the women in
their households. That village boys did become involved intimately in the
election is evident from a fight that continued for several days in the
school between Arunpur SSP supporters and Congress supporters from
another village. The school remained a hum of election activities right up
to election day, when the people from Arunpur and a neighboring village
came to cast their votes at the Intercollege polling station.
ELECTION DAY IN ARUNPUR: REGIONAL POLITICS AND THE
VILLAGE ARENA
Voting was carried out smoothly, with a sixty-six percent turnout of
Arunpur's voters (397 out of 602). The vote was split primarily between
the Congress candidate (victorious in the constituency) and the Jan
Sangh, SSP, and Chamar Independent candidates-with some Kurmis
voting for the BKD. Each of these political parties had set aside a small
area on the road outside the Intercollege with their party flag. Agents of
the respective political parties handed out prepared slips containing a
voter's name and his registration number, which was required in the poll-
ing station. The agent from which a voter took his slip (unless he had one
already) would be one indicator of how he would vote. There were
strange bedfellows under different party flags; members of opposing fac-
tions stood together, while members of the same faction or family were
with different parties.
The only incidents which marred the otherwise peaceful day were a
number of hot disputes between Jai Singh, Chandra Singh, and some
other kinsmen and friends who, though members of the same faction,
were divided between the Jan Sangh and Congress candidates. I had been
told of incidents in the previous election where lower-caste people were
prevented from voting by threats or physical violence, but observed no
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FIGURE 26. Women wait to cast their votes at the Arunpur Intercollege
polling station.
overt intimidation at the polling station. Admittedly, this might have
been accomplished beforehand, and my findings are partly contrary to
those of one writer in a reputed national political weekly. He says:
The fact is that never before in U.P. have terrorism and casteism been prac-
tised on such a scale. Even leftist parties set up candidates on the criterion of
caste origins.... It is clear that not national politics but regional politics is
getting the upper hand in U.P. Casteism and fear are becoming significant
factors (Economic and Political Weekly 1969:384).'
This election was instead marked by a lessening of voting along
dependency ties that is characteristic of the patron-client bond in village
politics. Factions did not act as units, and the Bhumihar vote was
dispersed. This was most pronounced among the big men, to whom can-
didates personally appealed for support, and their families. The Prad-
han, his family, and allies all voted independently of one another, but
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this was not seen as a mark of weakness in their alliance. There was tacit
recognition of the fact that as village links with the outside increase,
there is bound to be a diffusion of interests among the different allies. As
one Bhumihar observed:
The Pradhan may not vote for the Jan Sangh. Because we are both
educated, he understands that friendship is something other than the right
to vote. He and his family will never tell us which party to vote for because
he has his own individuality and thoughts [and we ours]. He will vote for
whom he likes-and I'll vote for whom I like. So there is nothing like a con-
flict. I will vote Jan Sangh and they for SSP. It makes no difference.
Only Jai, Chandra, and their allies fought over their divided votes and
took it as a sign of lessening prestige that they were not united. Yet while
Chandra refused to switch back to the Congress and to support a candi-
date which his enemies did, Jai was less hesitant about associating with
those he formerly despised (and perhaps still does).
The cleavage among castes came out much more strongly in this elec-
tion and votes were decided along horizontal lines of caste. This was par-
ticularly true of the Chamars, who were almost unanimous in their sup-
port for the Independent contestant. This autonomy in voting is closely
connected to their growing struggle for independence from the Bhumi-
hars in their working conditions and agrarian relations within the village.
In purely village politics, however, they still remain bound to the upper
castes and have further antagonized their superiors by this show of in-
dependence. The old Brahman who was influential in organizing his
family's and possibly neighboring Lohars' votes for the Jan Sangh
declared after the election:
Yesterday I decided that I can't let any Chamar go on cycle past my door.
Now I can't tolerate this. [Abuses] ... Everyone is out of his mind. These
people never listen to us and didn't vote for Jan Sangh, so what right do
they have to come by my door sitting high upon their cycles while we may be
squatting on the ground. It is impossible. If they don't listen to us, I will
break their legs. I have started shouting abuses to our worker [a female
Chamar] and now they will understand the cost of not listening to us. How
will I remain a Brahman if I will not "beat" the Chamars?
After the election was over, many Bhumiharsalso commented that it
was good that the Kurmis had lost. They were berated for never having
canvassed for Bhumihar votes (as indeed, the latter were not seen to can-
vass among the Kurmis) and for thinking that numbers alone would win
them the office. Others declared that if the Kurmis had won again they
would have "cut our noses in the village."
This election reveals the extent to which the model of a political arena
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encompassing a number of villages has been shifting from a fragmented
one to one in which the relationship between a specific village and the
wider arena is marked by certain discontinuities. In the model of a frag-
mented arena, the voting outcome within individual villages would be
primarily determined by vertical clientelist bonds and there would be no
necessary connection between the way that different villages voted. Each
would be determined by its own particular configuration of factional ties
and patron-client bonds. Politics at the village level would then be con-
tinuous with constituency politics; voting would ideally be determined by
vertical ties in both arenas.
The shift to a model of a regional arena, which is characterized by
discontinuities with the village arena, exhibits, on the contrary, connec-
tions among villages for certain castes whose collective interests express
themselves in a unified voting pattern. Arunpur voting disclosed three
discontinuities. The comparatively weak corporate links among the
Chamars and the vertical ties with upper castes within the village, which
in the past would have determined their voting, were juxtaposed with a
united position in the present election. The Kurmis, who take no active
role in village politics remained, however, an important force in the
supravillage arena. Finally, the weak corporate links of the Bhumihars,
which are expressed in competitive village factionalism, continued as
such but gave way to a division of interests along other lines of cleavage.
The question for future elections remains whether there will be an in-
creasing proliferation of upper-caste political loyalties, due to greater
education, awareness of political ideologies, and extensive participation
in the world outside, or whether they will unite behind a major party as
the cleavage among castes comes to predominate over vertical ties for the
lower castes.
NOTES
1. They were held in 1952, 1957, 1%2, and 1967.
2. The translation of BKD as "Indian Revolutionary Party" is, as Baxter points
out, somewhat misleading for a party dominated by landowners of medium-
sized holdings belonging primarily to Jat and Ahir castes (1975: 121).
3. See Brass (1968) for a discussion of party ideologies.
4. It does not seem completely correct to conclude, as Brass does, that "in the rural
areas, ideology is hardly a factor. Neither in urban nor in rural areas are there
many people who vote Congress because of habit or family tradition" (1968:76).
5. Amar's "grandson," not to be confused with the big man, Chandra Singh.
6. Lohia was a major Socialist leader and, with others, formed a new Socialist
Party after differences with some leaders in the Praja Socialist Party. In 1964,
these two combined into the SSP, only to find former PSP leaders opposed to
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Lohia leave the Party and revive their own party a year later. Raj Narain is the
SSP Member of Parliament from the Constituency who later came into national
prominence by opposing Mrs. Gandhi.
7. Failure to get this well repaired was later the cause of a severe conflict between
the Bhumihars and Chamars (see Case 26 earlier).
8. A similar conclusion is expressed in a government report on the midterm polls
held in several states, although it does reveal that a "comparatively large number
of complaints regarding coercion and intimidation were received from Bihar and
U.P.-especially the western region" (Election Commission of India 1970:26,
28).
CHAPTER 11
Conclusions
Every society has some way in which it organizes the competition for
scarce and valued resources among its members. It also has some way of
designating who makes decisions about the allocation of resources and
how these decisions are made. Taken together, these may be regarded as
the cultural rules pertaining to political activity. Such rules interact with ,/
the actual situation regarding the distribution of power and resources in
a community. The divergence between the rules of political activity and
their applicability to the situation within which members of society find
themselves is greater in times of change, when new lines of cleavage
emerge. The need to find new cultural solutions for coping with the prob~/
lems raised by such changes can ultimately lead to a change in the rules
themselves. It seems that what is happening in rural India today can be
understood in this light. .
THE POLITICAL ARENA IN ARUNPUR
An analysis of the organization of political activity in Arunpur reveals an
arena in flux. New ideas reach the village from nearby Banaras city, and
its social life has been affected to some extent by the increasing mobility
characteristic of the wider Indian scene. Significant areas of conflict lie
in the changes in land tenure, the introduction of government tubewells
and other resources, and the system of agricultural labor. The decline in
the traditional form of conflict resolution, the panchayat, the failure of
the new statutory panchayats, and the increasing appeal to institutions
that lie outside the village have provided people with the opportunity to
choose between alternative structures. To settle a dispute, for example, a
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person might appeal to either the traditional or new panchayats, or to the
courts. The distribution of wealth, status, and power, however, still
tends to coalesce within the dominant caste of Bhumihars. Although
other castes have made some advances, notably the agricultural Kurmis,
power (and most land) in the village belongs to the Bhumihars.
The separation of the political activity which is a part of all human in-
teraction from that which involved most villagers was the first step in an
attempt to circumscribe a villagewide arena (see Chapter 5). This in-
volved trying to classify different case histories of disputes according to
the way in which villagers spoke about them. The key factors seem to be
how wide a breach becomes and the way in which conflict is resolved.
Four propositions were stated which denote the characteristics of politi-
cal activity that did not escalate to the villagewide arena.
In contrast to this, conflict in the wider arena was found to have dif-
ferent characteristics. The keys to village political activity are the big men
who figure as leaders of factions and main participants in the disputes
between the landed and landless. These men control whatever resources
enter the village and make decisions about their distribution. Arunpur
villagers hold two cultural models of leadership styles-that of the
aristocrat (rais), who is generous and helps others selflessly, and that of
the big man (bara admi). The latter is best recognized as the village politi-
cian who takes an active role in village affairs by virtue of his wealth and
power and who is concerned only with the pursuit of self-interest.
A big man becomes a leader when he can claim to have a core of
followers and attempts to increase his network of supporters by offers of
mutual gain. The present village big men are all wealthy Bhumihars who
desire to advance their own families' wealth and position and whose in-
volvement in the political arena is regulated by belonging to one or the
other faction. This situation is somewhat different from what prevailed
in the past when, it is said, the zamindar and the appointed village head-
man, acting in counsel with a village and local panchayat of selected
villagers, were able to control conflict more effectively.
The traditional and predominant form of rural conflict-factional-
ism-seems clearly related to the diffuse nature of authority inherent in
the caste system. This condition is intensified today· by the fact that
leadership or big man status no longer adheres to any position but is a
commodity on the open market for which many are competing. The big
men who have emerged are organized into two competing parties in the
absence of any single authority to which all will accede. Effective power
lies with wealthy Bhumihars who belong to families that had a recog-
nized status in the past. They engage in entrepreneurial activity by ac-
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cepting innovations to increase material wealth and by acting as media-
tors between villagers and outsiders.
Factional strife in Arunpur exemplifies a vertical cleavage that is sur-
prisingly stable in terms of its coalitions and followers. Each encounter
between the factions reveals a patterned sequence of phases approx-
imating Turner's developmental cycle (1957). Any dispute has the poten-
tiality of escalating to the political arena via factions if it concerns fac-
tion leaders and their family members initially or ifthey become involved
as third parties when it is to their advantage.
Factional politics in Arunpur means Bhumihar politics and, because
they command and control more resources than any other caste group,
this form of conflict occupies the major part of the village political
arena. The contest between different factional coalitions is evenly
matched and there is a great expenditure of resources in each conflict en-
counter. This situation contrasts markedly with the horizontal cleavage
that takes the form of class conflict between the subordinate (and land-
less) Chamars and their Bhumihar masters. The present class alignments
in Arunpur which oppose these Untouchables to the rest of the villagers
are based not only upon ideological opposition but also upon the fact
that the Chamars have hardly benefited from recent changes. The num-
erous Chamars are kept separate from the few and even poorer Musahars
and Dharkars by an isolation rooted in the ideology of hierarchy and
separate living quarters. This, combined with Bhumihar actions that
politically enforce such separation, prevents any feeling of unity among
all Untouchables in the village.
The way in which factions and classes organize the political arena was
seen more clearly by focusing upon the allocation of a single resource,
water from the government tubewell. This focus also served to isolate an-
other field of the arena which consisted, negatively, of conflict not
organized by factions or classes. A relatively stable distribution of power
exists in the village, though authority is diffuse, and the conflict over the
allocation of water follows a segmentary pattern. It would seem that the
same general pattern would be reflected in the distribution of other
things of value within the village-land, education, elective office, the
distribution of public services, the allocation of government develop-
ment resources or those which accrue to the village panchayat, and, to
some extent, the allocation of prestige.
This study has also shown that the boundaries of the political arena of
a single village are markedly fluid and can extend outward to become in-
volved in a wider network of relations. This was seen in a number of
ways. A big man from the neighboring village of Ramapur has been inti-
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mately involved in Arunpur politics; he is credited with having created its
factions and is considered the main leader of one coalition. Political
activity in the Intercollege also spills over to the village arena, and the re-
lationships which Arunpur big men have with others in the area are stra-
tegically formed so that factions in this village are connected with those
existing in other villages. Certain resources, such as water from the gov-
ernment tubewell, are intended for distribution among two or more vil-
lages. Other resources lie outside the village arena, and access to them ne-
cessitates interaction with external institutions, groups, and individuals.
That the boundaries of the village political arena are in flux, due to
changes in a wider arena, is reflected in the increasing demand for village
big men to act as entrepreneurial middlemen who can transform and ex-
ploit resources from one arena to another. This was highlighted by the
part that the big men took in the 1969 midterm poll to elect a new mem-
ber of the State Legislative Assembly from their district. Big men were
induced to support one or another candidate on the basis of preexisting
ties of friendship or kinship and the promise of political perquisites.
Villagers attempted, on the other hand, to bargain with their votes in ex-
change for declarations of future help. The discontinuities between the
village and regional areas reveal that there are competing ways of orga-
nizing political activity that lie outside the vertical patron-client bonds.
Rules of the political arena relating to who the decision makers are,
how decisions are made, and how conflict is resolved are are also in flux
in Arunpur due to changes in the wider arenas. The political activity of a
single village is intimately related to changes that have been occurring at
the local, state, and national levels. The greater part of the changes
which have taken place in Independent India have come about through
government initiatives and legislation. The abolition of zamindari and
subsequent land reform measures, in conjunction with the rise of new oc-
cupations, a monetized economy, and market relations, have created
new economic opportunities. Government resources are reaching areas
previously untouched by them. The vote, Local Self-Government institu-
tions, legal provisions for scheduled castes, and the legal protection
(ideally) available for all villagers have brought about an increased politi-
cal consciousness and awareness of the identity of interests. Economic
and political gains have been consolidated by the increasing importance
and accessibility of education.
Such changes have had three major effects in Arunpur which, in turn,
have altered the rules and organization of its political arena. These are:
the introduction of new resources, new alternatives for action, and the
breakup of the old authority system backed by the British Raj. It is
perhaps the last of these which has had the most crucial effect.
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FROM BRITISH RAJ TO ENTREPRENEURIAL BIG MAN
With the removal of the only real basis for a panvillage authority such as
the zamindar and the British-appointed headman-that is, backing by an
external power-the inherent diffuseness of rural authority was clearly
revealed. The principle of caste hierarchy, combined with that of domi-
nance, results in a situation of "fragmented" authority within the
village. There is no single head or uncontested leader within each caste of
a given status, but more or less rival leaders coexist (especially in the
dominant caste). Thus, each caste has its own men of power and influ-
ence within the village as a whole, and authority over a given caste is con-
centrated in the hands of castes which are superior to it either directly, by
the principle of hierarchy, or indirectly, because they are dominant (see
Dumont 1972:209, 228-229). This was true of British India as it is true of
India today.
The people of Arunpur, however, are commenting on the state of flux
existing in the current village political situation when they say that all
men think themselves equal today and no one man is obeyed by all. The
abolition of zamindari secured previously favored Bhumihars in their
control of the land, while the old positions of panvillage leadership sup-
ported by the British have been eliminated. In its place, the elected
pradhan has no special power to enforce his decisions. Second, the elec-
tive system of Local Self-Government (as well as the state and national
elections) has led to a weakening of the power of the dominant caste over
all others in the village within certain spheres of action. Finally, leader-
ship within the dominant caste of Bhumihars has become more open to
competition and control from entrepreneurial village big men and it is
they who have emerged as the new leaders and decision makers. The fact
that these men all belong to families that were influential in the past pro-
vides the link of continuity.
The interaction between the struggle for power and the authority struc-
ture reveals political process. Authority ensures the routinization of
political decisions and associates decision making with various roles (see
Cohen 1970:492-495). But each decision in Arunpur causes a crisis which
is mediated only by the competition for power. Most villagers seem to
regard the decisions of big men as backed solely by their personal power
and oppose such decisions to the more authoritative ones that the British-
appointed headman made (Le., he had the right to decide for others). It
is in this sense that I said that big men are self-appointed and do not
fulfill any role in the authority structure; it is only when they act in a pan-
chayat or in some official capacity that they can be said to have authori-
ty. Some big men are attempting to consolidate and legitimize their posi-
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tions and control over certain processes. Krishna Singh, pramukh of the
Community Development Block, pradhan of his village, and Secretary of
the Intercollege, is one who is most concerned with legitimizing the new-
found wealth and consequent power that has come to him.
Krishna and other big men have responded to the situation by becom-
ing entrepreneurs who may well succeed in bringing about a new authori-
ty structure. Changes in the functions of village leaders as traditional
patrons have transformed them into "brokers" with connections outside
the village. I The key to entrepreneurial activity is innovativeness, specifi-
cally in the ability to convert and exploit resources of one kind into an-
other where no such connection existed (e.g., turn money or kin ties into
votes). The entrepreneur also becomes an essential broker in situations of
culture contact or change by establishing linkages between spheres of ex-
change formerly kept separate (see Bailey on "bridge-actions" 1960:
248,252).
Entrepreneurs act out of self-interest and seek to maximize their profit
(material goods, power, prestige, and so on) in all transactional rela-
tions. The potential for profit exists when the disparity between the two
kinds of resources involved in a transaction, the different spheres of ex-
change, is greatest, and this state of affairs is maintained by the lack of
any such previous transactions or "bridge-actions." Another character-
istic of entrepreneurial activity is the willingness to be experimental and
speculative. This is accompanied by risk taking in an enterprise and by a
trust in one's own judgment of success rather than common opinion
(Barth 1963:7-9; 1966:17-20; 1967:64; Bailey 1960:256-257).
The entrepreneurial activity of big men takes several forms. They seek
the way by which they can best obtain, control, and allocate new
resources entering the political arena so as to gain the most profit, and
keenly compete for the position of pradhan because the patronage that
adheres to this office can be translated into personal loyalties. They also
establish network ties which link the village to the wider society and
transmit exchanges from one sphere to another. When a big man, for ex-
ample, campaigns for a particular candidate, he converts his own local
ties into votes for a man from whom he will, in turn, receive a subsequent
payoff. This payoff is later utilized in the village arena, and so the cycle
of transactions continues. A big man is therefore greatly concerned with
backing the winning candidate in state and national elections because the
latter is in a position to honor his debts. At the same time, this enables
the big man to improve his position in the village by maintaining access
to power outside it (Weiner 1965b:202).
An important function of the big man is to act as a middleman who
mediates extravillage relations, and the strength and importance of out-
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side contacts reflects his power and the extent to which he can obtain
brokerage transactions. The increasing importance of such transactions
over that of patronage further emphasizes the entrepreneurial aspect of
being "big" in village politics. Big men have become more crucial to
villagers as their dependence upon the outside (especially government)
for necessary services continues to expand.
As the opportunistic seeker of power and the promoter of his own in-
terests, the big man is also willing to act experimentally. It was the village
big men (some attribute it first to Jai Singh) who saw the economic ad-
vantage of employing Chamar labor to walk behind the bullocks when
the sugar cane is being crushed, cook the sugar cane juice, and then even
make the molasses formed into large cakes. Today they justify this be-
havior by saying that molasses cooked in this manner (Le., polluted by
the Chamars' touch) is sold in the market and not retained for home con-
sumption. Chandra Singh, however, accepted and ate the molasses of-
fered by a Chamar in another village when he was campaigning for a Jan
Sangh candidate in the midterm election. Arunpur big men have also
adopted innovations in agriculture, business pursuits, and material bet-
terment.
NEW ALTERNATIVES FOR ACTION
The removal of positions of authority within the village that had the
strong backing of an external power, and the need for leaders to respond
to a situation of change, has promoted the rise of big men as political en-
trepreneurs and influenced the nature of village politics. At the same
time, the creation of alternative structures has widened the arena of con-
flict. When an individual has an option regarding the choice of structures
he can employ in decision making, the power which any single alternative
exercised in the past is subsequently weakened. The presence of new and
alternative modes for action and conflict resolution, which are often
based on rules of behavior that are contradictory, will lead to structural
change in Arunpur society and the society at large (see Bailey 1960:7).
Choice can now be made, for example, among decision-making bodies
which settle disputes: among the traditional panchayats, the statutory
ones, or the courts. Each of these operates on a different basis, that is,
on caste or dominance, on personal or factionalloyalities, and on sup-
posed "impartiality." Political competition on the basis of "one man,
one vote" results in different types of cleavages from that of the old con-
sensus, which was based on a concentration of power in the hands of a
dominant caste. A Chamar can alternately view himself as an Untouch-
able or an equal citizen of free India; he may choose to renounce his
ascribed status by becoming a Christian or a Buddhist. Participation in _
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"caste-free" occupations and a monetized economy present alternatives
to jajmani relationships.
CoMPETITION FOR NEW RESOURCES
The third major way in which changes in the wider society have affected
the village political arena is through the introduction of new resources
for which no widely accepted rules exist regarding their allocation. The
range of contestants who can compete for a scarce resource has also in-
creased, and this has had a decided effect on the way in which politics are
organized in Arunpur. The case of the village panchayat elections may
make this clearer (see Case 15, earlier). Elective office represents a new
resource. As such, there is an absence of rules to determine who should
automatically fill these positions and who can compete for them. In con-
trast to this, for example, rules did (do) exist which specify who could
hold the office of village headman under the British and who can com-
pete for the division of family property. The lack of rules in determining
elected officers, however, means that the range of possible contestants
has also increased. To be elected to the panchayat, one must only fulfill a
minimum age and residence requirement. In this way, elections are like
the resources of government tubewell water, land on the open market,
and education.
The competition for power among leaders and factions is quite dif-
ferent from the competition for tangible resources, such as those men-
tioned earlier, or money. The latter can presumably be made more
available if its amount is increased, and the money that one has gained
does not necessarily affect the amount of value in the hands of others.
However, competition for intangible social resources, such as prestige,
success, recognition, and power, cannot be ameliorated by increasing the
resource pool. There can be only one winner if winning is to have a value.
Therefore, to become powerful one necessarily weakens others (Swingle
1970:ix; Riker 1962:190). In this manner the competition for power
resembles a zero-sum game.
The big men of Arunpur who enter the political arena may be seen as
engaging in a zero-sum game of conflict insofar as they are engaged in a
struggle for power to acquire distribution prerogatives over scarce
resources (see Southwold 1969:29; Swingle 1970:ix; Nicholas 1966:57;
Dahrendorf 1959:196). The villagers also perceive the situation as one in
which the total quantity of available power is limited in amount. A big
man's sphere becomes smaller by the presence of other competitors, and
any increase in the power of one of them results in a corresponding
change in the weight of at least one other.
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EFFECT OF A CHANGED POLmCAL ARENA ON FACTIONAL CONFLICT
The creation of new resources, the increase of choice among alternatives
for action, and the emergence of the big man as an entrepreneur have
changed the nature of the political arena in which the village politician
operates and the strategies which he employs. A major change in the
organization of the arena, which its inhabitants as welf as observers of
the rural scene note, has been the increase of factional conflict.
Factions are most certainly not recent phenomenaTiliiidian villages
and are related to the fragmentation of authority discussed earlier. The
.resulting diffusion of power" and.authority has been a stimulus Jor. the.
forma.tion of factions. both in the past and at present. Because no one
-man has (or had) complete power to obtain a decision, Ii~_ll'l.uSLconstant~__
Iy.ally.himselfwith others againsta common opponent. In Arunpur, the
present-day factions are essentially composed of coalitions of village big
men, that is, temporary, means-oriented alliances among individuals
who differ in goals (see Gamson 1961 :374; Boissevain 1971 :470-471).2
We IIHlY-hYPO-thesizeJhatJhe.more diffuse the power base in a village is,
~eaterwill ~!~es.copeforfactio~~based on.(;()a1itiQnS_9fj~~ci~r~_~
opposecUCislngle-leader factions.
- Although factional conflict is not peculiar to groups undergoing rapid
transformations and was present in traditional India as well (cf. Beals
1962:247-248; Siegel and Beals 1960b:399), this does not explain the in-
crease in frequency of this type of conflict. It is important to realize that
the big men who are faction leaders act as opportunistic entrepreneurs
engaged in political competition to gain power, if we are to understand
why they participate in conflict which to some appears to be solely
"disruptive" to public enterprise, unregulated, and interfering with the
achievement of group goals (e.g., Beals 1962; Beals and Siegel 1966;
Siegel and Beals 1960a; 1960b; Dhillon 1955; Singh 1961).
The increase of this type of conflict is intimately related to the three
changes just outlined that affect the village and is "likely to be the most
efficient way that is available to the competitors for taking part in
politics" (Nicholas 1966:58). More explicitly, factions organize the arena
when there is increasing competition for resources and an absence of any
other effective decision-making bodies or widely accepted rules to deter-
mine their allocation. It seems logical to assume that in times of change,
these conditions will be exaggerated and will provide factions with more
conflict occasions on which to operate. 3
Several writers have noted the adaptive functions performed by fac-
tions and advocate a more positive approach to them (e.g., Weiner
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1965a; 1965b; Firth 1957; Chance 1962; Gallin 1968; Boissevain 1964;
1968; Brass 1965; Bailey 1969; Miller 1965; Schwartz 1969; Nicholas
1965; 1966; 1%8a; 1968b). While Boissevain states that factions are the
basic units of conflict in any society and are not disruptive (1968:551;
1964:1286), Gould sees them as manifestations of a basic jati model
governing group formation (1969:292-294). Nor is factional conflict
necessarily detrimental to the implementation of group goals; consensus
politics may be another name for the effective suppression of dissent (see
Weiner 1965a; Gallin 1968; Schwartz 1969; Bailey 1965:19). The conclu-
sions of Schwartz and Nicholas come closest to my own.
Schwartz related factionalism in Guatemala to: (1) the absence of
other structures to organize and channel political activity, (2) the frag-
mentation of the power base, and (3) a weakening of traditional author-
ity before new forms of authority could be effectively instituted (1969).
Nicholas also found that
factions constitute a form of political organization that is particularly well
adapted to certain kinds of arenas. In an Indian peasant village, where
resources are fixed, or nearly so, the only gain one can make is at the ex-
pense of his opponent, and any loss by one's opponent is a relative gain in
resources. (1966:58)
In addition, he sees the changes taking place outside the village as bring-
ing about structural changes in the village system. These changes relate to
the scope of resources and the different sets of rules which govern their
use. In situations of uncertainty, pragmatic rules, ad hoc decisions made
by politicians, seem to come to the fore and political activity crosses the
boundaries of the community itself (Nicholas 1968b).
The actual relationship of rules,resources, and decision making to fac-
tionalism may be made clearer by referring again to the example of pan-
chayat elections. The competition for elective office in the village must
be organized in some way. There is neither a group of elders with
recognized panvillage power, nor are there politically active corporate
lineages or political parties that could settle the issue. In the absence of
any other decision-making body, factions serve to fill the vacuum by
canalizing and promoting specific interests, articulating demands, and
recruiting members. They organize political conflict despite the increase
of factionalism in the absence of traditional forms of conflict resolution.
Factions achieve goals for their members, and villagers have an aware-
ness of the progress that accompanies this form of competition. The
VLW reports that factionalism in no way inhibits agricultural advances
or innovation; rather, the antagonisms between the two sides act as a
spur to competition for material gain. Competition of this sort also ex-
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tends to acts of generosity and giving. We may assume that the same was
true in the past.
The relationship between factions, disruptiveness, and change is also
a critical one and appears to have confused some writers. Siegel and
Beals, for example, view factions as "divisive," "disruptive," "non-
adaptive," and "one of the more common maladaptive reactions to
stress" (Beals 1962:247; Siegel and Beals 1960a:107, 108, 115). They may
be drawn to the disruptive features of factionalism because of the fact
that an increase in this form of conflict is often associated with "rapidly
changed or changing societies and institutions" (Nicholas 1965:57). It is
important, however, to distinguish between the disorganization caused
by rapid change and the organization brought about by factionalism,
which often increases and intensifies during such periods.4 Factions
themselves are an old and universal political phenomenon appearing
even beneath bureaucratic infrastructures. Rather than being the cause
of division, they are a result of, and reflect, preexisting cleavages (Gould
1969:292; Cohn 1955:65-66; 1965:96-97). Factionalism has been and still
remains the most efficient way to organize political activity and effect
decisions despite the fact that the escalation of disputes may regrettably
often prove an obstacle to certain cooperative ventures in Arunpur.
DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS CONFLICT
Factional conflict cuts across classes.' Factions do not reflect the
cleavage between the dominant landed Bhumihars and their landless
laborers, nor do they represent the interests of those dominated (most
villagers) against the dominant (the Bhumihars). A focus on factionalism
alone emphasizes the stability of the village political situation and the
competition that has been traditional in Indian society. Because factions
are still preeminent, the importance of class conflict and its possibilities
for providing the basis of future political action, as well as the indica-
tions of contradiction and change that lie outside the village arena, have
often been minimized. The changes that are occurring in India and af-
fecting its multitude of villagers are, moreover, placing a strain on the
ability of caste rules to encompass the political activity emerging in re-
sponse to these transformations.
A major effect of recent change in India is that the distribution of sta-
tus, wealth, and power has become more dispersed throughout the popu-
lation. Economic opportunities, educational facilities, and the increase
of other resources have introduced a greater mobility among the middle
castes, while adult franchise gives an advantage to the more populous
ones. Hand in hand with this process has been another by which econom-
ic disparities have increased between certain caste groups. As greater
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disparities in wealth arise in the population, those groups which have
least succeeded in disassociating caste from wealth and power will mark
new lines of cleavage-horizontal in nature (cf. Dahrendorf 1959).
Earlier ethnographies have reported incidents of conflict between
castes acting as classes (listed in Nicholas 1968a:277). This has been cor-
roborated by a recent and growing body of literature which indicates or
predicts the increase of class conflict in rural India. Although many of
these studies specifically relate to the "Green Revolution," they have a
more general significance and are akin to the findings of others on village
society and politics (e.g., Byres 1972; Jannuzi 1974; Mamdani 1972; Par-
thasarathy 1971; Frankel 1971; Frankel and von Vorys 1972; Sivertson
1963; Pohekar 1970; Sharma 1973; Zagoria 1971; Breman 1974; Epstein
1973; Gough 1960; 1970; 1973; Juyal 1974; Wood 1973; Economic and
Political Weekly 1974) These writers all note that major changes in the
technology and economic organization of agriculture have had far-
reaching effects on other aspects of social life, especially the political.
This position may best be summarized by Frankel and von Vorys:
In the agro-economic setting of the Asian countryside, the introduction of
capital-intensive technologies simultaneously (1) increases economic dispar-
ities between the dominant landowning groups on the one hand and the ma-
jority of subsistence cultivators, sharecroppers and landless laborers on the
other; and (2) intensifies the predisposition of large landowners to adopt
profit-maximizing criteria in their relations with the landless. This combina-
tion of growing disparities and the increasing commercialization of agricul-
ture accelerates the erosion of traditional norms of agrarian relationships
based on the exchange of mutual, albeit non-symmetrical, benefits and ser-
vices that have historically provided a justification for inequalities between
the propertied upper and middle status groups and the landless low castes
and classes. The immediate political consequences are a decline in the moral
claim of landed elites to positions of authority and the breakdown of verti-
cal patterns of peasant mobilization. Over the long term, large numbers of
the landless become available for participation in new political commit-
ments and groups based on egalitarian values and class-struggle doctrines.
(1972:2)6
Although the overall decline of patron-client ties in jajmani relation-
ships was a gradual process in India (Wiser 1936; Kessinger 1974:6Off,
123ff), the landlord-laborer bond has been more drastically affected by
the increasing capitalization of agriculture, mechanization of farming,
and conversion to contractual labor which the Green Revolution and
agricultural advances of the 1950s and 1960s intensified. 7 The decline of
these traditional ties has affected caste groups differentially, and the
situation in Arunpur generally mirrors that of India as a whole. Mason
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has commented that Harijans (Untouchables), whom he includes in toto
in jajmani, have been adversely affected by societal change. He points
out that "the old structure was rigidly stratified-and therefpre abhor-
rent to the modern West-but it was a way of existence" (1967:18). De-
spite their serflike existence, which entailed a hereditary bond to the
landowner of the dominant class, their jajman or patron, Harijans were
at least assured of a minimum subsistence. "If the patron exploited, he
also protected" (Mason 1967:18). Mason goes on to say:
... The Chamars were unprepared for freedom. They were not trained in
its ways. As jajmani-hereditary patronage-gives way to a cash nexus, to
competition and contract, insecurity grows more rapidly than social esteem,
and real advance is for a very few.... Legal emancipation does not bring a
job. (1967:18; also see Beteille 1969b:143, 200; Epstein 1967; 1973:46)'
The Untouchables, with few alternative sources of livelihood, are ef-
fectively barred from new opportunities by other castes who came first
and are handicapped by their lack of education and capital and by social
discrimination. Some students of the Indian scene have concluded that
their problem is essentially an economic one, that of landlessness, pover-
ty, and unemployment (e.g., Beteille 1969b:142; Epstein 1973). The fre-
quently quoted study on poverty in India by Dandekar and Rath reveals
that the poor are getting poorer and that inequities in the distribution of
resources are widening (1971; also Etienne 1968:319; Byres 1972:109;
Frankel 1971:8, 198). Whether or not the prediction that agrarian ten-
sions will be exacerbated and that conflict will increasingly occur along
class lines is fulfilled (Frankel 1971:8; Beteille 1969b:136; Jannuzi 1974:
chap. 8; Gough 1960:59; cf. Mencher 1974b:317; Aggarwal 1973:131;
Jannuzi 1974:160-161), there can be little doubt that those sections oftQe
population left behind will not remain satisfied with their lot. The disen-
chantment of these poorer people with the lack of any significant struc-
tural changes that affect their lives is leading to a greater involvement in
politics (Beteille 1969b:110, 142; Sharma 1973:95).
The microcosm of Arunpur substantiates many of the points made
earlier which apply to various parts of the country. I have described the
rise of entrepreneurial big men whose maximization of profit through
capital investments in agriculture and related businesses increasingly con-
flicts with the traditional pattern of their ties with laborers and with their
clients in jajmani. To some extent, they have succeeded in transforming
the moral bond between patron and client into an instrumental tie be-
tween the big man and his followers that is utilized in the political arena.
But, except possibly for Jai Singh, they have become alienated from their
fellow villagers and are no longer interested in the well-being of the com-
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munity as a whole, rather seeking prestige outside the village. Their in-
volvement in entrepreneurial business activities, and their role as aspiring
capitalist farmers seeking maximum profits, leaves them little time to be
engaged in village affairs. People say that they have no real interest in
helping the lower castes and now even charge for their services as
brokers.
The Chamars accuse them (as well as their other Bhumihar and Brah-
man masters) of not providing a minimum subsistence, while on occasion
customary perquisites have been discontinued (see chapters 6 and 8). The
Bhumihars also manipulate and, in many ways, incite factionalism
among their mazdurs so that by being divided they will be easier to con-
trol. They are also willing to lend Chamars money for nonproductive
court cases that engage them in conflict and keep them in debt and,
hence, in continual bondage. Chamars have described a worsening of
their economic condition: before Independence they used to lease land,
but now they have none. Most men now subsist as casual day laborers
earning two rupees, and it is not unlikely that even the ploughman, who
is still paid in land and in kind. (that is, in grain), may soon be reduced to
a purely monetized form of contractual labor. With the disappearance of
the traditional economic bond between patron and client, it can be ex-
pected that the ritual aspect will become dissipated (Epstein 1973:47).
Already some Chamar women spoke about discontinuing their services
at childbirth, which are considered polluting but not profitable.
As the Chamars of Arunpur have not achieved the dispersion of ine-
qualities in wealth, status, and power that has characterized other castes,
they are in the process of forming themselves into a class. It seems that
the more conscious they become of their own situation and what is hap-
pening to their caste brothers elsewhere, the stronger they will emerge as
a class. This, in turn, is bound to affect the vertical cleavage among the
dominant Bhumihars when the two factions find that they must increas-
ingly fuse to oppose their subordinates as the Chamars press forward
their own interests. The Chamars have also found scope for their
political aspirations within the wider political arena of the region. While
theirIndependent candidate could not possibly win because of a narrow
caste appeal, there is no reason to doubt that a Chamar (or other Un-
touchable) leader of greater repute could command a wider base of sup-
port among the dispossessed.
CASTE AND CLAss IN INDIAN POUTICS
I have described the ill feelings between Bhumihars and Chamars,
especially among the younger generation of Untouchables (see also
Beteille 1969b:l11, 135-136). The latter feel that they are exploited,
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while their maliks believe that the workers have become impertinent and
lazy. During the year I was in Arunpur, for reasons already noted (see
chapters 1 and 8), these tensions and hostilities led to several incidents of
open conflict. On each occasion, without fail, the two factions united
against the Chamar threat.9 Until the time I left, however, there was no
clear indication of the cumulative effect upon factions of this type of
conflict within the village, although it may become increasingly impor-
tant in regional and national politics.
Several writers foresee the demise of clientelist politics under the
pressures which are affecting traditional vertical bonds. Frankel has been
the most explicit. She writes that
the multicaste political faction led by traditional landowning patrons and
constructed with support from families of low-status client groups, especial-
ly tenants and farm workers, will become more and more difficult to sustain
as a viable political unit at the local level. The question is not whether the
old pattern of clientelist politics can be put back together again, but how to
fill the political vacuum in the rural areas as a result of its collapse.
(1971:208; also Frankel and von Vorys 1972:9, 38; Sharma 1973:80).'0
Prophecies aside, there is also no clear indication of the transforma-
tion of a caste into a class society. Both factionalism (and clientelist
politics) and intercaste conflict in the form of classes seem certain to
coexist in rural India into the foreseeable future, as each succeeds in ar-
ticulating the demands and interests of various elements of society (see
Singer on "adaptive strategies" 1972:285; 357ff; also Alavi 1973:59;
Nicholas 1968b:275; Mayer 1967a:124).11 Furthermore, contrary to some
interpretations, it is not the caste s;r.stem per ~_~~a.!.inhibit.~clJhe
~owt~of class reeIing bllt. the.presence oUactionalisII1.~~~~donvertical _
patron-clieiit . bonds as the characteristic mode of politics' (Alavi
-1965:273'::'274; 1973:46; Powell 1970:420; Mencher 1974a.;seeil1so note 9
to this chapter). Nor does factionalism necessarily exclude class solidari-
ty or class conflict (Alavi 1973:46ff; see also note 5 to this chapter). The
importance of these two forces on the political scene in India must be
viewed at their point of contact within the wider regional arena. The ex-
tent to which political parties consciously foster and manipulate class in-
terests, as well as taking a lead in defining them, will also determine the
direction of political activity. The "traditional idiom" of politics, ex-
pressed through caste and factionalism at the village level, has been con-
sidered a major force in determining such a direction in the past. Today
we may witness, in turn, that th[Yillage arena will become more and
more a reflection of those conflicts and interests expressed in the wider
political arena. J
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NOTES
CONCLUSIONS
1. Mayer has noticed a similar transformation in the leadership of four overseas
Indian communities. Conditions that previously favored the emergence of
patrons-since leaders were appointed-have changed and become more
favorable to the rise of brokers (1967b).
2. My approach is different from that of those writers who have been mistaken
about the nature of factions as I understand them, either confining them to kin
groups or confusing them with classes (e.g., Singh 1961; Lewis 1958; Shepperd-
son 1969).
3. Boissevain's work, which came to my notice after the final draft was prepared,
contains a similar conclusion in a succinctly written page (1974: 199).
4. Indeed, Miller is led to conclude that the highly disruptive form of "pervasive"
factionalism which Beals describes for Namhalli (1952-1953) illustrates an un-
common form of conflict, "significantly different from types of behavior and
social organization normally treated as factionalism in Indian villages" (1965:23,
24). He, like Nicholas, also criticizes the assumption that the village constitutes a
corporate entity as a group with defined common aims. It is misleading "to
idealize the autonomy and integrity of Indian villages" (Nicholas 1968b:295;
also Miller 1965:18).
5. There is a need to reexamine the relationship between factionalism, regarded as
relating to conflicts of personal interests, and ideological issues. Brass raises the
question of whether it is not that the "personalization of conflict is merely a
stylistic cultural form that covers more deep-seated ideological, social or institu-
tional conflicts" (n.d.:2). A closer analysis of data regarding the diversity of fac-
tional recruitment for a panchayat election in a West Bengal village (from
Nicholas 1965) leads Alavi to conclude: "The principle of diversity of factional
recruitment, looked at from the point of view of the faction leader, may well
justify indifference about who votes for him, so long as he gets support. But,
looked at from the point of view of the followers, the basis of support is by no
means a matter of indifference" (1973:49). The data show that whereas the Con-
gress candidate drew most support from vertical ties, the Communist one relied
mostly on the factor of kinship and, secondarily, caste. "There is, therefore,"
Alavi believes, "a strong suggestion of an underlying structural pattern"
(1973:49).
6. A closely related model for the growth of peasant unrest and rebellion linked to
the erosion of patron-client bonds has been developed for Southeast Asia
(Kerkvliet 1972; Scott 1972; Scott and Kerkvliet 1973).
7. The debate concerning the extent, success, and effects of the Green Revolution is
far from settled. The situation of Indian agriculture has also been drastically af-
fected by recent international economic and political events.
8. Cohn had written much earlier that the "movements for social and economic
uplift of the low castes have destroyed the moral base of the relationships of
super-ordination-subordination among the Thakurs and their low caste
dependents" (1959:89). He seemingly invites contradiction when he then states,
"Indian peasant society is still largely dominated by values surrounding the con-
cept of 'status' [as opposed to contractual relations]" (1959:91).
9. This fact casts strong doubt on the validity of Dube's position that factionalism
within a dominant caste inhibits its power and will threaten its position of
dominance (1968). The situation in Arunpur reveals, as it must elsewhere, that
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what is crucial is not that such castes are divided as that they are secure enough in
their dominance to tolerate division because of the lack of any serious threat to
their power. Dube appears to be speaking more of a class than dominance when
he refers to a strong feeling of group unity, leadership, and sense of direction
combined with an internal parity of wealth and a use of economic power to fur-
ther the interests of the caste. It is only at the crucial test of a conflict of interests
between the dominant caste and a group opposed to them that the weakness of
factionalism in threatening their true dominance can be ascertained. The Bhumi-
hars have closed their ranks when faced with such a threat. Chamars perceive
that their masters succeed in dividing others by flattery and fear because they
themselves are united against others. Cohn also confuses the situation when he
writes that a threat to their position of dominance from the lower caste (or
castes) can prevent the factionalization of the dominant caste (1965:94). How-
ever, he goes on to recognize that these are situational responses that may reflect
a developmental cycle of conflict (1965:97).
10. Unlike Siegel and Beals who find it highly probable that pervasive factionalism
will lead to a "developing anomie which would result from a loss of interest in
the traditional integration of values" (1960b:413), Frankel and von Vorys see the
decline of clientelist politics as a step in that direction (1972:38).
11. Philippine society contains a definite two-class horizontal cleavage that is
crosscut by a network of patron-client relationships tying the poor to the rich.
The line of cleavage between the rich and the poor is thus turned into a bridge
uniting them (Lande 1965:6-10).

Glossary of Commonly Used Terms
agua
amin panchayat
baraadmi
bareadmi
bare admi panchayat
bigha
biradari
biradari panchayat
bisa
bise
brahman
dipak
gauna
jajman
jajmani
jati
khandan
leader or foremost among equals
the British local council
big man
big men
council of big men
0.67 of an acre; approximately one-fourth
hectare
subcaste
subcaste council
one twentieth of a bigha
plural of bisa
priest and intellectual; one of the four vamas
oil lamp, symbol of Jan Sangh party
second marriage ceremony
patron
ritualized economic interaction of the caste
system
caste
male descendants of a common-named ancestor,
their wives, and unmarried daughters; might be
equated with a lineage
kshatriya
ma/ik
maund
mazburi
mazdur
mazduri
mukhiya
neta
nyaya panchayat
panchayat
panchayati raj
purdah
parti
partibandi
patti
pattidar
paua
pradhan
praja
pura
rais
rupee
ser
shudra
thokdar
vaishya
vama
zamindar
zamindari
GLOSSARY
ruler and warrior; one of the four vamas
master
forty sers or eighty pounds
condition of helplessness
laborer
wages
headman, appointed by the British
political party leader
justice council in the Local Self-Government
system
council
Local Self-Government program
seclusion of women
party or faction
factionalism
place where pattidars live
kinsmen who have rights to property that is
divided; might be equated with a minimal lineage
one quarter ser or one half pound
elected head of the village
client or dependent
main village settlement or associated hamlets
aristocrat
thirteen cents
two pounds
servant; one of the four vamas
official in charge of water distribution from the
government tubewell
artisan, merchant, or farmer; one of the four
vamas
class division of ancient India
landlord
landlordship
AJ
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